THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG

JURIES SUB-COMMITTEE

CONSULTATION PAPER

CRITERIA FOR SERVICE AS JURORS

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JANUARY 2008
This Consultation Paper has been prepared by the Juries Sub-committee of the Law Reform Commission. It does not represent the final views of either the Sub-committee or the Law Reform Commission, and is circulated for comment and discussion only.

The Sub-committee would be grateful for comments on this Consultation Paper by 30 April 2008. All correspondence should be addressed to:

The Secretary  
The Juries Sub-committee  
The Law Reform Commission  
20th Floor, Harcourt House  
39 Gloucester Road  
Wanchai  
Hong Kong  

Telephone: (852) 2528 0472  
Fax: (852) 2865 2902  
E-mail: hklrc@hkreform.gov.hk

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It is the Commission's usual practice to acknowledge by name in the final report anyone who responds to a consultation paper. If you do not wish such an acknowledgment, please say so in your response.
# Criteria for Service as Jurors

## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of the sub-committee</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Existing law and practice in Hong Kong</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins of the jury system</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The history of the jury system in Hong Kong</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The jury system today</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the jury</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provisional list of jurors</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifications and disabilities</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of and empanelling the jury</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenge and discharge of jurors</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority verdicts</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidentiality of jurors' discussions in jury room</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. The law in other jurisdictions</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New South Wales</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juries Act 1974</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juries Act 1976</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juries Act 1981</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifications for jury service</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions from jury service</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Common law position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good character</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language competence and educational standard</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deafness</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blindness</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligibility and excusals</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. Issues for consideration and reforms in other jurisdictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Trial by one's peers&quot; and the representativeness of the jury</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The representativeness of the jury in Hong Kong</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age requirements</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower age limit</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper age limit</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residency requirements</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good character</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal records</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undischarged bankrupts</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education requirements</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. Proposals for reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifications for jury service</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A person who has reached 21 years of age, but not 65 years of age&quot;</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A person who … is a resident of Hong Kong&quot;</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The person is of good character&quot;</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The person has a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proceedings&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The person is of sound mind and not afflicted by blindness, deafness</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or other disability preventing the person from serving as a juror&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Notice of Jury Service</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions from jury service under section 5 of the Jury</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Summary of recommendations</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 1</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of persons exempted from jury service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 2</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notice for jury service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 3</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Summons to Juror</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex 4</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of Summons to Juror (Coroner's Court)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

Introduction

1. The existing legislative rules and administrative practices that apply to the appointment of jurors require that, among other things, a juror must be a resident of Hong Kong, between 21 and 65 years of age, not afflicted by blindness, deafness or other disability preventing him from serving as a juror, be of good character, and have "a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the proceedings." The legislation is silent as to how that linguistic competence is to be measured, but the administrative practice has been to exclude from the jury pool those with an educational attainment below Form 7, or its equivalent. The legislation is equally mute as to what constitutes "good character" or "residence" for jury purposes.

2. The question of whether the existing criteria for jury service are appropriate was raised by members of the Legislative Council in April 1997, and has been subsequently raised by both the Law Society and the Hong Kong Bar Association. The question also arises as to whether the criteria should be set out with greater clarity and precision.

Terms of reference

3. In June 2003, the Chief Justice and the Secretary for Justice asked the Law Reform Commission to review this subject. The Commission’s terms of reference are:

"To review the present criteria for service as jurors in relation to:

(a) education requirement;
(b) age requirement;
(c) residency requirement;
(d) good character; and
(e) exemption on disability grounds

set out in section 4(1) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3), and to review the exemptions from jury service set out in section 5 of that Ordinance, and to recommend such changes in the law and

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1 Section 4(1)(c) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3)
practice as may be considered appropriate."

Membership of the sub-committee

4. In October 2003, a sub-committee with the following members was appointed to review the subject:

- **Hon Mr Justice Woo**  
  (Chairman)  
  Vice President  
  Court of Appeal of the High Court

- **Hon Mr Justice Stock**  
  Justice of Appeal  
  Court of Appeal of the High Court

- **Hon Mr Justice Pang**  
  Judge  
  Court of First Instance of the High Court

- **Hon Mr Justice Tong**  
  Judge  
  Court of First Instance of the High Court

- **Mr Lawrence Lok, SC**  
  Senior Counsel

- **Mr Jonathan Midgley**  
  Partner  
  Haldanes, Solicitors

- **Mr Arthur Luk, SC**  
  Senior Counsel  
  Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions

- **Ms Alice Chung**  
  Assistant Director of Legal Aid

- **Mr Jason Yeung**  
  Company Secretary  
  Bank of China Hong Kong Limited

- **Mr Andrew Tse**  
  Former Principal of the John F Kennedy Centre

5. Ms Judy Cheung, Senior Government Counsel in the Law Reform Commission Secretariat, is the secretary to the sub-committee. The Sub-committee considered the reference over the course of nine meetings between 24 October 2003 and 9 February 2007. The recommendations in this paper are the result of those discussions. They represent our preliminary views, presented for consideration by the community. We welcome any views, comments and suggestions on the issues in this paper, which will assist the sub-committee to reach its final conclusions in due course.
Chapter 1
Existing law and practice in Hong Kong

Introduction

1.1 In this chapter, we look at the origins of the jury system and some of its key features. We also examine the existing statutory provisions under the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) governing the qualifications for jury service.

Origins of the jury system

1.2 The jury has been described as "a peculiarly English institution", unknown in civil law jurisdictions. Its form today gives little hint of its origins:

"It began as something quite different and the nature of its origin is shown by its name. A juror was a man who was compelled by the King to take an oath. It was the Normans who brought over this device whereby the spiritual forces could be made to perform a temporal service and the immense efficacy which they possessed in medieval times used for the King's own ends. The oath then was so strong a guarantor of veracity that, provided that the men who were compelled so to answer were the men who must know the truth about a matter, there could be no better way of getting at the facts. ... It was King Henry II who was directly responsible for turning the jury into an instrument for doing justice and Pope Innocent III who was directly responsible for its development as a peculiarly English institution. ... A jury which gave the King information for administrative purposes could also be used to give him information which would enable him to decide a dispute. ... Henry ordained that in a dispute about the title to land a litigant might obtain a royal writ to have a jury summoned to decide the matter. The character of the jurors was not thereby altered. They were drawn from the neighbourhood who were taken to have knowledge of all the relevant facts (anyone who was ignorant was rejected) and were bound to answer upon their oath and according to their knowledge which of the two disputants was entitled to the land. When a party got twelve oaths in his favour, he won. This is the origin of the trial jury, though there was as yet no sort of trial in the modern sense. ... It began by the parties putting their case, but not really distinguishing between pleadings, evidence and argument. It ended with the jury as it is today – a body whose strict duty it is to 'hearken to the evidence' and return a verdict accordingly, excluding from their minds all that they have not
heard in open court. ... Jurors are still drawn from the neighbourhood, but only because it would be inconvenient for them to be brought from afar. ... In theory the jury is still an instrument used by the judge to help him to arrive at a right decision .... No doubt the easiest way of explaining the modern relationship between judge and jury is to start from the hypothesis that the law is for one and the facts for the other. ... Judges give their reasons, either so as to satisfy the parties or because they themselves want to justify their judgments. Even arbitrators detail their findings of fact. The jury just says yes or no. ..."
simply requiring the juror to be a 'good and sufficient person' (No. 4 of 1851, s. 2). This was over one hundred years before the property qualification was abandoned in England. The next and last major extension to the jury franchise in Hong Kong occurred in 1947 when women became eligible for service (Ordinance No. 37 of 1947).

The 1845 ordinance created exemptions for government employees, lawyers, doctors, clergymen, service personnel and employees of the East India Company. … Over the years, the list of exemptions has expanded considerably …. However, one extremely significant addition to the list of those exempted from jury service is worthy of further discussion. The 1851 Ordinance disqualified 'any person ignorant of the English language' …

1.6 The evolutionary development of the jury system from one requiring jurors to satisfy certain financial qualifications (holding property or belonging to a certain income group) before they could serve, to one without any property and income qualifications suggests that the jury system in Hong Kong, in line with most common law jurisdictions, reflects the principle of a right to a "trial by a jury of one's peers" to safeguard the liberty of the subject. Jurisdictions which adopt this concept of a right to "a trial by one's peers" include Canada, England (manifested in the Magna Carta 1297, chapter 29) and Victoria (by section 391 of Crimes Act 1958). This right is further entrenched in Canada under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which forms part of the Canadian Constitution, though it is a right which can be expressly waived by the accused.

1.7 Section 2 of the 1851 Ordinance provided no guidance as to who might be considered a "good and sufficient person" for jury purposes. That uncertainty of statutory meaning continues to the present day, when the current Jury Ordinance's reference to "good character" is undefined. We will examine this provision and other qualifications now required of a juror later in this consultation paper.

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6 "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
7 "If any person arraigned on any indictment or presentment pleads thereto "not Guilty", he shall without further form be deemed to have put himself upon the country for trial; and subject to section 391A the jury for his trial shall in the usual manner be impanelled accordingly."
The jury system today

*Use of the jury*

1.8 The jury is most commonly used in criminal trials. All criminal trials in the Court of First Instance must be held with a jury. Jury trial is not available for offences designated as summary offences which are usually minor offences. Summary offences are tried summarily before a Magistrate whose sentencing jurisdiction in respect of a single offence is limited to two years’ imprisonment. More serious offences are indictable offences which are only triable on indictment. An offence is triable only upon indictment if the Ordinance that creates the offence declares it to be treason, or the words "upon indictment" or "on indictment" appear in the statutory provision. Trials on indictment are held either before a judge of the Court of First Instance and a jury or before the District Court where the judge sits alone. The limit of the District Court's sentencing jurisdiction is seven years’ imprisonment whereas the Court of First Instance’s jurisdiction is unrestricted, entitling it to pass the maximum of sentences allowed by law. Thus, the most serious offences are tried in the Court of First Instance, and not in an inferior court. These offences that must be tried in the Court of First Instance are listed in Part III of the Second Schedule to the Magistrates Ordinance:

(i) Any offence which is punishable with death.

(ii) Any offence which is punishable with imprisonment for life, except an offence against section 37C (offence by crew, etc, of ship carrying unauthorized entrants) or 37D (arranging passage to Hong Kong of unauthorized entrants) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), an offence against section 53 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property) or 123 (intercourse with girl under 13) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200), an offence against Part VIII of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) such as destroying or damaging data held in another person's computer or computer storage medium, an offence against section 4 (trafficking in dangerous drug of a high quantity) or 6 (manufacture of dangerous drug) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance (Cap 134), an offence against section 10 (robbery) or 12 (aggravated burglary) of the Theft Ordinance (Cap 210), section 17 (shooting or attempting to shoot, or wounding or striking with intent to do grievous bodily harm), 28 (causing bodily injury by gunpowder, etc.) or 29 (causing gunpowder to explode, etc, or throwing corrosive fluid, with intent to do grievous bodily harm) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap 212) or section 16 (possession of arms or ammunition with intent to endanger life), 17 (resisting arrest with or committing offence while in possession of arms or ammunition or imitation firearm) or 18 (carrying arms or ammunition or

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8 Section 41(2), Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221).
9 Section 14A, Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221)
10 Section 82(2)(a), District Court Ordinance (Cap 336).
imitation firearm with criminal intent) of the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap 238).

(iii) Any offence against section 21 (trading, etc, with pirates) or 22 (being found on board piratical vessel and unable to prove non-complicity) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200).

(iv) Misprision of treason.

(v) Blasphemy and offences against religion.

(vi) Composing, printing or publishing blasphemous, seditious or defamatory libels.

(vii) Genocide and any conspiracy or incitement to commit genocide.

1.9 The usual characteristics of an offence triable with a jury are that it is an offence of the most serious kind which is prescribed by statute to be heard in the Court of First Instance, or that the likely sentence upon conviction exceeds seven years' imprisonment, or that it is in the public interest that the case should be tried before a judge and a jury.

1.10 The jury is also available in limited circumstances in a civil trial. Where a claim arises in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or sedition, the action must be tried with a jury, "unless the Court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury." 11

1.11 The Coroners Ordinance (Cap 504) also provides for a death inquest to be held with a jury in specified circumstances. 12 Where a person dies whilst in official custody, a coroner must hold an inquest with a jury. 13 Where a person dies suddenly; by accident or violence; or under suspicious circumstances; or the dead body of a person is found in or brought into Hong Kong, a coroner has a discretion to hold an inquest with a jury. 14 While a jury in trials in the Court of First Instance usually consists of 7 jurors, the size of the jury in a coroner's inquest is 5. 15

The provisional list of jurors

1.12 The Commissioner of Registration, appointed under section 2 of the Registration of Persons Ordinance (Cap 177) is empowered by section 7 of the Jury Ordinance to compile a provisional list of jurors.

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11 Section 33A, the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4).
12 Part IV, Coroners Ordinance (Cap 504).
13 Section 15, Coroners Ordinance (Cap 504).
14 Section 14, Coroners Ordinance (Cap 504).
15 Section 23, Coroners Ordinance (Cap 504).
1.13 Section 7(1) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) requires the Commissioner of Registration to serve a notice in the form prescribed by the Ordinance on any person who appears to the Commissioner to be qualified to serve as a juror under section 4 (which sets out the criteria for service as a juror), and is not exempt from service as a juror under section 5. Section 5 of the Jury Ordinance specifies the persons in particular employment or professions to be exempted from jury service. These exemptions may in certain cases extend to their spouses. Those exempted include the following persons:

- Members of the Executive Council or Legislative Council;
- Justices of the Peace;
- Public officers, including judges, Government legal officers, officers in the law enforcement agencies, officers in the Correctional Services Department, etc;
- Consuls, vice-consuls, etc
- Barristers and solicitors in actual practice and their clerks;
- Registered doctors and dentists;
- Daily newspaper editors, chemists, and members of the clergy;
- Full-time students; and
- Members of the crew of ships or aircraft.

The full list of exemptions can be found at Annex 1 to this paper.

1.14 The reasoning behind the exclusion of these groups from jury service is explained by John Sprack in Emmins on Criminal Procedure:

"Judges, barristers, solicitors, etc, might exert too great an influence over their lay colleagues on a jury, police officers could be suspected of bias towards the prosecution, and conversely, probation officers could favour the defence. The exclusion of the clergy is a little surprising, and may spring from a feeling that a clergyman, by reason of his vocation, would not wish to sit in judgment on others." 16

1.15 A notice (Form 2 in the schedule to the Jury Ordinance)17 to notify a person that he is qualified to serve as a juror and is not exempt from service is issued in the name of the Registrar of the High Court.18 A person who has been served with a notice who wishes to claim exemption from

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16 (Oxford University Press, 2002), 261.
17 Section 7, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
18 A copy of Form 2 is at Annex 2 of this paper.
service should within 14 days notify the Registrar in writing of the grounds upon which he claims exemption from service.

1.16 When members of the public apply for identity cards, either for registration or for replacement, the Commissioner of Registration takes the opportunity to identify potential jurors. The registration officer will consider whether the applicant meets the qualification requirements set out in section 4 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) for inclusion in the provisional list of jurors, if he is not already on the list. In broad terms, persons between the age of 21 and 65 who have attained an educational level of at least Form 7 (or its equivalent) will be treated as qualified, as long as they are not exempted persons under section 5 of the Jury Ordinance. Any potential juror will be presumed by the Commissioner to be of sound mind, unless there is evidence to the contrary. In practice, it is the Registrar of the High Court who maintains the provisional list of jurors, using information provided by the Commissioner of Registration.

1.17 The Commissioner of Registration also annually requests the eight local universities (University of Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist University, Lingnan University and the Open University of Hong Kong) to provide a list of their graduates. The Commissioner then seeks up-to-date personal details from those graduates to enable him to consider whether they should be included in the provisional list of jurors. The Commissioner will also inform the graduates that they are no longer exempt from service as jurors as they have ceased to be full-time students.

1.18 Any updated information on those already included on the list (such as change of address, or death of persons identified as qualified), together with information on newly identified potential jurors, is forwarded to the Registrar of the High Court on a weekly basis. The Registrar of the High Court will also forward to the Commissioner on a monthly basis the names of those who should be deleted from the provisional list (for instance, persons who have reached 65 years of age and are therefore no longer qualified, those suffering from disabilities, etc).

Qualifications and disabilities

1.19 The criteria for service as a juror are set out in section 4 of the Jury Ordinance. A person is liable to serve as a juror if he:

- has reached 21 years of age, but not 65 years of age;
- is a resident of Hong Kong;
- is of sound mind and not afflicted by blindness, deafness or other disability preventing him from serving as a juror;

Section 5 specifies persons in particular employment or professions, in certain cases extending to their spouses.
is of good character; and

has a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the proceedings.

1.20 The requisite length of residence or stay in Hong Kong is not specified. In practice, the Commissioner of Registration or his deputy (or an assistant commissioner of registration) will place the name of any person who satisfies the other criteria (and who is not exempted under section 5 of the Ordinance) on the provisional list of jurors as long as that person is at that time resident in Hong Kong. Foreign domestic helpers, so far as they meet the requirements stipulated in section 4, are also included in the list compiled by the Commissioner. Tourists, visitors, and illegal immigrants are excluded by the Commissioner in the application of this section.

1.21 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, any person who is eligible for inclusion in the list as a potential juror will be presumed by the Commissioner to be of sound mind, unless there is evidence to the contrary. If it comes to the notice of a registration officer of the Immigration Department that the person is blind or deaf, the person will not be included in the list of jurors.

1.22 It should be noted that the "good character" requirement in section 4 is not defined in the Ordinance and no mechanism is provided for determining whether a juror is of "good character" or not. In practice, no steps are taken by the Commissioner to assess a person's character before including him in the provisional list of jurors.

1.23 In relation to the language requirement for service as a juror, any person who has obtained a grade of pass in "an English language examination" or a Chinese language examination or part of such examination as may be so specified would be identified by the Commissioner as a potential juror. Section 4A(1)(b) also empowers the Registrar of the High Court or the Commissioner of Registration to require any person to supply them with such information as the Registrar or the Commissioner consider necessary to enable them to determine whether any person has a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the relevant proceedings.

1.24 The Court of First Instance or a coroner may, on its own motion or on the application of the Registrar or of any interested party, discharge any person summoned to serve as a juror who is unable to satisfy the court or the coroner that the person's knowledge of the language in which the proceedings

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20 Section 4(A)(4)(a) defines "an English language examination" to mean "an examination of English language or an examination conducted in the English language".

21 Section 4(A)(4)(b) defines "a Chinese language examination" to mean "an examination of Chinese language or an examination conducted in the Chinese language".

22 Section 4(A)(1)(a), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
are to be conducted is sufficient to enable the person to understand the proceedings.\textsuperscript{23}

1.25 The court also has power to exempt a juror on application and for cause under section 28 of the Jury Ordinance. Under section 28, the Registrar may excuse a person who has been summoned from attending on a jury if that person shows in writing to the satisfaction of the Registrar that there is a good reason why he should be excused from so attending. In such circumstances, the Registrar must produce to the court the person's application to be excused from attendance.

**Formation of and empanelling the jury**

1.26 The Registrar of the High Court maintains a provisional list of jurors, consisting of all those persons qualified in Hong Kong. This, as previously explained, is based on information forwarded by the Commissioner of Registration. This list is updated by the Registrar of the High Court in alternate years,\textsuperscript{24} and is made available for inspection.\textsuperscript{25} Any person who wishes to have his name deleted from the list upon being served notice (Form 2) of his inclusion in the list, or to have his name added, may make written application for cause between 1 and 14 October of the year of publication of the list.\textsuperscript{26}

1.27 Whenever it is necessary to summon a jury, the Registrar of the High Court will select from the list of jurors, by ballot or by any other method of random selection, the number of persons which a judge has directed should form a panel.\textsuperscript{27} The Registrar then issues a summons to each person so chosen, requiring him to appear on the day specified in the summons.\textsuperscript{28} If for any reason a juror who has been selected cannot be served the summons, the Registrar will select a replacement juror to complete the panel.\textsuperscript{29} The Registrar may pass over persons whom he believes to be exempt, disqualified, or dead.\textsuperscript{30}

1.28 The panel must attend and serve for such period as directed by the judge. No juror will be excused from attendance and service unless and until discharged by the judge in respect of any case in which he has been called to serve as a juror.\textsuperscript{31}

1.29 The Registrar of the High Court will arrange for numbers corresponding to the names of all the jurors summoned to form a panel to be printed on separate cards of equal size and put in a box. The clerk of the

\textsuperscript{23} Section 4(2), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{24} Section 7(3), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{25} Section 10, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{26} Section 9(2), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{27} Section 13(1), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{28} A copy of the summons to a juror to attend trial at the Court of First Instance is at Annex 3, and a copy of the summons to a juror to attend a coroner's inquiry is at Annex 4.
\textsuperscript{29} Section 13(1), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{30} Section 16, Jury Ordinance (Cap3).
\textsuperscript{31} Section 13(1), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
court, in open court, then draws cards from the box until a jury is formed.\textsuperscript{32} The Registrar will not issue jury summonses to those persons who have undertaken jury service, or have been called for service, at any time within the preceding two years.\textsuperscript{33}

1.30 The Registrar of the High Court provides the trial judge with the names and occupations of the persons summoned, whereas the prosecution and defence are only provided with a list of names of the persons summoned.

1.31 Each juror selected will step into the jury box and take the juror's oath (or affirmation) individually. The prosecution (or plaintiff) or defence may only object to a juror before he takes the oath or affirmation. Other than section 29 (which provides that an accused person on trial may challenge up to five jurors without cause and any number for cause), the Jury Ordinance contains no provisions relating to challenges and many principles and procedures derive from common law. After the jury have been sworn, they remain in court until the evidence has been presented, the judge has summed up the evidence and has left the case with the jury. If, however, the court adjourns during the hearing of the case (either during the sitting or at the end of a day's sitting), the judge may either allow the jury to disperse, or may direct that they be removed in charge of an officer of the court "to some convenient place, there to take refreshment and rest", until the court reassembles.\textsuperscript{34}

1.32 The usual practice is to summon more jurors for service than are likely to be required. If, however, a full jury cannot be made up from those on the jury panel, the court may summon, without written notice, any "fit and proper persons" among the bystanders or others (called —alesmen") who "can be speedily procured" to make up the full number of the jury.\textsuperscript{35}

1.33 The jury consists of seven members in all civil and criminal trials and all inquiries into the idiocy, lunacy, or unsoundness of mind of any person, except where the court orders that the jury will consist of nine persons.\textsuperscript{36} In the case of a coroner's inquest, five jurors are selected by the coroner by ballot from the panel. The coroner may require a fit and proper person or bystander to serve as a juror, provided that that person is not exempted from jury service under section 5 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Challenge and discharge of jurors}

1.34 The court or a coroner may discharge any person summoned to serve as a juror if the court or the coroner is not satisfied that the person's knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted is sufficient to enable him to understand the proceedings. This discharge may be made on the court's or coroner's own motion, or on the application of the

\textsuperscript{32} Section 21, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{33} Section 17, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{34} Section 22, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{35} Section 30, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{36} Section 3, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
\textsuperscript{37} Section 23, Coroners Ordinance (Cap 504).
Registrar or of any interested party.  

1.35 In the process of selecting jury members from the panel, each accused (or counsel representing him) can challenge up to five jurors without giving a reason, or any number of jurors where a reason is given. The prosecution is entitled to "stand-by" prospective jurors, that is, to postpone consideration of the cause of challenge until the panel of jurors in waiting is exhausted. If a person summoned as a juror is not qualified or liable to serve as a juror, or is exempt from service, that would be good cause for challenge, and he must be discharged if challenged on that basis. However, if no such challenge is made, the person’s appointment to the jury cannot be a ground for subsequently challenging any verdict given by the jury.

1.36 There is also considerable discretionary power for the court to exclude persons from jury service during the trial at any time prior to the verdict. The court may discharge a juror if it is in the interests of justice or the juror to do so. Where a member of the jury dies or is discharged by the court, the jury would nevertheless be considered as remaining properly constituted for all the purposes of the action or indictment then being tried. The death or discharge of a juror obviously reduces the number of members of the jury, but section 25(4) of the Jury Ordinance requires that in any civil or criminal trial the number of members of the jury must not be less than five.

**Majority verdicts**

1.37 In a civil trial, the verdict is by a majority of the jurors serving at the time the verdict is given. In other words, if the number of members of the jury has been reduced by death or discharge, the verdict will be by a majority of the remaining jurors.

1.38 In a criminal trial, where a jury consists of seven persons, the jury’s decision has to be reached by a majority of not less than five members, even if the number of jurors has been reduced to six by death or discharge. In the case of a jury of nine persons, the verdict must be by a majority of not less than seven. If the number of jurors has been reduced to eight, the verdict must be by a majority of six, and if the number of members has been reduced to six or seven, then the majority must be not less than five. If the number of jurors has been reduced to five, the verdict has to be unanimous.

1.39 When it appears to the court that the jury cannot agree upon a verdict, either unanimously or by majority, the court must discharge the jury, and empanel a new jury. The case will then be tried as if it was for the first

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38 Section 4(2), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
39 Section 29, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
40 Section 6, Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
41 As above.
42 Section25(1), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3)
43 Section 25(3), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
44 Section 24(2), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
45 Section 24(3), Jury Ordinance (Cap 3).
Confidentiality of jurors’ discussions in jury room

1.40 It is a matter of public policy that no enquiry should be made into what might have happened in the jury room. It was held in *R v Bean*[^47] that the court ought not to entertain evidence of what occurred in the jury room. This is a rule of practice based on public policy, and the sanctity of discussions in the jury room should not be infringed.

[^46]: Section 27, Jury Ordinance (Cap 27).
Chapter 2
The law in other jurisdictions

Introduction

2.1 We examine in this chapter the law in a number of jurisdictions which adopt the jury system. In some jurisdictions which formerly used the jury, its use has been abolished. In South Africa, for instance, the jury was introduced, beginning with the Cape in 1828, but jury trial was abolished altogether in 1969.\(^1\) Malaysia used trial by jury until around 1900. Following independence in 1957 it was reintroduced for most capital offences in 1958. Malaysia suspended its constitution in 1971 and jury trial was formally abolished in 1995.\(^2\)

2.2 In Singapore, the jury system was abolished in 1969.

Australia

New South Wales

Jury Act 1977

2.3 Currently, every person (aged 18 years or above) who is enrolled as an elector for the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales is qualified and liable to serve as a juror.\(^3\) A person is not qualified or liable to serve as a juror if that person is, for the time being, disqualified from serving as a juror, being a person referred to in Schedule 1, or ineligible to serve as a juror, being a person referred to in Schedule 2.\(^4\)

2.4 Schedule 1 of the Jury Act 1977 lists those persons who are disqualified from serving as jurors by virtue of section 6(a):

(1) A person who at any time within the last 10 years in New South Wales or elsewhere has served any part of a sentence of imprisonment (not being imprisonment merely for failure to pay a fine);

(2) A person who at any time within the last three years in New South Wales or elsewhere has been found guilty of an offence and

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\(^3\) Section 5, Jury Act 1977.
\(^4\) Section 6, Jury Act 1977.
detained in a detention centre or other institution for juvenile offenders (not being detention merely for failure to pay a fine); or

(3) A person who is currently bound by an order made in New South Wales or elsewhere pursuant to a criminal charge or conviction, not including an order for compensation, but including the following:

(a) a parole order, a community service order, an apprehended violence order and an order disqualifying the person from driving a motor vehicle,

(b) an order committing the person to prison for failure to pay a fine, or

(c) a recognizance to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace, a remand in custody pending trial or sentence and a release on bail pending trial or sentence.

2.5 Schedule 2 of the Jury Act 1977 sets out the persons who are ineligible to serve as jurors by virtue of section 6(b):

(1) The Governor;

(2) A judicial officer (within the meaning of the Judicial Officers Act 1986);

(3) A coroner;

(4) A member or officer of the Executive Council;

(5) A member of the Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly;

(6) Officers and other staff of either or both of the Houses of Parliament;

(7) A legal practitioner (whether or not a practising barrister or solicitor);

(8) A person employed or engaged (except on a casual or voluntary basis) in the public sector in law enforcement, criminal investigation, the provision of legal services in criminal cases, the administration of justice or penal administration;

(9) The Ombudsman and a Deputy Ombudsman;

(10) A person who at any time has been a judicial officer within the meaning of the Judicial Officers Act 1986 or a coroner, police officer, Crown Prosecutor, Public Defender, Director or Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions or Solicitor for Public Prosecutions;

(11) A person who is unable to read or understand English; or
(12) A person who is unable, because of sickness, infirmity or disability, to discharge the duties of a juror.

Persons who are entitled to be exempted from serving as jurors under section 7 are set out in Schedule 3 of the Jury act 1977:

(1) Clergy;
(2) Members of any religious order;
(3) Persons practising as dentists;
(4) Persons practising as pharmacists;
(5) Persons practising as medical practitioners;
(6) Mining managers and under-managers of mines;
(7) Persons employed or engaged (except on a casual or voluntary basis) in the provision of fire, ambulance, rescue, or other emergency services, whether or not in the public sector;
(8) Persons who are at least 70 years old;
(9) Pregnant women;
(10) Persons having the care, custody and control of children under the age of 18 years (other than children who have ceased attending school), and who, if exempted, would be the only person exempt under this item in respect of those children;
(11) A person who resides with, and has full-time care of, a person who is sick, infirm or disabled;
(12) A person who resides more than 56 kilometres from the place at which the person is required to serve;
(13) A person who:
(a) within the three years that end on the date of the person’s claim for exemption, attended court in accordance with a summons and served as a juror, or
(b) within the 12 months that end on the date of the person’s claim for exemption, attended court in accordance with a summons and who was prepared to, but did not, serve as a juror; and
(14) A person who is entitled to be exempted under section 39 on account of previous lengthy jury service.

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Section 7, Jury Act 1977.
Victoria

Juries Act 2000

2.7 Every person aged 18 years or above who is enrolled as an elector for the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council is qualified and liable for jury service.\(^6\)

2.8 Schedule 1 of the Juries Act 2000 specifies the persons who are disqualified from jury service by virtue of section 5(2):

(1) A person who has been convicted, in Victoria or another jurisdiction, of treason or one or more indictable offences and sentenced to –

(a) imprisonment for a term or terms in the aggregate of three years or more; or

(b) a period of detention, for three years or more, under a hospital security order made under section 93 of the Sentencing Act 1991 or an equivalent order in another jurisdiction –

but any conviction of an offence in respect of which a free pardon has been granted must be disregarded.

(2) A person who within the last 10 years has been, in Victoria or another jurisdiction –

(a) sentenced to imprisonment for a term or terms in the aggregate of three months or more (excluding a suspended sentence of imprisonment); or

(b) ordered to be detained, for a period of three months or more, under a hospital security order made under section 93 of the Sentencing Act 1991 or an equivalent order in another Jurisdiction,

but any conviction of an offence in respect of which a free pardon has been granted must be disregarded.

(3) A person who within the last five years, in Victoria or another jurisdiction –

(a) has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term or terms in the aggregate of less than three months; or

(b) has been ordered to be detained, for a period of less than three months under a hospital security order made under section 93 of the Sentencing Act 1991 or an equivalent order in another jurisdiction; or

(c) has served a sentence of imprisonment by way of intensive correction in the community, or an equivalent sentence in another jurisdiction; or

(d) has been sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment; or

(e) has served a sentence of detention in a youth training centre or youth residential centre or an equivalent sentence in another jurisdiction,

but any conviction of an offence in respect of which a free pardon has been granted must be disregarded.

(4) A person in respect of whom a court in Victoria (including the Magistrates' Court) or another jurisdiction, has, within the last five years, made a community-based order, or an equivalent order in another jurisdiction, but any conviction, or finding of guilt, of an offence in respect of which a free pardon has been granted must be disregarded.

(5) A person who within the last two years—

(a) has been sentenced by a court, in Victoria (including the Magistrates' Court) or another jurisdiction, for an offence; or

(b) has been released on the giving of an undertaking under section 72 or 75 of the Sentencing Act 1991, or an equivalent undertaking in another jurisdiction.

(6) A person who has been charged with an indictable offence and is released on bail in respect of that offence.

(7) A person who is remanded in custody in respect of an alleged offence.

(8) A person who has been declared bankrupt and has not obtained a discharge.

2.9 Schedule 2 of the Juries Act 2000 sets out the persons who are ineligible for jury service by virtue of section 5(3):

(1) A person who is or, within the last 10 years, has been -
(a) the Governor or the Official Secretary to the Governor;

(b) a judge, a magistrate or the holder of any other judicial office;

(c) a member of the Police Appeals Board;

(d) a bail justice;

(e) admitted to legal practice in Victoria;

(f) a person employed or engaged (whether on a paid or voluntary basis) in the public sector within the meaning of the Public Sector Management and Employment Act 1998 in law enforcement, criminal investigation, the provision of legal services in criminal cases, the administration of justice or penal administration;

(g) a member of the police force;

(h) the Secretary to the Department of Justice or the Department of Human Services;

(i) a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council;

(j) the Auditor-General;

(k) the Ombudsman or the Acting Ombudsman;

(l) an employee of the Ombudsman;

(la) the Director, Police Integrity or Acting Director, Police Integrity;

(lb) an employee in the Office of Police Integrity;

(lc) the Special Investigations Monitor or acting Special Investigations Monitor;

(ld) an employee in the office of the Special Investigations Monitor;

(m) a person employed as a Government shorthand writer or court reporter or in connection with any court recording service.

(2) A person who is:

(a) the Electoral Commissioner;
(b) the Legal Ombudsman or an acting Legal Ombudsman;

(c) employed by a person admitted to legal practice in Victoria in connection with legal practice.

(3) A person who:

(a) has a physical disability that renders the person incapable of performing the duties of jury service;

(b) is a patient within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1986;

(c) has an intellectual disability within the meaning of the Intellectually Disabled Persons’ Services Act 1986;

(d) is a represented person within the meaning of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986;

(e) is subject to a supervision order under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997;

(f) is unable to communicate in or understand the English language adequately.

2.10 A person who attends for jury service or serves on a jury may be exempted by the Juries Commissioner from jury service in certain circumstances for any period, not exceeding three years\(^7\). The court may also discharge a juror or a jury during or at the conclusion of a trial if the trial has required the attendance of the juror or jurors for a lengthy period; or for other good reason.\(^8\) The Juries Commissioner may excuse a person permanently from jury service\(^9\), or excuse a person from jury service for good reason\(^10\). Good reason for excusals includes illness or poor health, incapacity, long distance to travel to attend for jury service, substantial hardship to the person resulting from his attendance for jury service, substantial financial hardship resulting from the person's attendance for jury service, substantial inconvenience to the public resulting from the person's attendance for jury service, the advanced age of the person, the person is a practising member of a religious society or order the beliefs or principles of which are incompatible with jury service, any other matter of special urgency or importance. However, a person who has been exempted from jury service or excused from jury service may waive that exemption or excuse by written notice to the Juries Commissioner.

\(^7\) Section 13(1), Juries Act 2000.

\(^8\) Section 13(2), Juries Act 2000.

\(^9\) Section 9, Juries Act 2000. [Good reason includes, but is not limited to (a) continuing poor health; disability; and advanced age.]

\(^10\) Section 8, Juries Act 2000.
Canada

Alberta

Jury Act (Chapter J-3 of the Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000)

2.11 The provisions of this Act\textsuperscript{11} apply to both civil and criminal proceedings tried by a jury in Alberta.\textsuperscript{12} Section 3 of the Jury Act provides that every person is qualified to serve as a juror if he is:

(a) resident in Alberta,

(b) a Canadian citizen, and

(c) 18 years of age or older.

2.12 Persons who are excluded from jury service are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(a)] members of the Privy Council, the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada;
  \item[(b)] members of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta and the Executive Council;
  \item[(c)] members of the council of a municipality or members of a board of trustees of a school district or school division;
  \item[(d)] judges of the Provincial Court, justices of the Court of Appeal and Court of Queen’s Bench and justices of the peace, whether retired or not;
  \item[(e)] barristers and solicitors, whether or not they are practising, and students-at-law;
  \item[(f)] medical examiners under the Fatality Inquiries Act;
  \item[(g)] officers and employees of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta;
  \item[(h)] persons who have been convicted of a criminal offence for which a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months could have been imposed;
  \item[(i)] witnesses summoned to attend before the Legislative Assembly or a committee of the Legislative Assembly during the period that their attendance is required;
\end{itemize}
(j) persons confined in an institution;

(k) persons engaged in the administration of justice, including
(i) members and employees of any police service,
(ii) probation officers,
(iii) employees of the Department of Justice, and
(iv) employees of the Department of Justice of Canada or the Department of the Solicitor General of Canada.\(^{13}\)

2.13 The following persons are exempted from service as jurors:

"(a) a person whose conscience or religious vows preclude the person from serving on a jury;

(b) a person who has served on a jury within the 2 years preceding the person's summons to serve on a jury;

(c) a person for whom service on a jury will cause severe hardship in respect of the person's health or livelihood or in respect of any legal or moral obligations the person may have to others;

(d) a person who does not reside within a reasonable distance of the place where the proceedings are to be tried;

(e) a person who suffers from a physical, mental or other infirmity that is incompatible with the discharge of the duties of a juror;

(f) a person who is unable to understand, speak or read the language in which the trial is to be conducted;

(g) a person whose service on a jury would be contrary to the public interest by reason of that person's performance of urgent and essential services of public importance that cannot reasonably be rescheduled or performed by another during that person's absence;

(h) a person 65 years of age or over."\(^{14}\)

2.14 A person who suffers from a physical infirmity may serve on a

\(^{13}\) Section 4, Jury Act.

\(^{14}\) Section 5(1), Jury Act.
jury, if he wishes to, provided that he "(a) if aided would be able to see and hear adequately and to attend court in adequate comfort, and (b) will receive the assistance of a person, a device or altered physical surroundings that the Court considers adequate to enable the person to discharge the duties of a juror." It should be noted that a person giving assistance to the infirm person under category (b) may, as directed by the Court, attend with and assist the juror in all the proceedings, including the deliberations of the jury, though he should not comment on the proceedings and should take part in the proceedings only by assisting the juror as the Court directs.

England and Wales

**Juries Act 1974**

2.15 Currently, every person is qualified to serve as a juror in the Crown Court, the High Court and county courts if he is registered as a parliamentary or local government elector and is not less than 18 nor more than 70 years of age; he has been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man for any period of at least five years since attaining the age of 13; he is not a mentally disordered person; and he is not disqualified for jury service. "Mentally disordered person" means any person listed in Part I of the Schedule to the Juries Act 1974.

2.16 Part 2 of Schedule 1 sets out persons who are disqualified from jury service:

5. A person who is on bail in criminal proceedings (within the meaning of the Bail Act 1976).

6. A person who has at any time been sentenced in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man-
   (a) to imprisonment for life, detention for life or custody for life,
   (b) to detention during her Majesty's pleasure or during the pleasure of the Secretary of State,
   (c) to imprisonment for public protection or detention for public protection.

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15 Section 6(1)(a), (b), Jury Act.
16 Section 6(2), Jury Act.
17 Section 6(3), Jury Act.
18 Section 1(1)(a), Juries Act 1974.
19 Section 1(1)(b), Juries Act 1974.
20 Section 1(1)(c), Juries Act 1974.
21 Section 1(2), Juries Act 1974.
22 Section 1(3), Juries Act 1974.
(d) to an extended sentence under section 227 or 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 or section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, or

(e) to a term of imprisonment of five years or more or a term of detention of five years or more.

7. A person who at any time in the last ten years has—

(a) in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man—

(i) served any part of a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of detention, or

(ii) had passed on him a suspended sentence of imprisonment or had made in respect of him a suspended order for detention,

(b) in England and Wales, had made in respect of him a community order under section 177 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a community rehabilitation order, a community punishment order, a community punishment and rehabilitation order, a drug treatment and testing order or a drug abstinence order, or

(c) had made in respect of him any corresponding order under the law of Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man or any of the Channel Islands.\(^{23}\)

Ireland

Juries Act 1976

2.17 Section 6 of the Act provides that every citizen aged 18 years or over and under the age of 70 years who is entered in a register of D'ail electors in a jury district shall be qualified and liable to serve as a juror.\(^{24}\)

2.18 Persons who are ineligible for jury service are specified in Part I of the First Schedule of the Juries Act 1976 as:

- Persons concerned with the administration of justice, including persons holding or who have at any time held any judicial office; coroners, deputy coroners; the Attorney General and members of his staff; the Director of Public Prosecutions and members of

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\(^{23}\) Part 2, Schedule 1, Juries Act 1974.

\(^{24}\) Section 6, Juries Act 1976.
his staff; barristers and solicitors; solicitors' apprentices, solicitors' clerks and other persons employed on work of a legal character in solicitors' offices; officers attached to a court or to the President of the High Court; prison officers and other persons employed in any prison or in any place in which persons are kept in military custody; persons employed in the welfare service of the Department of Justice; and a person in charge of, or employed in, a forensic science laboratory;

- Members of the Defence Forces, including members of the Permanent Defence Force and Reserve Defence Force and Army Nursing Service; or

- "Incapable persons", who are defined as persons who because of insufficient capacity to read, deafness or other permanent infirmity are unfit to serve on a jury; or persons who suffer or have suffered from mental illness or mental disability and on account of that condition either -

  (a) are resident in a hospital or other similar institution, or

  (b) regularly attend for treatment by a medical practitioner.

2.19 A person would be disqualified for jury service if on conviction of an offence in any part of Ireland –

"(a) he has at any time been sentenced to imprisonment or penal servitude for life or for a term of five years or more or to detention under section 103 of the Children Act, 1908, or under the corresponding law of Northern Ireland, or

(b) he has at any time in the last ten years -

(i) served any part of a sentence of imprisonment or penal servitude, being, in the case of imprisonment, a sentence for a term of at least three months, or

(ii) served any part of a sentence of detention in Saint Patrick's Institution or in a corresponding institution in Northern Ireland, being a sentence for a term of at least three months."

2.20 A county registrar may excuse any person whom he has summoned as a juror if:

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25 Section 8, Juries Act 1976.
"(a) that person is one of the persons specified in Part II of the First Schedule and informs the county registrar of his wish to be excused, or

(b) that person shows to the satisfaction of the county registrar that he has served on a jury, or duly attended to serve on a jury, in the three years ending with the service of the summons on him, or

(c) that person shows to the satisfaction of the county registrar that, at the conclusion of a trial, a judge of any court has excused him from jury service for a period that has not terminated."

2.21 When a person is required to be in attendance as a juror at a court during a sitting, the judge has the same duty or discretion as that imposed or conferred on the county registrar to excuse that person from attendance or further attendance. The judge may also, for good reason, excuse the juror during the course of a trial from further service as a juror in the trial.

2.22 Part II of the First Schedule specifies persons who are excusable as of right. They include:

(i) Members of either House of the Oireachtas;

(ii) Members of the Council of State;

(iii) The Comptroller and Auditor General;

(iv) A person in Holy Orders;

(v) A regular minister of any religious denomination or community;

(vi) Members of any religious order living in a monastery, convent or other religious community;

(vii) Medical practitioners, dentists, nurses, midwives, veterinary surgeons, and pharmaceutical chemists;

(viii) A member of the staff of either House of the Oireachtas;

(ix) Heads of Government Departments and Offices and any civil servant;

(x) Any civilian employed by the Minister for Defence;

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26 Section 9(1)(a),(b) and (c), Juries Act 1976.
27 Section 9(7), Juries Act 1976.
(xi) Chief officers of local authorities, health boards and harbour authorities and any employee of a local authority, health board or harbour authority;

(xii) The head or principal teacher of the college of a university, of a school or other educational institution, and any professor, lecturer or member of the teaching staff of any such institution;

(xiii) Whole-time students at any such educational institution as is mentioned in the preceding paragraph;

(xiv) The secretary to the Commissioners of Irish Lights and any person in the employment of the Commissioners;

(xv) Masters of vessels, duly licensed pilots and duly licensed aircraft commanders; and

(xvi) Persons aged 65 years or above and under the age of 70 years.

New Zealand

Juries Act 1981

2.23 Every person who is currently registered as an elector is qualified and liable to serve as a juror. Persons who are not qualified to serve on jury service are:

"(a) Any one who, at any time, has been sentenced to imprisonment for life or for a term of 3 years or more, or to preventive detention."

(b) Any one who, at any time within the preceding 5 years, has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 3 months or more, or to corrective training.

2.24 Section 8 of the Act sets out the categories of persons who would not be required to undertake jury service. They are:

"(a) Members of the Executive Council of New Zealand;

(b) Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) Judges of the High Court, Masters of the High Court, Judges of the Employment Court, Judges and Commissioners of the Maori Land Court, District Court Judges and Community Magistrates;"

28 Section 6, Juries Act 1981.
29 Section 7, Juries Act 1981.
(d) Visiting Justices under Corrections Act 2004, and members of the Parole Board;

(e) Justices who have agreed to make themselves available from time to time to exercise the summary jurisdiction of District Courts;

(f) Barristers and solicitors holding current practising certificates under the Law Practitioners Act 1955;

(g) Members of the Police, and Traffic Officers;

(h) An employee of the Public Service who is employed -
   (i) in the Ministry of Justice; or
   (ii) in the Department of Corrections; or
   (iv) as an officer of the High Court or of a District Court; or

(ha) a party to a management contract entered into under section 4A of the Penal institutions Act 1954 or to a security contract entered into under section 166 of the Corrections Act 2004; or

(hb) a security officer within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Corrections Act 2004;

(i) persons with a mental disorder;

(k) persons with an intellectual disability.\(^{30}\)

2.25 "Mental disorder" means an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature) that is (a) characterised by delusions, or disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition; and (b) not induced by substance abuse; and (c) not simply due to the fact that the person has an intellectual disability.\(^{31}\)

2.26 Section 2 of the Act provides that "Intellectual disability" has the same meaning as in the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, which defines the term as follows:

\(^{30}\) It should be noted that paragraph (h)(iii) (officers of any penal institution or pre-release hostel or work centre) was repealed, as from 1 October 2003, by the State Sector Amendment Act 2003, and paragraph (j) (persons who are incapable of serving because of blindness, deafness, or any other permanent physical infirmity) was repealed, as from 30 July 2000, by the Juries Amendment Act 2000.

\(^{31}\) Section 2, Juries Act 1981.
(1) A person has an intellectual disability if the person has a permanent impairment that –

(a) results in significantly sub-average general intelligence; and

(b) results in significant deficits in adaptive functioning, as measured by tests generally used by clinicians, …

(c) became apparent during the developmental period of the person. 32

The developmental period of a person generally finishes when the person turns 18 years. 33

2.27 It should be noted that section 15(1) of the Act empowers the Registrar to excuse a person summoned to attend as a juror on any occasion, if attendance on that occasion would cause or result in undue hardship or serious inconvenience to that person, or to any other person, or to the general public, owing to the nature of that person's occupation or business, or of any special and pressing commitment arising in the course of that person's occupation or business; or that person's physical disability; or that person's state of health, or family commitments, or other personal circumstances. "Physical disability" is defined in section 2 of the Act as including visual or aural impairment.

2.28 Further, a person summoned to attend as a juror on any occasion may, on application, be excused by the Registrar from attending on that occasion if that person is:

"(a) Is a practising member of a religious sect or order that holds service as a juror to be incompatible with its tenets; or

(aa) Is of or over the age of 65; or

(b) Had served, or (having been summoned) has attended for service, as a juror at any time within the preceding period of 2 years; or

(c) Has been excused from jury service for a period that has not yet expired." 34

2.29 A judge may also excuse a person from attending as a juror on any occasion, on application made to him, on any ground on which the Registrar could have excused that person under section 15 of the Act, whether

32 Section 7(1), Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.
33 Section 7(5), Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.
or not the Registrar had declined to excuse that person under that section. A judge may also discharge the summons of a person to serve as a juror, on that person's application, or on that judge's own motion, if the judge is satisfied that, because of physical disability, the person is not capable of acting effectively as a juror. The discharge may apply to the whole period for which the person is summoned, or to a particular proceeding. An application to discharge the summons must be heard in private, and the judge may conduct the hearing and consider such evidence as he thinks fit.

2.30 It is worth noting that a judge may discharge a juror if it is brought to the judge's attention that the juror is not capable of acting effectively as a juror in the proceedings because of physical disability. The discharge of a juror under section 22 would not affect his liability to serve on any other jury.

Scotland

Qualifications for jury service

2.31 The basic qualifications for jury service in Scotland, as provided in section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980, are the same as those in England and Wales, save that the maximum age for jury service is 65, as opposed to 70 in England and Wales.

Exemptions from jury service

2.32 Exemptions from jury service in Scotland may arise because an individual is ineligible, disqualified or excused. Excusal may be as of right or discretionary.

2.33 The categories of those ineligible, disqualified or excused are set out at Parts I to III of Schedule 1 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980. Those who are ineligible include persons receiving medical treatment for mental disorder (as defined in the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984) and those subject to guardianship under the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. These categories are similar to those which apply in England and Wales, but Part I of Schedule 1 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980 adds members of the Judiciary and anyone who, at any time within the 10 years immediately preceding the date at which their eligibility for jury service is being considered, have come within any of the categories listed in this group. Others concerned with the administration of justice, including advocates and solicitors (whether in actual practice or not), Procurators Fiscal, police officers and court staff concerned

35 Section 16, Juries Act 1981.
36 Section 16AA (1), Juries Act 1981.
37 Section 16AA(2), Juries Act 1981.
38 Section 16AA(4), Juries Act 1981.
39 Section 22(1)(b), Juries Act 1981.
40 Section 22(1B)(3), Juries Act 1981.
with the day-to-day administration of the court, are also ineligible for jury service, as are any persons who, at any time within the five years immediately preceding the date at which their eligibility for jury service is being considered, have come within any of these categories.

2.34 The Scottish position in regard to ineligibility differs from that in England and Wales, where the only categories of otherwise qualified persons who are ineligible for jury service are the mentally disordered.

2.35 Those disqualified from jury service in Scotland include any person who has at any time been sentenced in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man to life imprisonment or a term of five years or more, or served any part of a sentence of imprisonment or detention of three months or more and is not a rehabilitated person for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. In addition, persons who are on bail in connection with criminal proceedings in any part of the United Kingdom are disqualified, as are persons who have been convicted and been the subject of a probation, drug testing, restriction of liberty or community order, and who are not rehabilitated persons for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.

2.36 These provisions are broadly similar to those which apply in England and Wales, though in England a person is disqualified if he has in the last ten years in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man served any part of a sentence of imprisonment or detention (regardless of its length) or been the subject of a community, community rehabilitation, community punishment, drug treatment and testing, or drug abstinence order.

2.37 Part III of the Schedule to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980 lists the persons who are excusable from jury service as of right. These include members and officers of the House of Lords or the House of Commons, members of the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Executive or the Welsh National Assembly, and representatives to the European Parliament. In addition, the list includes full-time serving members of the armed services and their associated nursing services. Practising medical practitioners, dentists, nurses, midwives, pharmaceutical chemists and vets are also excusable as of right, as are persons in holy orders, regular ministers of any religious denomination and vowed members of any religious order living in a monastery, convent or other religious community. In respect of jury service in criminal proceedings, persons who are practising members of religious societies or orders which have beliefs which are incompatible with jury service are excusable. Finally, if a person has served on a jury or attended for jury service within the previous five years he is excusable as of right.

\[\text{Part II of Schedule 1 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980.}\]
\[\text{Part II of Schedule 1 to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980.}\]
2.38 Section 1(5) of the 1980 Act provides for discretionary excusal by the court of any person from jury service where the person cited to attend for jury service satisfies the clerk of the court that there is a “good reason” why he should be excused. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, section 1(5A) requires the clerk of court to cite a person for jury service within one year of being excused under section 1(5).

2.39 Section 86(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 requires the court to excuse a juror before he is sworn to serve on the jury if the parties jointly apply for him to be excused.

2.40 The Scottish provisions in respect of excusal are in marked contrast to those in England and Wales, where the Criminal Justice Act 2003 removed any excusals as of right. Section 8 of the Juries Act 1974 entitles a person to be excused from jury service in England if he has served on a jury within the preceding two years. The basis for discretionary excusal in England is broadly similar to that in Scotland.

United States of America

2.41 The Victorian Law Reform Committee pointed out the significance of the jury in the American legal system:

“The United States of America has inherited the fundamental characteristics of its legal system from England. Perhaps the single characteristic which gives shape to much of the rest of the legal system is the reception of the institution of the jury. The function of the jury has always been to ensure that the substantive law is thoroughly applied and that parties to any law suit receive a fair trial.”

2.42 The defendant’s right to trial by jury is enshrined in the American constitution. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in Duncan v Louisiana, Mr Justice White made the following comments:

“... Jury trial continues to receive strong support. The laws of every State guarantee a right to jury trial in serious criminal cases; no State has dispensed with it; nor are there significant movements underway to do so. ... The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. ... Our conclusion is that in the American states, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offences is a fundamental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants.”

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44 391 U.S.145 (1968), paras 154-158.
2.43 The Victorian Law Committee had the following observations on the concept of representativeness in the US jury system:

"In the United States today, it is common to describe the ideal jury as a body truly representative of the community. … Both Federal and State legislation requires that every citizen must have an equal opportunity to perform jury service. … The lists from which juries are made up must be constantly reformed to ensure that they are representative and inclusive of the eligible adult population."\(^{45}\)

2.44 The US federal legislation on jury trials provides that "no citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United states or in the Court of International Trade on account of race, colour, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."\(^{46}\)

2.45 The federal legislation lays down the eligibility criteria for jury service, and this is mirrored by most States in their respective statutes. A person would be deemed to be qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in the district court unless he:

"(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district;

(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;

(3) is unable to speak the English language;

(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service; or

(5) has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil rights have not been restored."\(^{47}\)

2.46 The following persons are "barred from jury service on the ground that they are exempt":\(^{48}\)

"(A) members in active service in the Armed Forces of the United States;"

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\(^{46}\) Title 28 USC Chapter 121, Juries; Trials by Jury, s.1862.

\(^{47}\) Title 28 USC Chapter 121, Juries; Trials by Jury, s.1865.

\(^{48}\) Title 28 USC Chapter 121, Juries; Trials by Jury, s.1863(6).
(B) members of the fire or police departments of any State, the District of Columbia, any territory or possession of the United States, or any subdivision of a State, the District of Columbia, or such territory or possession;

(C) public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Government of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, any territory or possession of the United States, or any subdivision of a State, the District of Columbia, or such territory or possession, who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties.\textsuperscript{49}

2.47 A person summoned to serve on a jury may be excused or excluded in certain circumstances. He may be:

"(1) excused by the court, or by the clerk under supervision of the court if the court's jury selection plan so authorizes, upon a showing of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, for such period as the court deems necessary, at the conclusion of which such person either shall be summoned again for jury service … or, if the court's jury selection plan so provides, the name of such person shall be reinserted into the qualified jury wheel for selection … , or

(2) excluded by the court on the ground that such person may be unable to render impartial jury service or that his service as a juror would be likely to disrupt the proceedings, or

(3) excluded upon peremptory challenge as provided by law, or

(4) excluded pursuant to the procedure specified by law upon a challenge by any party for good cause shown, or

(5) excluded upon determination by the court that his service as a juror would be likely to threaten the secrecy of the proceedings, or otherwise adversely affect the integrity of jury deliberations.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} Title 28 USC Chapter 121, Juries; Trials by Jury, s.1863(6).

\textsuperscript{50} Title 28 USC Chapter 121, Juries; Trials by Jury, s.1866(c).
California

Penal Code

2.48 Section 893 of the Penal Code (dealing with criminal procedure and related matters) governs the qualification of members of the grand jury:

"(a) A person is competent to act as a grand juror only if he possesses each of the following qualifications:

(1) He is a citizen of the United States of the age of 18 years or older who shall have been a resident of the state and of the county or city and county for one year immediately before being selected and returned.

(2) He is in possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence, of sound judgment, and of fair character.

(3) He is possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language.

(b) A person is not competent to act as a grand juror if any of the following apply:

(1) The person is serving as a trial juror in any court of this state.

(2) The person has been discharged as a grand juror in any court of this state within one year.

(3) The person has been convicted of malfeasance in office or any felony or other high crime.

(4) The person is serving as an elected public officer."

Code of Civil Procedure

2.49 Chapter 1 of Title 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, known as the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act, deals with the selection of jurors, and the formation of trial juries, for both civil and criminal cases, in all trial courts of the

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Section 888 of the Penal Code provides that "A grand jury is a body of the required number of persons returned from the citizens of the county before a court of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to inquire of public offences committed or triable within the county. Each grand jury or, if more than one has been duly empanelled pursuant to Sections 904.5 to 904.9, inclusive, one grand jury in each county, shall be charged and sworn to investigate or inquire into county matters of civil concern, such as the needs of county officers, including the abolition or creation of offices for, the purchase, lease, or sale of equipment for, or changes in the method or system of, performing the duties of the agencies subject to investigation pursuant to Section 914.1"
Juries are of three kinds: grand juries, trial juries, and juries of inquest.\(^{53}\)

2.50 Section 203 governs the qualification of prospective trial jurors. It provides as follows:

"(a) All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except the following:

(1) Persons who are not citizens of the United States.

(2) Persons who are less than 18 years of age.

(3) Persons who are not domiciliaries of the State of California, as determined pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 2020) of Chapter 1 of Division 2 of the Elections Code.

(4) Persons who are not residents of the jurisdiction wherein they are summoned to serve.

(5) Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored.

(6) Persons who are not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language, provided that no person shall be deemed incompetent solely because of the loss of sight or hearing in any degree or other disability which impedes the person's ability to communicate or which impairs or interferes with the person's mobility.

(7) Persons who are serving as grand or trial jurors in any court of this state.

(8) Persons who are the subject of conservatorship.

(b) No person shall be excluded from eligibility for jury service in the State of California, for any reason other than those reasons provided by this section."

2.51 Section 204 makes provision for the exemption and excusal of jurors:

"(a) No eligible person shall be exempt from service as a trial juror by reason of occupation, race, colour, religion, sex, national origin, economic status, or sexual orientation, or

\(^{52}\) Section 192, Code of Civil Procedure.

\(^{53}\) Section 193, Code of Civil Procedure.
for any other reason. No person shall be excused from service as a trial juror except as specified in subdivision (b).

(b) An eligible person may be excused from jury service only for undue hardship, upon themselves or upon the public, as defined by the Judicial Council."

2.52 A person may be required to complete a questionnaire if a jury commissioner requires him to do so for the purpose of ensuring a fair cross section of the population is represented in the jury. Section 205 provides the following:

"(a) If a jury commissioner requires a person to complete a questionnaire, the questionnaire shall ask only questions related to juror identification, qualification, and ability to serve as a prospective juror.

(b) Except as ordered by the court, the questionnaire referred to in subdivision (a) shall be used solely for qualifying prospective jurors, and for management of the jury system, and not for assisting in the courtroom voir dire process of selecting trial jurors for specific cases.

(c) The court may require a prospective juror to complete such additional questionnaires as may be deemed relevant and necessary for assisting in the voir dire process or to ascertain whether a fair cross section of the population is represented as required by law, if such procedures are established by local court rule.

(d) The trial judge may direct a prospective juror to complete additional questionnaires as proposed by counsel in a particular case to assist the voir dire process."

2.53 Section 208 provides that the jury commissioner should hear the excuses of jurors summoned, in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Judicial Council. It is also a matter for the jury commissioner's discretion whether to accept an excuse section 204(b) without a personal appearance. All excuses must be in writing, setting forth the basis of the request, and signed by the juror.

2.54 The jury commissioner should randomly select jurors for jury panels to be sent to courtrooms for what is referred to as "voir dire". This is an examination of the potential jurors by, first, the judge, and then counsel for each party. No peace officer should be selected for voir dire in criminal matters.

54 Section 219(a), Code of Civil Procedure.
55 Section 219(b), Code of Civil Procedure.
2.55 A trial jury consists of 12 persons, except that in civil actions and cases of misdemeanour, it may consist of 12 or any number less than 12 upon which the parties agree.\textsuperscript{56}

2.56 In order to ensure a fair and impartial jury in civil jury trials, an examination process of jurors is provided in the Code of Civil Procedure:

"To select a fair and impartial jury in civil jury trials, the trial judge shall examine the prospective jurors. Upon completion of the judge's initial examination, counsel for each party shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, any of the prospective jurors in order to enable counsel to intelligently exercise both peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. During any examination conducted by counsel for the parties, the trial judge should permit liberal and probing examination calculated to discover bias or prejudice with regard to the circumstances of the particular case. The fact that a topic has been included in the judge's examination should not preclude additional non-repetitive or non-duplicative questioning in the same area by counsel.

The scope of the examination conducted by counsel shall be within reasonable limits prescribed by the trial judge in the judge's sound discretion. In exercising his or her sound discretion as to the form and subject matter of voir dire questions, the trial judge should consider, among other criteria, any unique or complex elements, legal or factual, in the case and the individual responses or conduct of jurors which may evince attitudes inconsistent with suitability to serve as a fair and impartial juror in the particular case. Specific unreasonable or arbitrary time limits shall not be imposed. …\textsuperscript{57}

2.57 For criminal cases, the examination process is governed by section 223:

"In a criminal case, the court shall conduct an initial examination of prospective jurors. The court may submit to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by the parties as it deems proper. Upon completion of the court's initial examination, counsel for each party shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, any or all of the prospective jurors. The court may, in the exercise of its discretion, limit the oral and direct questioning of prospective jurors by counsel. The court may specify the maximum amount of time that counsel for each party may question an individual juror, or may specify an aggregate amount of time for each party, which can then be allocated among the prospective jurors by counsel. Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence

\textsuperscript{56} Section 220, Code of Civil Procedure.
\textsuperscript{57} Section 222.5, Code of Civil Procedure.
of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Examination of prospective jurors shall be conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for cause."

2.58 Section 203(a)(6) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that:

"no person shall be deemed incompetent solely because of the loss of sight or hearing in any degree or other disability which impedes the person's ability to communicate or which impairs or interferes with the person's mobility."

Section 224 further provides the following In relation to disabled jurors:

"(a) If a party does not cause the removal by challenge of an individual juror who is deaf, hearing impaired, blind, visually impaired, or speech impaired and who requires auxiliary services to facilitate communication, the party shall (1) stipulate to the presence of a service provider in the jury room during jury deliberations, and (2) prepare and deliver to the court proposed jury instructions to the service provider.

(b) As used in this section, 'service provider' includes, but is not limited to, a person who is a sign language interpreter, oral interpreter, deaf-blind interpreter, reader, or speech interpreter. If auxiliary services are required during the course of jury deliberations, the court shall instruct the jury and the service provider that the service provider for the juror with a disability is not to participate in the jury's deliberations in any manner except to facilitate communication between the juror with a disability and other jurors.

(c) The court shall appoint a service provider whose services are needed by a juror with a disability to facilitate communication or participation. A sign language interpreter, oral interpreter, or deaf-blind interpreter appointed pursuant to this section shall be a qualified interpreter, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 754 of the Evidence Code. 58 ...

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58 Subdivision (f) of section 754 of the Evidence Code provides that: "For purposes of this section, "qualified interpreter" means an interpreter who has been certified as competent to interpret court proceedings by a testing organization, agency, or educational institution approved by the Judicial Council as qualified to administer tests to court interpreters for individuals who are deaf or hearing impaired."
Chapter 3
Common law position

Introduction

3.1 This chapter looks at the common law position in relation to the various qualifying criteria for jury service, and the exemptions from service on disability grounds.

Age

3.2 In *R v Tremearne*¹, an 1826 case of perjury in England, a boy who was not on the panel of jurors and who was under age, answered for his father when the latter was called. The son was sworn and served on the jury in his father’s place. The court subsequently held that this was a fatal objection and that there had been a mistrial. Abott C.J said:

“But in the present case, the person who appeared in the name of his father, and served on the jury, was not qualified by estate so to do, and had not arrived at the age which the law considers necessary to give competent knowledge to sit in judgment. … Looking at these particular circumstances in this case, I think that we ought, in a sound exercise of our discretion, to make the rule for a new trial absolute.”²

3.3 The distinction between disqualification and exemption on the grounds of age was discussed in *Denis Dowling Mulcahy v R*³. The court held that where a juror’s age exceeded sixty years, that fact only operated in his favour as an exemption, but was not a ground for challenge as a personal qualification. Mr Justice Willes said:

“... the judges are of the opinion that the challenge to James Booth upon the ground of age ought not to have been allowed. Infancy has been considered a ground of disqualification on account of probable deficiency of understanding (propter defectum). … Being over the prescribed age has been considered only a ground for not returning the juryman, and there is no known head of challenge (certainly not that of propter defectum) under which objection can be made to a juryman over the prescribed age, if otherwise competent. … A like

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¹ 108 ER 95.
² 108 ER 95, at 96.
³ 1868 [L R] 3 HL 306.
construction ought to be put upon the present Jury Act. … Is, then, the personal quality of being over sixty a want of qualification, or only a personal ground of exemption? It should seem the latter. The statute, being in the affirmative, leaves infants disqualified as at the common law. Aliens, convicts of treason felony … are specially disqualified by section 3. … Persons of sixty and upwards are, by the first section, forbidden to be returned by the sheriff in words no more stringent than those of the Statute of Westminster, which were held not to disqualify, or even exempt, after return made. And the enactment dealing in terms with qualification as ‘qualification in respect of property’ is, in effect, that persons qualified as to property … shall if under sixty be liable to serve, and if over sixty shall be not disqualified, but for their age sake relieved in the manner specified. The challenge to James Booth was, therefore, rightly overruled.”

3.4 In the US case of Michael Anthony Chivers v the State of Texas⁵ in 1990, the prosecution used its right to strike out potential jurors to achieve a jury composed of older members. The prosecutor explained to the trial court why he considered the age of the jurors to be important:

“Additionally, Juror Number 8 was a young male. What I am looking for in this panel is – generally speaking are established, preferably older or more established people in the community, and because of the case being based on circumstantial evidence … I'm looking for what I believe to be educated people.”⁶

The trial court's judgment was subsequently reversed on appeal, but this was because the prosecution did not provide a racially neutral explanation for one of its peremptory challenges. The importance of the age of the jurors was not questioned in either the trial or appeal court.

3.5 In Devlin Darnell James v The State of Texas⁷, the prosecution explained to the court that they wanted an older jury to judge a case involving young persons “in a shooting over a drug transaction”. The prosecution consistently struck out all potential jurors under the age of thirty, regardless of race. The court accepted that age may be a legitimate neutral reason for a peremptory challenge, and determined that the prosecution had not engaged in purposeful discrimination based on race in the exercise of its peremptory challenges.

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⁵ 796 SW2D 539.
⁶ 796 SW2D 539, at 541.
⁷ Case No 06-04-00155-CR.
Residency

3.6 A residency requirement to act as a juror dates back at least as far as 1828 in England, where it was held in R v Sutton⁸ that "alienage is a ground of challenge to a juror", but that "if a party has an opportunity of making his challenge, and neglects it, he cannot afterwards make the objection".

3.7 In the US case of Michael Anthony Chivers v the State of Texas⁹, the prosecutor expressed concern about one juror's length of stay in the community. He explained that his strike of that particular juror (Stone) was because he did not feel that Stone was established in the community and "has only been living in the community for five years." The Court of Appeals of Texas held that the prosecutor's explanation for striking Stone did not give a plausible, racially-neutral reason and said:

"Unlike Murray [another juror also struck by the prosecutor], who had no job, Stone had held a job for the past five years. Finally, while Murray lived in Dallas County for only one and one-half months, Stone resided in Dallas County for five years. Thus, Stone was significantly more established in the community than Murray."¹⁰

3.8 The issue of residence was considered in the Hong Kong case of Norcross v Registrar of the Supreme Court¹¹. The applicant was a citizen of the United States of America. He was a sales manager of a Hong Kong company who was required to travel extensively. Over the years he spent quite a lot of time in Hong Kong. Over the period 1985 and 1989, he spent 144 days in Hong Kong in 1986, and 32 days in 1989. The duration of each stay varied, but the single longest period of stay was 28 days and the shortest was one day. As he received permission to remain in Hong Kong in excess of 180 days, he was not an exempt person and was required to register under the Registration of Persons Regulations, and be issued with a Hong Kong identity card. Mr Norcross's name was therefore put on the list of common jurors. Mr Norcross applied to have his name removed on the basis that he was not liable to serve as a juror as he was not resident in Hong Kong. The Registrar refused to remove Mr Norcross's name from the list.

Bokhary J, in granting the general exemption to the applicant, said:

"'Resident' does not mean 'exclusively resident'. …

The duty to serve on a jury does not end with the question of residence. By virtue of the power given to the Court under s.28(1)(b) of the Jury Ordinance, the Court may – on application and on cause being shown – remove the name of any person from the list of common jurors or the list of special jurors or both.

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⁸ (1828) 8 B & C 417.
⁹ 796 SW2D 539.
¹⁰ 796 SW2D 539, at 543.
¹¹ HCMP003606/1990.
So the fact that somebody is on the list or lists because he is resident here does not mean that he may not obtain general exemption from jury service. …

Although he is resident here, his residence here is of such a nature that it would be inordinately inconvenient to him to be liable to serve on a jury here. It is right that one should have regard to, among other things, his convenience. Of course that is not the only consideration. There is also the public interest to be considered. But one must remember that it is not to the advantage of the administration of justice generally to have on juries persons to whom jury service is unduly onerous.  

Good character

3.9 In *Rex v Kelly*\(^\text{13}\), the appellant was convicted of murder. After his trial, it came to light that one of the jurors had been convicted of receiving stolen goods and sentenced to one month's imprisonment five years before. The juror's name appeared in the jurors' book as that of a person qualified and liable to serve as a juror, and his appointment to the jury had not been challenged. The appellant argued that the juryman in question was disqualified from serving and that the trial was therefore a mistrial.

3.10 In deciding the appeal, Lord Goddard, CJ gave the following reasons:

"Although one would not expect a person disqualified, for instance, because he had been convicted of an infamous crime to disclose that fact by claiming that he was disqualified, it seems to us that, as the Juries Act 1870 imposed a disqualification, whether the person concerned claimed or did not claim exemption does not matter: if his name is included in the jurors' book, he is liable to serve. It is true that his name might have been taken out if he had objected; and it is true that his name might not have been included if the registration officer had been aware of his conviction; but it seems to us that the Act provides in terms that a person whose name appears in the jurors' book is liable to serve as a juror, and that that, again, is an answer to the present objection.

There remains always the right of the accused person to challenge either peremptorily or, if he has exhausted his peremptory challenges, for cause. This right remains unaffected, but, it is asked, how could he challenge if he did not know? It is also contended that the cases show that, where information has come to the knowledge of the accused person\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) HCMP003606/1990, at 4-5.
\(^{13}\) [1950] 2 KB 164.
after conviction with regard to the qualification of a juror, effect has been given to it by the court and the trial treated as a nullity. It is true that there are such cases, but, so far as this court can ascertain, they have all been cases where there has been either impersonation of a juror or a mistake as to the identity of a juror.”

3.11 In *R v Mason*\(^*\)\(^1\) before the applicant's trial, the police had checked the local criminal records and, unknown to the defence, had supplied the prosecution with the names of those called for jury service who had been convicted of criminal offences. When the jury was being empanelled, the prosecution asked four members of the panel to “stand by for the Crown.”\(^2\) Three of those had criminal convictions, although at least one of them was not disqualified by his conviction from jury service. The applicant was convicted and applied for leave to appeal against conviction. Issue was taken as to whether the prosecution had wrongly used the particulars of the convictions to ask some members of the panel to “stand by for the Crown” who were not disqualified by their convictions from serving as jurors.

3.12 Counsel for the applicant submitted, *inter alia*, that on its true construction the Juries Act 1974 envisaged that all who were qualified to serve as jurors in the Crown Court should be allowed to do so unless they were ineligible or disqualified or excused under Schedule 1 to that Act. The Court of Appeal considered this argument misconceived, and explained that before 1974 prosecuting counsel, without showing cause, could ask a member of the jury panel to “stand by for the Crown,” and the trial judge could refuse to allow a member of the panel to be sworn, even though there had been no challenge by either party. Far from altering the old law, section 21(5) of the Juries Act 1974 had confirmed it.

3.13 The Court of Appeal summarised the rights of different parties to a jury trial with regard to peremptory challenge as follows:

“For centuries the law has provided by enactment who are qualified to serve as jurors, and has left the judges and the parties to criminal cases to decide which members of a jury panel were suitable to serve on a jury to try a particular case. To this extent the random selection of jurors has always been subject to qualification. Defendants have long had rights to peremptory challenges and to challenges for cause; prosecuting counsel for centuries have had the right to ask that a member of the panel should stand by for the Crown and to show cause why

\(^1\) [1950] 2 KB 164, at 173.

The term “stand by for the Crown” refers to a procedure dating from the time when the Crown did not have the right to make peremptory challenges (that is, challenges without giving a reason). The Crown was instead given an unlimited right to request prospective jurors, as they were ballotted, to “stand by for the Crown.” These people would then not be sworn as jurors but would, in effect, go to the back of the queue. Only if the prospective jurors remaining were insufficient to complete a jury would the people “stood by” be balloted again. If the Crown wished to exclude them on this second occasion, it was required to show cause.
someone should not serve on a jury; and trial judges, as an aspect of their duty to see that there is a fair trial, have had a right to intervene to ensure that a competent jury is empanelled."\[17\]

3.14 The Court of Appeal refused the application. In delivering the judgment, Lawton LJ said:

"In our judgment, the practice of the past is founded on common sense. A juror may be qualified to sit on juries generally, but may not be suitable to try a particular case. An example put to … [counsel for the applicant] during argument shows this. X is charged with unlawfully wounding a gamekeeper whilst out poaching. The prosecution’s case is that he was a member of a gang at the material time. When the jury comes to be empanelled one member of the panel is found to have a number of convictions for poaching (not amounting to disqualifications) all in the petty sessional division where the gamekeeper worked. In our judgment, to allow such a man to serve on that jury would be an affront to justice. He would be unlikely to be impartial; and, although he would be only one of 12, he could be expected to press his point of view; and its effect upon his fellow-jurors would depend upon his persuasive powers and their receptiveness to suggestion. The prospect of the case being tried according to the evidence would, in our judgment, be materially reduced.\[18\]

3.15 In *R v Richardson*\[19\], the applicant appealed against his conviction on the ground that one of the jurors was disqualified from jury service. Part II of Schedule I to the Juries Act 1974 included in the classes of persons disqualified from jury service "a person who at any time in the last five years has in the UK . . . had made in respect of him a probation order." The juror in question was subject to a Community Rehabilitation Order and was thus in effect on probation. The juror did not contact the Jury Summoning Bureau to advise them of his convictions, nor did he raise with the Bureau or with any staff member at the Crown Court any question as to his eligibility to sit as a juror. In this regard, the court referred specifically to section 18 of the Juries Act 1974, which provides:

"(1) No judgment after verdict in any trial by jury in any court shall be stayed or reversed by reason –

(a) that the provisions of this Act about the summoning or empanelling of jurors, or the selection of jurors by ballot, have not been complied with, or

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\[18\] *R v Mason* [1981] QB 881, at 888.
\[19\] [2004] EWCA Crim 2997.
(b) that a juror was not qualified in accordance with section 1 of this Act, or

(c) that any juror was misnamed or misdescribed, or

(d) that any juror was unfit to serve.

(2) Subsection (1)(a) above shall not apply to any irregularity if objection is taken at, or as soon as practicable after, the time it occurs and the irregularity is not corrected. …"

3.16 Clarke LJ reiterated in the judgment that:

"The question is whether the verdicts were safe. … [T]he mere fact of disqualification does not by itself justify the conclusion that the verdict is unsafe by reason of the express terms of s 18 of the Juries Act 1974. The cases show that there must either be some direct evidence or some evidence from which the inference can be drawn that the verdict is unsafe. … Section 18(1) begins:

'No judgment after verdict in any trial by jury . . .'

It does not refer only to verdicts which are unanimous. It must have been intended to include both unanimous and majority verdicts since in s 17 of the same Act, as we have already observed, Parliament provided for majority verdicts."

3.17 The court in R v Richardson also considered a number of cases in which problems of this kind had arisen in the past, and was of the view that the appeal case of R v Bliss provided the fullest consideration of the decided cases. In that case, Garland J said:

"It appears to us that the principle which emerges from these cases is that this Court will not interfere with the verdict of a jury unless there is either evidence pointing directly to the fact or evidence from which a proper inference may be drawn that the defendant may have been prejudiced or may not in fact have received a fair trial."

3.18 Garland J referred to the case of Chapman and Lauday, and said:

"The effect of section 18 was considered some 10 years ago in Chapman and Lauday, where after a verdict had been returned it was found that one of the jurors was exceedingly deaf
and had only heard at best about half of the proceedings. This Court held that not only was section 18 a complete answer to that particular difficulty but that had the juror's disability been known he could have been discharged, or alternatively he could have decided to take no part in the proceedings and the jury could after deliberations have returned a majority verdict of 11:1. However, this Court did go on to relate the provision of the Juries Act 1974, to which I have referred, to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and pointed out for any deficiency in a member of the jury to afford grounds for quashing a conviction, it had to constitute either a material irregularity in the course of the trial or render the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory. The Court went on to add at page 79 (a passage to which our attention has been drawn):

"One can see that there may be circumstances in which it could be argued that despite the provisions of section 18 of the Juries Act 1974 the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory because of some deficiency in a member of the jury or for some other reason, but on the facts of this particular case, where there is only one juror involved, where that juror could well have been discharged had the facts of his deafness become known and the trial proceeded; having regard to the fact that majority verdicts are possible in circumstances these days, and there being no evidence whatsoever of miscarriage of justice by reason of the verdicts, it is not possible to say that verdicts in the case of each of these appellants were either unsafe or unsatisfactory."

Language competence and educational standard

3.19 In United States of America v Jorge E Marin25 (a 1993 case), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of the appellant and held that the trial judge properly permitted the government to base a peremptory challenge on a witness's lack of education, and that that reason was not necessarily a racially motivated one. The court accepted that the prosecutor "had no interest in the race of prospective jurors but that he did have an interest in selecting educated jurors to try this complicated drug conspiracy case."26

3.20 In United States of America v Mike Moeller and Peter Thomas McRae, and Billie B. Quicksall27, the prosecution claimed at trial that the length and complexity of the case required jurors with at least a high school education. One panel member with no formal education seemed to be having difficulty with the questions and was unable to fill out the juror questionnaire. The

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25 7 F 3d 679.
26 7 F 3d 679, at 686.
27 80 F 3d 1053.
Circuit Judge ruled that "in this case, ... the complex nature of the conspiracy, and the number of interconnected offences alleged, adequately support the district court's determination that the prosecution articulated adequate race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes."  

3.21 Likewise, in United States of America v Jesus Carrasco Sandoval, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted that "the government sought to obtain a well-educated jury because the case is complex. ... Courts have also recognised that the education of a panel member may be considered in complex conspiracy cases." 

3.22 In Delvin Darnell James v the State of Texas (an unpublished appeal case), the Court of Appeals of Texas appeared to have accepted the prosecution's explanation that its challenge to two jurors was based on their education level. The Court noted:  

"The State explained it struck [potential juror] 24 because he had no high school education. The State further explained it also struck [potential juror] 18 for the same reason. The juror information card for [potential juror] 18 revealed that he had not completed high school. The rationale given was that the case involved a shooting and medical records would be introduced (presumably, the State was concerned about the jurors being able to read and understand the medical records). Such an explanation is race neutral." 

3.23 In the Canadian case of R v Saraga, the Quebec Superior Court granted an application made by the accused pursuant to section 555(2) of the Criminal Code for an order that the jury at his trial be composed of jurors speaking the English language. The application was to be determined on the basis that an accused who spoke English or French had the right to be tried by a jury skilled in whichever of the two official languages he habitually spoke. While the accused's first language was French and he still spoke excellent French, his recent day-to-day life had been conducted exclusively in English. In the circumstances, the court was satisfied that it was in the interest of justice that the trial be conducted in English. 

3.24 In the Canadian case of R v Fatt, the Crown brought a motion for a change of venue of the trial on the ground that the community size and the close personal relationships in the community between the defendant, the victim, and the Crown witnesses would make it impossible to select a jury from 159 voters listed in the community of approximately 300 people. The defendant asked the Court to declare that he had a right to a jury of 6 persons and asked that the Crown's motion for a change of venue be dismissed. The Crown's motion was rejected. In doing so, the court observed that a jury

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28 80 F 3d 1053, at 1060.  
29 1997 US Dist LEXIS 16253.  
30 Decided by the Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, Texarkana on 8 November 2005.  
31 1998 W C B LEXIS 6963.  
should be selected from the community of the defendant. There could be a good case made for classifying all Canadians as peers and members of the same community, though in the Northwest Territories that was more difficult. The court commented that that would imply a degree of integration with all the advantages that uniformity brings, but one could forcefully argue that that had not been the way, either in the Northwest Territories or in Canada itself. In the Northwest Territories, where the majority of the people were of native or aboriginal ancestry, a recent amendment to the Jury Act would allow for jurors who speak only one of the aboriginal languages to qualify as jurors. This was to benefit and preserve cultural pluralism in the North. Further, the Court said that:

"[Section 27 of this Charter [The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom] provided that the Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. This was a mandate for the preservation of the pluralistic society, especially, it would seem, in the North with its vast distances and vast differences. It would direct the court not to utilise the judicial system as if it were a tool for integration but rather to recognise the distinct culture and community of such groups as the unique Chipewyan group of the Dene. …

Community then, from these authorities, and from the realities imposed by size and logistical considerations … should mean a reasonably distinguishable group by language and culture. It should occupy … a unique geographic area. If those conditions are met, then it seems that those people living in that area should qualify as community. … Put simply, it seems that when a relatively homogeneous group, culturally and traditionally, live in a distinct geographic area (indeed, as the Dene or the Inuit do), if the jury is to fill its purported role, it will do this only if the jurors reflect the values and cultural mores of that community."\textsuperscript{33}

3.25 The court added that "[h]ere the accused has evidenced a legitimate concern and has waived his rights under the Charter to a 12-member jury." The court ruled that "a 6 or 12-member jury should be available at the option of the accused. … Here the venue will be changed to Fort Resolution (another village) because of the bias of the witnesses\textsuperscript{34} and granted the cross-motion for the 6-member jury.

3.26 In a 1997 NorthWest Territories Court of Appeal case, \textit{R v Kaunak}\textsuperscript{35}, the accused was acquitted on a charge of sexual assault. The Crown appealed and sought an additional order excluding monolingual Inuktitut speakers from the jury at a new trial. The accused had been tried by a jury, the members of which spoke two different languages. The Crown sought to adduce fresh evidence on appeal that the translation given to the jury

\textsuperscript{35} 36 WCB (2d) 237.
of the trial judge's instructions were wrong. The Court of Appeal ruled that the fresh evidence should be admitted and, as a result, a new trial was required as the Inuktitut-speaking jurors had not been properly instructed. While it was proposed that all jurors should be English-speaking at the retrial, the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the affidavit evidence led to the conclusion that concepts such as reasonable doubt, contained in any jury charge, were not capable of being translated into Inuktitut. The dissenting judge said that "... Absent Charter considerations, the court should defer to the legislative choice set out in the Jury Act so that no order should be made that the accused be tried by an English-speaking jury."  

3.27  In *United States of America v Martin Henderson* 37, the defendant was convicted following a jury trial and appealed on the grounds that the District Court erred in denying his motions challenging the array of petit jurors, because the Clerk of Court and Jury Commissioner, who were jointly responsible for the selection of qualified petit jurors, attached significant consideration in making that selection to each prospective juror's formal education. The contested issue was:

"Whether the clerk and the jury commissioner may consider intelligence level as indicated by a formal eighth grade education as a factor in the selection of the names of persons to be placed in the box from which the names of jurors are publicly drawn." 38

3.28  The Circuit Judge explained the process of selection of jurors as follows:

"The manner of the selection of the persons whose names were placed in the box from which the panel was drawn for the trial of the defendant was stipulated. The clerk of the court and the jury commissioner annually send a questionnaire to each of approximately 800 prospective jurors. Prospective jurors are required to answer the questionnaire in their own handwriting. It asks, among other things, the person's occupation, length of time of present employment or business, and ability to read, write and understand English. It requires that the number of years of primary, high school and college education be indicated by the circling of appropriate figures on the form. ... In determining whether to place the name of the person in the jury box the decision is made on the basis of the information disclosed by the questionnaire. Spelling, grammar, penmanship, failure to answer any question, and the nature and length of employment are all considered. A person may be accepted if the nature and length of employment indicate responsibility, ability and experience, regardless of the amount of formal education. The questionnaire is the sole basis for estimating the intelligence of the prospective juror and significant

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36 1997 WCB LEXIS 5526.
37 298 F 2d 522.
38 298 F 2d 522, at 523.
consideration is given to the amount of formal education for the purpose of obtaining more intelligent jurors. In connection with the selection of persons with less than an eighth grade education, if relatively few names are needed to fill the box, the clerk and commissioner become more selective and are more likely to select those who have had more formal education. At the time of defendant's trial there were some jurors whose names were in the box and some on the jury panel who had less than an eighth grade education.

The defendant contends that in the selection of prospective jurors for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which embraces the metropolitan Milwaukee area, whether such persons have completed eight grades of formal education may not be considered. He argues that in the enactment of 28 USCA section 1861, Congress has imposed a 'literacy' standard which precludes inquiry into the intelligence of prospective jurors and that the use of the intelligence criteria here employed by the clerk and commissioner in the selection process destroys the uniformity intended by Congress, violates the statute, and results in an exclusion of an important segment of the community, precluded by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and which voids defendant's conviction.”

3.29 In addressing the issue raised by the defendant, the court said:

"The government disputes that intelligence may play no part in jury selection and points to the fact that until September 1, 1948 qualifications and exemptions of federal jurors were dependent upon the laws of the state where the federal district court sat and that nineteen states imposed qualifications of 'intelligence, fair education'. In 1948, 28 USCA, sections 1861 and 1864 were enacted. Except for disqualification for certain criminal convictions, section 1861 made every citizen meeting the age and residence requirements competent for jury duty provided that he was able to read, write, speak and 'understand the English language', that he was not incapable to render efficient jury service because of mental or physical infirmities, and that he was not incompetent under state law. In 1957 Congress removed the provision requiring competency under state law from section 1861 as a part of civil rights legislation designed to attain objectives not inconsistent with recognition that a reasonable level of intelligence is appropriate, if not a requisite, to the rendition of efficient service as a juror. And, that the goal of 'efficient' service is an express objective of the statute is evidenced by its provision requiring rejection of persons incapable by reason of mental or physical infirmities of rendering 'efficient jury service'. Recognition that the statute envisions

39 298 F 2d 522, at 523-524.
‘efficient’ service requires rejection of a conclusion that an intelligence level equated with mere literacy was intended to be imposed as a maximum standard to be employed by the clerk and the commissioner in the selection of persons pursuant to section 1864 whose names are to be placed in the box from which jurors are drawn. And this view of the statute not only is in accord with its express provisions but is in harmony with the observation in Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 474, … that no due process infirmity invalidates a jury source which ‘reasonably reflects a cross-section of the population suitable in character and intelligence for that civic duty’. And as was pointed out in United States v Dennis, 2 Cir, … the theory that a jury must be a ‘cross-section’ of the community ‘must be taken with some reserves’ and the statute ‘presupposes some winnowing of those called’. The ‘cross-section’ contemplated is not an absolute. Frequently such complete representation would be impossible. …. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without the use of irrational or self-imposed standards.\textsuperscript{40}

3.30 In giving its ruling, the court said:

"The record before us discloses that the criteria here employed by the clerk and the commissioner in selecting persons whose names were placed in the box are not in themselves unreasonable or violative of the letter or spirit of the statute. Their use did not constitute or result in arbitrary exclusion. Lack of a formal eighth grade education did serve to require closer scrutiny of the nature of the person's employment to ascertain if it indicated such responsibility, ability or experience as evidenced a similar degree of intelligence. And, it was only where relatively few names were needed that persons who had more formal education were likely to be preferred for selection. Sole reliance on a questionnaire is not the most ideal method for the selection of prospective jurors. But the criteria here employed in the selection were not only practical, under the circumstances, but did serve to confirm the required ability to read, write, speak and understand the English language and indicate the existence of an intelligence level which certainly is not unreasonable as a requirement for the selection of efficient jurors. …. The facts here present no arbitrary exclusion of the nature condemned in Smith v Texas, 311 US 128, … cited and relied upon by the defendant. Nor do the criteria employed have the effect of excluding an important segment of the community here involved. The record shows that in such urban areas 82% of the adult population has at least an eighth grade education and 79% of male labourers meet this standard. …. Defendant has no constitutional or statutory right that 'ignorance'
be represented in the jury box. We are of the opinion that the District Court did not err in its rulings rejecting the challenge to the array.\textsuperscript{41}

3.31 In Robert K Mason, aka Anthony Bernard Smith \textit{v} Commonwealth of Virginia\textsuperscript{42}, a jury was empanelled without objection. While the jury was deliberating, defence counsel made a motion for a mistrial because he had received information that one of the jurors purportedly had "great difficulty understanding English." The trial judge interrupted the jury's deliberations and summoned the jurors to the courtroom, where he examined the challenged juror to determine her level of proficiency in the English language. The juror understood all the trial judge's questions. The Supreme Court of Virginia considered in the appeal whether the trial court should have removed the juror, who had been empanelled and sworn without objection. The Supreme Court referred to \textit{Weeks v Commonwealth}\textsuperscript{43} which pointed out that:

"[the appellate court] must give deference to the trial court's decision whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror because the trial court 'sees and hears the juror'; … the trial court's decision will be disturbed only upon a showing of manifest error."\textsuperscript{44}

3.32 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the decision of the trial court and said that:

"the trial court properly denied Mason's motion for a mistrial because the record fails to demonstrate that the challenged juror had a disability which was "such as to probably cause injustice" in Mason's criminal trial. … The trial court made a factual finding that the challenged juror had a sufficient level of understanding of the English language which permitted her to participate fully in the jury deliberations. According the trial court the deference to which it is entitled, we perceive of no reason to disturb the trial court's finding, which is supported by the record."\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item 298 F 2d 522, at 525-526.
\item 498 SE 2d 921.
\item 450 SE 2d 379.
\item 450 SE 2d 379, at 389.
\item 498 SE 2d 921, at 924.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Disability

Deafness

3.33 In the English case of Chapman and Lauday\(^{46}\), the defendants were convicted by unanimous verdicts of burglary and going equipped for burglary. After the trial it transpired that one of the jurors, though duly qualified, was deaf and did not hear half of the evidence or all of the judge's summing-up, because of his disability. The juror did not disclose his deafness to anyone during the trial, and it only came to light afterwards. The defendants appealed against conviction and contended that because of the juror's disability their trial was a nullity. The Court dismissed the appeal and said:

"… where there is only one juror involved, where that juror could well have been discharged had the facts of his deafness become known, and the trial proceeded; having regarded to the fact that majority verdicts are possible in circumstances these days, and there being no evidence whatsoever of miscarriage of justice by reason of the verdicts, it is not possible to say that verdicts in the case of each of these appellants were either unsafe or unsatisfactory.\(^{47}\)

3.34 Chapman and Lauday was followed in R v Barry Bliss\(^{48}\) where it was held that, pursuant to section 18(1) of the Juries Act 1974, the verdict of a jury should not be stayed or reversed by reason only that a disqualified juror was party to it. A deficiency in a member of a jury would only afford grounds for quashing a conviction if it constituted either a material irregularity in the course of the trial or rendered the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory. The Court of Appeal said that:

"… the principle … is that this Court will not interfere with the verdict of a jury unless there is either evidence pointing directly to the fact or evidence from which a proper inference may be drawn that the defendant may have been prejudiced or may not in fact have received a fair trial.\(^{49}\)

3.35 The English case of Re Osman\(^{50}\) concerned an application by a Mr Touron Osman who had received a summons for jury service at the Central Criminal Court. Mr Osman informed the court that he was profoundly deaf and thus required the services of an interpreter. The Recorder of London, Sir Lawrence Verney, pursuant to section 9B of the Juries Act, considered whether the summons should be discharged. Section 9B of the Juries Act 1974 provides that:

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\(^{46}\) (1976) 63 Cr App R 75.

\(^{47}\) (1976) 63 Cr App R 75, at 79.

\(^{48}\) [1986] Crim LR 467

\(^{49}\) (1987) 84 Cr App R 1, at 5.

\(^{50}\) [1996] 1 Cr App R 126.
"(1) Where it appears to the appropriate officer, in the case of a person attending in pursuance of a summons under this Act, that on account of physical disability there is doubt as to his capacity to act effectively as a juror, the person may be brought before the judge.

(2) The judge shall determine whether or not the person should act as a juror; but he shall affirm the summons unless he is of the opinion that the person will not, on account of his disability, be capable of acting effectively as a juror, in which case he shall discharge the summons.

(3) In this section "the judge" means any judge of the High Court or any Circuit judge or Recorder."

3.36 In his decision to discharge Mr Osman's jury summons, Sir Lawrence Verney addressed the issue of severe deafness:

"The disability here is one of severe deafness. Mr Osman … concedes that in court it would not be possible for him without help to be sure of hearing the questions of counsel, or the answers of witnesses, or the speeches of counsel, or the summing-up, … . What he says that he needs, and I accept that he does, is the service of a communicator or interpreter in British Sign Language. It is possible given notice to obtain those services as we have this morning. It is not easy, but the problem which arises therefrom is a problem which a court could face. What the court cannot allow is for this juror to have an interpreter retire with him to the jury room to interpret the deliberations. …

[Mr Osman] would not on account of his disability be able to follow the whole of the evidence and in those circumstances he cannot be capable of acting effectively as a juror. However willing he is to participate, his participation through no fault of his own would be incomplete and it is not fair to the defendant to have a jury in that situation. The interests of the defendant if they clash with those of a potential juror should in my opinion prevail."\(^51\)

3.37 Sir Lawrence Verney also made the following observations as to whether a deaf juror would be able to act effectively:

"I am sure that many people understand what is required in acting effectively as a juror and that may be why there has been little authority upon that subject. The only reference which I have found which is useful is Guildford Crown Court, ex p. Re Osman, [1996] 1 Cr App R 126, at 128-129."
Siderfin (1990) Cr App R 192, [1990] 2 Q B 683 where it is said that the duties [of a juror] include a willingness to enter into discussions with other members of the jury and to perform the duties of a juror in conjunction with them. I have no doubt as to the willingness of Mr Osman.

There are two aspects: the duties in court and the duties in retirement. In court, fairness to the defendant requires that every juror should have a similar opportunity to listen to the evidence and to assess the reliability of a witness. .... For even one [juror] to have an interpreter is likely to leave the defendant with a fear that the juror, while perhaps helped to understand what has been said, must inevitably has lost any nuances available to his colleagues from the manner and tone of voice in which answers are given. Where assessment of the credibility of a witness is important, as so often it is, that juror may not be capable of acting as effectively as the others.

More difficult – and I think insoluble – is the problem in the jury room on retirement. In court there is a reasonable prospect of ensuring that only one person speaks at a time, although that is not always achieved. In retirement all jurors may make a contribution – or so it is to be hoped – and they may try to do so simultaneously. How is the juror who requires an interpreter to make an equal contribution? It would seem that this can only be achieved by the presence in the jury room of the same interpreter.

It has long been held that it is an incurable irregularity for an independent person to retire with the jury even though he may take no part in the discussion. An interpreter would be bound to take a part even though not expressing any personal opinion."52

3.38 However, in People v Guzman53 the Court of Appeals of New York held that a hearing-impaired person was not disqualified from jury duty. As reported, the juror in question:

"[S]peaks English, reads English, but he cannot hear. Although he is able to read lips, he was assisted during jury selection by a court-appointed sign language interpreter. He explained that, through lip-reading, 'I can see everything about the person, I can feel the tone, I can see the tone, the inflection of the person, but I can never get full verbatim. That is why I prefer to use the interpreter."54

3.39 The prospective juror and the interpreter in People v Guzman communicated using sign language that transmitted the speaker's words

53 76 NY 2d 1.
54 76 NY 2d 1, at 3.
literally, without any intervening translation. The interpreter assured the court that she was familiar with, and would abide by, the code of ethics for sign language interpreters and that she would limit her role to that of a "communications facilitator".

3.40 The findings of the trial court, as noted by The Court of Appeals were:

"As with most juror qualification questions, the determination whether a hearing-impaired person can provide reasonable jury service in a given case must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court, which can question and observe the prospective juror and the interpreter during the voir dire. ... In addition, the [trial] court was satisfied that the interpreter was competent and could abide by ethical constraints and the court's instructions prohibiting participation in the jury's deliberations."55

3.41 The Court of Appeals' ruling on the defendant's contentions regarding the prospective juror's hearing impairment in People v Guzman was:

"Defendant contends, nonetheless, that the prospective juror was incapable of performing the duties of a juror in several respects. First, he challenges the juror's ability to perceive and understand the evidence on the ground that an interpreter might make mistakes in transmitting the testimony to the juror or might miss certain testimony if more than one person speaks at a time. Given the trial court's findings concerning the abilities of this juror and the interpreter, however, it seems unlikely that mistakes or omissions would occur with significantly greater frequency than they do with hearing jurors, who may be distracted or inattentive at times. Furthermore, material discrepancies between oral testimony and the signed transmission could be detected with the juror's lip reading ability or would surface during deliberations and could be resolved by having the testimony read back. Defendant also contends that, even with a signer, the juror could not adequately evaluate oral testimony because he would miss vocal inflections, which provide important clues about a witness's credibility. We disagree. For one thing, as the trial court noted, a qualified signer is able to convey much about the speaker's delivery, including the speed, pauses, modulations and other variations. Furthermore, the juror testified that he was able to use visual clues to determine the tone and inflection of the speaker. More importantly, however, there is no reason to suppose that perception of vocal inflections is a necessary part or a superior method of assessing credibility. Each juror is expected to bring to the courtroom his or her own method of

55 People v Guzman, 76 NY 2d 1, at 5.
sorting fact from fiction -- the same method the juror relies on in conducting everyday affairs. …

**Blindness**

3.42 In *Edwin R Lewinson v Robert J Crews*57 (a New York Case in 1967), a totally blind man was considered as not having the qualifications required of jurors under section 596 of the Judiciary Law because he is not "in the possession of his natural faculties". The court examined the practical duties and responsibilities which would fall upon a juror:

"The interpretation which we put upon the statute is supported by an examination of the practical duties and responsibilities which fall upon a juror:

He is frequently required to evaluate physical evidence. There are still photographs and moving pictures, and there are mechanical objects which demonstrate working parts. Sometimes enlarged fingerprints are the subject of comparison and examination; so, too, are diagrams and enlargements of handwriting exhibits when the genuineness of documents is being questioned. Occasionally, demonstrations are made with diagrams upon a blackboard. These are but a few of the many materials, objects and methods of presentation brought to the courtroom concerning which sight is indispensable to a full understanding.

Sight is also a factor in testing the credibility of a witness. The veracity of a witness is determined in the main by what he says. It may be discovered in the context of the questions and the answers and to some extent by the intonations of his voice. Another aid in this respect is the facial expression and body movement of a witness upon close and intense interrogation. Sight enforces the juror's judgment in this regard. Appellate courts recognize that a witness's physical presence provides assistance to the trier of the facts in evaluating his testimony, for although the appellate court has all the words of the trial before it in the printed record on appeal, it often bows to the determinations of fact made by the Judge or jury at the trial based on personal observations of the witnesses. There is sound reason for this rule of law for at the trial other aids beyond the cold record help to tell truth from falsehood.

A litigant who comes before the Bar of Justice, whether in a criminal case or in civil litigation, wishes to have the impact of his evidence fall with its full weight upon the jury, if there be a jury trial. If his evidence or exhibits are not understood or the force

56 People v Guzman, 76 NY 2d 1, at 6.
57 282 NYS 2d 83.
of his interrogation of witnesses is lost, he will not have been afforded his full rights. It is not an adequate protection to say that he may challenge the blind juror on the voir dire for if we hold blindness not to be a disqualification under the statute, a challenge for cause will not be available thereafter on that account. A peremptory challenge would be still available but these are limited in number and they are an important right possessed by a litigant; he should not be made to resort to such challenges in order to preserve his right to fair trial.

In requiring ‘natural faculties’ as a qualification for service on a jury, the Legislature may have considered not only the function of a juror, but also the effect his disability would have on the orderly and practical operation of the court’s processes. While this factor alone would not support the construction we make, it is a pertinent consideration.

3.43 Hopkins J (dissenting) however, expressed the following view:

"The qualifications of a juror are defined in the statute. … A citizen is guaranteed certain privileges and immunities. Traditionally, the right and duty to serve as a juror has been accounted to be a privilege of citizenship. Correlatively, all persons, whether citizens or aliens, are entitled to a trial by jury composed of citizens representing a broad spectrum of the community. A statute, which, either by definition or by administrative enforcement, prevents jury service by a large segment of the population violates the constitutional guarantees. The blind is a large segment of our population. A statute which by its definition of qualifications of jurors denies to the blind the right of jury service should do so in unmistakable terms; and the discrimination must be based on rational grounds. But our statute does not single out blindness as a ground of disqualification, as it does felons or the non-propertied. …

The right of jury service, then, unless limited by a clear direction, reposes in all citizens; the litigants may, of course, exercise their power of selection at the voir dire. A litigant might well favour the acceptance of a blind juror to serve in his case, despite the physical handicap. …

The ability of the blind to serve in the seat of judgment is reflected by the career of many non-sighted persons. Blindness does not disable one to be a lawyer or a Judge; it is contradictory to use the defect as a reason of rejection as a juror, especially since the juror does not act alone but in conjunction with 11 other persons to reach a joint determination. …

58 282 NYS 2d 83, at 85-86.
True, the blind juror cannot see the witness or real evidence. But an appraisal of testimony does not depend on the mere visual presentation; the voice of the witness and the inherent probability of the truth of the testimony are as cogent signs of the credibility of the evidence. In the use of these tests a blind person is no more handicapped than the sighted. … [T]he selection of jurors depends largely on the judgment of the suitors at the time of the trial. … Any predilection or bias on the part of a prospective juror which would militate against a fair verdict is thus left to exposure at the voir dire … The community has increasingly recognized the potential reservoir of talent and intelligence which the blind possess in common with other members of the group through the expansion of schools and auxiliary services: jury service, it seems to me, is not beyond their capabilities.⁵⁵⁹

3.44 In Commonwealth v Susi⁶⁰, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that "a mere description of the physical evidence would not have conveyed adequately the subtleties which would be apparent on a visual comparison".⁶¹ The predominant issue at the trial was identification of the defendant. The trial judge refused to excuse a blind prospective juror for cause, thereby necessitating the defendant to exhaust his peremptory challenges. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty and the defendant appealed against conviction on the ground that the trial judge erred in denying his challenge for cause of a juror who was blind. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the defendant had suffered a prejudicial diminution of peremptory challenges which warranted reversal and a new trial. The Supreme Court said:

"We believe that, in the circumstances of this case, the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the defendant's challenge for cause of a blind juror. The issue of identification was the predominant issue at trial. The jury were asked to view and to compare a drawing and photographic evidence, to compare the physical appearances of witnesses, and to compare the appearance of the defendant with is appearance in photographs and with a composite drawing. A mere description of the physical evidence would not have conveyed subtleties which would be apparent on a visual comparison."⁶²

3.45 In Jones v New York City Transit Authority⁶³, a blind person was considered to be properly excluded from jury service through the use of a challenge for cause based solely on his blindness in a personal injury action involving substantial amounts of physical evidence. David B Saxe J in his

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⁵⁹ 282 NYS 2d 83, at 86-89.
⁶⁰ Commonwealth v Susi 394 Mass 784
⁶¹ Commonwealth v Susi 394 Mass 784, at 788.
⁶² Commonwealth v Susi 394 Mass 784, at 788.
⁶³ 483 NYS 2d 623.
judgment highlighted the significance of whether a person's impairment would preclude him from serving as a reasonable juror in a particular case. He said:

"... when considering the competence of a blind person, the court must determine whether the person's impairment would preclude him from serving as a reasonable juror in that particular case. Physical handicaps, such as blindness, must be treated like any other disability when determining whether a prospective juror should be held incompetent to serve on a jury and thus removed for cause. It is therefore important to look at the duties and responsibilities of the jury and determine whether a blind individual is incapable of performing these duties."  

3.46 In the New York case of People v Caldwell, the court ruled that a vision-impaired juror was able to participate because the case primarily involved a determination on the issue of credibility based on conflicting accounts from witnesses. The court followed the decision in People v Guzman and said:

"No question exists about [the juror's] mental ability to understand the evidence or about her verbal communication skill. The sole question is whether her inability to observe the witnesses' facial expressions prevented her from fairly evaluating the testimony.

As the Court of Appeals noted in Guzman, each juror brings to the deliberation process his or her own background and experience. Thus, the court in Guzman held that a hearing-impaired juror should not be disqualified because that individual could not determine credibility based on the witness' tone and delivery. ... Similarly, it would have been inappropriate to disqualify [the juror] simply because she could not see the witnesses' facial expressions or their body language. ... [T]he question is whether the court could accommodate the juror by verbally describing the evidence or by any other means, and whether the evidence is so crucial that the juror's inability to see it denied the defendant a fair trial."

3.47 The decision in Jones v New York City Transit Authority was distinguished from People v Caldwell. In People v Caldwell, Rosalyn H Richter J remarked:

"In Jones, the court concluded that the prospective juror who was blind should not be permitted to serve because there would be a significant amount of physical evidence. Here, however,
the case primarily involved credibility determinations based on conflicting accounts from witnesses, whose testimony Ms B [the juror with visual impairment] was able to hear at trial. The jury also had to listen to a number of tape recordings, all of which Ms B could evaluate in the same manner as the other jurors. There were only a limited number, all of which the court read into the record.\textsuperscript{69}

3.48 In Donald Galloway v The Superior Court of the District of Columbia (a 1993 case), the plaintiff, who was blind, attempted to register for jury service. However, he was informed that he was barred from serving by the official policy of the defendant court, which excluded all blind persons. The plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the court and the district, alleging that the policy violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act\textsuperscript{70} and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The District Court for the District of Columbia, hearing the plaintiff's motion, said:

"…plaintiff has offered uncontradicted testimony that blind individuals, like sighted jurors, weigh the content of the testimony given and examine speech patterns, intonation, and syntax in assessing credibility. Thus, the 'nervous tic or darting glance, the uneasy shifting or revealing gesture is almost always accompanied by auditory correlates, [including inter alia,] clearing the throat, pausing to swallow, voice quavering or inaudibility due to stress or looking downward,' … and permits a blind juror to make credibility assessments just as the juror's sighted counterparts do."

3.49 However, in Walter Lavan Trammel v The State\textsuperscript{72} (a 1995 case), Justice Hunstein made the following observations:

"The prosecutor testified that she struck juror no 5 because he was visually impaired to the point of requiring a cane to make his way and she was concerned that he would be unable to see, adequately, the diagrams to be used by State's witnesses to point out the locations and movements of the victim and the defendant, all of which the prosecutor considered very important to the State's case. … The trial court, having the opportunity to observe juror no 5, could reasonably conclude as it did that the explanation offered by the State for striking him was race-neutral and without discriminatory intent."

\textsuperscript{69} 603 NYS 2d, at 715.
\textsuperscript{70} Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that:
"No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, … shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal assistance."
\textsuperscript{71} Donald Galloway v The Superior Court of the District of Columbia 816 F Supp 12, at 16-17.
\textsuperscript{72} 265 Ga 156.
\textsuperscript{73} 265 Ga 156, at 157.
It is clear from the case law that the basis for exempting persons who are blind or deaf from jury service is that they are thought unable to witness the demeanour of a person giving evidence. "Demeanour" denotes the outward manifestations of a witness, including appearance, conduct and tone and inflection in speech, which may assist the trier of fact generally in interpreting the witness's oral evidence and also in determining the credibility of the evidence given by that witness. "Demeanour" was given its importance in common law by the appellate courts' reluctance to overturn the trial judge's decision where that decision was based on the judge's opinion of a witness's demeanour.\footnote{The "El Uruguayo" [1928] 31 LIL Rep 89.}

The significance of observing the demeanour of a witness was highlighted in the Scottish case of Watt v Thomas\footnote{Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484, at 487-8.}, in which Lord Thankerton referred to the following opinion of Lord Shaw in Clarke v Edinburgh & District Tramways Co Ltd\footnote{1919 SC (H.L.) 35.}:

"Witnesses without any conscious bias towards a conclusion may have in their demeanour, in their manner, in their hesitation, in the nuance of their expressions, in even the turns of the eyelid, left an impression upon the man who saw and heard them which can never be reproduced in the printed page."\footnote{1919 SC (H.L.) 35, at 36-37.}

In Murray v Fraser\footnote{Quoted by Lord Justice Clerk in Murray v Fraser SC 1916, at 632 n.}, the Lord Justice Clerk referred to the following observations made by Lord Halsbury in Kilpatrick v Dunlop:

"I am unable to determine one thing or the other, namely, whether the appellant or respondent was worthy of credit. It is a question of credit, where each gives a perfectly coherent account of what he has done and said, and contradicts the other. Under these circumstances it is impossible that the Court of Appeal should take upon itself to say, by simply reading printed and written evidence, which is right, when it has not had that decisive test of hearing the verbal evidence and seeing the witnesses, which the judge had who had to determine the question of fact, and to determine which story to believe."\footnote{[1974] AC 484, at 489.}

In referring to the same observations made by Lord Halsbury in Kilpatrick v Dunlop, Lord Thankerton said:

"In other words, whereas you might formerly find in the judge's notes some indication of the impression made on his mind by the witnesses, no trace of any such impression is to be found in the cold, mechanical, record of the evidence."\footnote{[1974] AC 484, at 489.}
Ineligibility and excusals

3.54 As we have discussed in the previous chapters, all people are liable for jury service unless disqualified, ineligible or exempt as of right under statutory provisions. However, there are cases in which particular jurors have sought to be excused from service, and cases in which defendants have appealed against conviction on the ground that a particular juror was ineligible for jury service.

3.55 In *R v Crown Court at Guildford ex parte. Siderfin*\(^{81}\), the applicant belonged to the Plymouth Brethren, a religious sect which had conscientious objections to jury service. She was summoned to appear before the Crown Court and wrote objecting to jury service on religious grounds. The chief clerk decided not to excuse her from jury service pursuant to section 9(2) of the *Juries Act 1974*\(^{82}\). On appeal, a judge in chambers, after refusing her an adjournment for legal representation, found that she had not established sufficient grounds to be excused from jury service. She applied for judicial review of the judge's decision. In the judgment granting her application for judicial review, Watkins LJ said:

"We repeat that the existence of a serious conscientious objection arising out of a religious belief, on its own, would be unlikely to amount to a 'good reason' for being excused jury service. In other words, it would not outweigh the necessity to insist upon the observance of the public duty or obligation to perform jury service. It may, in our view, do so if the applicant's religious beliefs, for example, would be likely to prevent her from performing her duty as a juror in a proper way. Adherence to some kind of religious belief simply cannot be regarded as an unchallengeable right to excusal from jury service as automatically amounting to 'good reason.' ... In the present case, ... the judge did not ... appreciate that if the applicant served on a jury she would, according to her, perform her duties in isolation from the other jurors. She would, she informs us in her affidavit, have reached a verdict without reference to any other juror, and moreover announced it separately. In other words, she would not participate at all in the usual discussion between jurors which is an integral part of the jury system. There is, as has been recently emphasised in *Watson and Others* (1988) Cr App R 1, 8, [1988] QB 690, 700 in the judgment of a five judge Court given by Lord Lane, C.J.:

\[^{81}\](1990) 90 Cr App R 192.
\[^{82}\]Section 9(2) of the *Juries Act 1974* provides that:

"If any person summoned under this Act shows to the satisfaction of the appropriate officer that there is good reason why he should be excused from attending in pursuance of the summons, the appropriate officer may excuse him from so attending and shall do so if the reason shown is that the person is entitled under subsection (1) to excusal."
'A duty on each jury member not only as an individual but collectively. That is the strength of the jury system. Each of you takes into the jury box with you your individual experience and wisdom. Your task is to pool that experience and wisdom. You do that by giving your views and listening to the views of the others. There must necessarily be "discussion, argument and give and take within the scope of your oath."’’

3.56 It was also said *per curiam* that:

"We feel it right to repeat in conclusion that membership of a religious sect or movement cannot be regarded as a passport to excusal from jury service. Excusal is a personal matter. Every application must, as we have said, be determined on its own facts and strictly according to law."

3.57 In *R v Gray*, an application was made by counsel for one of the accused that a juror should be "excused" after the commencement of a trial for rape on the ground that one of the jurors was known to the step-father of the prosecutor. Counsel argued that that juror should be excused from further attendance under section 55a of the Juries Act, 1927-1976, and that the trial should continue with eleven jurors. The juror concerned stated that, although he knew the prosecutor’s step-father, he did not know the prosecutor, and he denied that his impartiality as a juror would be in any way affected. Jacobs J denied the application and said:

"I am unable to construe s 55a as conferring a power to discharge a juror or to require that he be excused. The power is to excuse a juror from further attendance in cases of special urgency or importance …. The power to excuse is not a power to discharge, neither in my judgment is the power to order that a juror be excused a power which the judge can exercise of his own motion, without application by the juror and contrary to the wishes of the juror. In any event, in view of the juror's categorical assertion that he was aware of his duty and responsibility, and that his impartiality was not affected by the matter to which attention had been drawn, I was not satisfied that "any matter of ... importance" had arisen to justify me in requiring the juror to be excused, if indeed I had such power. I appreciated that justice must appear to be done, but there was no reason to apprehend that it would not be.

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84 (1990) 90 Cr App R 192, at 199.
85 Section 55a of the Juries Act, 1927-1976 provides:
-During any inquest civil or criminal, except for murder or treason, if the presiding judge is satisfied that by reason of any matter of special urgency or importance any juror should be excused from further attendance, the judge may order that that juror be excused from attendance during that inquest, and during such further period (if any) as the judge specifies."
In the course of submissions, counsel for one of the accused suggested that I should invite the juror to seek to be excused, in terms which gave him little or no option to refuse, but it seemed to me that to adopt such a course would not only be a grave and unfair imputation against the juror, but would have one of two other consequences. If the juror refused I would have been left with no alternative but to discharge the jury, a course which all counsel wished to avoid. If, however, the juror, in response to pressure from me, had sought to be excused notwithstanding his assertions of impartiality, it could scarcely have failed to undermine the confidence that ought to exist between the Court and the jury, or the balance of the jury as the case may be. I doubt very much that I would in any circumstances have put the jury, or the jury concerned, in such a dilemma. It seems to me that the only real choice or discretion that I had was either to discharge the jury, whatever the consequences, and irrespective of the wishes of counsel, if I had any reason to apprehend a mistrial or a miscarriage of justice, or else, if I had no such apprehension (and I had none) to direct the trial to continue.

3.58 In the Scottish case of Hamilton v HM Advocate, a juror was excused from service on the last day of a trial because of a threat made to him. He communicated the fact that he had been threatened to another juror when entering the court. The trial judge refused to excuse the latter juror. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground inter alia that this decision by the trial judge was erroneous in law. The High Court refused this ground of appeal and held that the trial judge had not erred in law, and had cured the problem by an adequate direction in his charge to the jury. This direction was to the effect that the jury should put out of their minds any information which they had as to the fact of, and circumstances surrounding, the discharge of the former juror and that they would be breaking their judicial oath if they allowed themselves to be influenced by any extraneous considerations.

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86 R v Gray, 17 SASR 534, at 538-539.
87 1986 SLT 663.
Chapter 4

Issues for consideration and reforms in other jurisdictions

Introduction

4.1 This chapter looks at each of the criteria currently applied for qualification as a juror and the issues which those criteria raise. It also refers to proposals for reform which have been made in a number of other jurisdictions. It may be useful at the outset, however, to set out what are generally perceived to be the functions of the jury.

4.2 The jury’s primary function is to determine the relevant facts of the case from the evidence presented and to apply the law to reach a verdict. The jury acts as a fact-finder and it is for the jury to decide which witnesses to believe and which to reject, either in whole or in part. In addition to this primary function, the New Zealand Law Commission identified a number of others which the jury serves:

“...The core value underlying all the various functions of the jury is their democratic nature. They allow members of the community to participate in the criminal justice system and to bring a diverse range of perspectives, personal experiences and knowledge to bear in individual criminal cases. ...

... The jury, because of its nature, acts as the community conscience in deciding criminal cases. However, this function is dependent on juries representing all members of the community, and deliberating in an impartial and democratic manner.

The jury is also regarded as a safeguard against arbitrary or oppressive government. However, it rarely operates actively in this sense. It plays an important role in legitimising and maintaining public confidence in the criminal justice system. In order to maximise that confidence, juries should appear to be, and in fact be, impartial and representative of the community. The jury also has a role in educating people about the workings of the criminal justice system.”

4.3 In Juries: A Hong Kong Perspective, Peter Duff, Mark Findlay, Carla Howarth and Chan Tsang-fai considered the role of jurors as finders of fact and commented:

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"It is argued that because the jury is comprised of ordinary citizens, it is able to assess more accurately than the judge what actually happened in the incident with which the trial is concerned. In fulfilling their task, jurors are seen as being able to utilize their collective common sense, apply their own knowledge of the world and draw upon their own everyday experiences. Collectively, or even singly, jurors will have a wider experience of the world than the judge, and it is also likely that the jury will be more familiar with the social world from which most defendants and witnesses will come. Also, it is argued that there is less danger of the jury becoming case-hardened, and thus cynical about the tales told by the defendant and disposed automatically to believe the police. On this basis, it is alleged, the jury can better weigh up the facts presented to them, decide which witnesses to believe and which to doubt, determine whether certain events were possible or probable, and assess the credibility of the defendant’s story."

The authors remarked, however, that a number of criticisms could be levelled at this "rather rosy" picture of the jury. These included the fact that the rules of evidence would often prevent the jury from hearing all the available evidence; that the jury might not fully understand the evidence, particularly technical evidence; and that the jury’s view of the evidence could be significantly influenced by the judge.

"Trial by one’s peers" and the representativeness of the jury

4.4 The democratic and social functions of the jury to which the New Zealand Law Commission referred are reflected in the somewhat ambiguous concept of "trial by one’s peers." That concept dates back to the Magna Carta in England in 1225. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta provides that:

"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land."3

4.5 At the time of the Magna Carta, however, this provision had nothing to do with trial by jury in the sense that it is understood today. Instead, as pointed out by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, "trial by one’s peers":

"... benefited only direct tenants of the King, such as barons, who were entitled to be tried by their feudal peers rather than by the King's justices. The procedure was expanded after Pope

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2 Peter Duff, Mark Findlay, Carla Howarth, Chan Tsang-fai (eds), Juries: A Hong Kong Perspective (Hong Kong University Press, 1992), Chapter 1, at 3.
Innocent III forbade trial by ordeal, also in 1215. English judges began to rely instead on informed neighbours of an accused person; people who would be expected to know the facts. Gradually, however, the jury developed into a body of free and propertied men who were required to find the facts by weighing only the evidence presented to them. Knowledge of the facts or of a party became a ground for excluding a person from a particular jury.⁴

4.6 The term “peers” was used in the Magna Carta in the general sense of social equals. In the context of the modern jury trial, the term has been taken to mean a representative cross-section of the community. Trial by one’s peers does not equate to trial by one’s own ethnic group. In the Queensland case of *R v Walker*,⁵ the applicant complained that the panel of prospective jurors for his trial contained no members of his own Nunukel people. In dismissing his complaint, the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal said:

“There is nothing at all in the record to suggest that the jury before whom the applicant's trial in the District Court proceeded was not formed from a panel selected and summoned in the manner provided by the provisions of the Jury Act. The fact, if it be so, that the panel included no Nunukel people may have been attributable to chance, or to the limits, prescribed under s.11 of the Jury District of Brisbane. However that may be, it does not follow that the appellant did not receive trial by a jury of his ‘peers’ or equals; and, even if it did, it would not signify. The provisions of the Jury Act regulating the composition of juries were complied with at his trial and, if in conflict with ch. 39 of Magna Carta, the provisions of ch. 39 are to that extent impliedly repealed.

The appellant's complaint that he was not tried by a jury of Nunukel people is therefore not one that is admitted under the law of Queensland, which does not recognise the possibility of a jury drawn exclusively from a particular ethnic or other distinctive group in the community.”⁶

4.7 It has long been recognised that the jury should be representative of the community as a whole, rather than a particular group. But that does not mean that each jury must be a statistical cross-section of the community from which it comes, as the New Zealand Law Commission pointed out:

“‘Peers’ on a jury in a criminal trial are the 12 people drawn randomly from the population living in the court’s jury district.

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⁵ [1988] 2 Qd R 79.
⁶ Same as above, at 85-86.
It is statistically possible to have any number of random samples, none of which is representative of the population from which they are drawn. A random sample of names from a jury list is not necessarily a representative sample of the jury district population (or of the general population). In other words, we cannot always expect ‘individual juries’ to reflect the distribution of different groups in the jury district population. In practice, the random selection process is also compromised by various factors including the completeness and accuracy of electoral rolls (and therefore jury lists) the ability to excuse people from jury service, and the use of peremptory challenges.\(^7\)

4.8 The importance of representativeness is explained by Professor Michael McConville in the preface to *Juries: A Hong Kong Perspective*:

"For many jurisdictions, the jury is a core political institution symbolizing the commitment of the state to democratic, representative and participatory forms of government. The jury constitutes a force for laws which are understandable to ordinary people and in keeping with their sentiments about fairness and justice. And in a real sense, whilst applicable to only a small minority of cases, jury trial acts as some restraint upon both the cult of professionalism and the centrifugal tendencies of the strong state. Through the general verdict, the jury has the power and the right to judge not only the facts but also the law and the use to which it is put in specific cases.\(^8\)"

4.9 The importance of a representative jury was recognised by the Departmental Committee on Jury Service in its 1965 report, when it said:

"A jury should represent a cross-section drawn at random from the community, and should be the means of bringing to bear on the issues that face them the corporate good sense of that community. This cannot be in the keeping of the few, but is something to which all men and women of good will must contribute.\(^9\)"

4.10 One argument advanced in favour of a representative jury is that it helps ensure impartiality: the biases of the individual are cancelled out within the group.\(^10\) The significance of a representative jury is further explained in *Juries: A Hong Kong Perspective*, by Peter Duff, Mark Findlay, Carla Howarth, and Chan Tsang-fai:

"Ultimately perhaps, the independence of the jury and its representativeness are subsidiary to the notions of impartiality

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8 Duff, Findlay, Howarth & Chan (1992), above, at xi.
and community participation. … the representativeness of the jury guarantees that it is genuinely the community view that is put forward and so furthers impartiality in that any individual prejudices are submerged in the group. Any biases present in particular sectors of the community are negated."¹¹

4.11 A similar view was expressed by the Victorian Law Reform Committee in its 1997 report on *Jury Service in Victoria*:

"It is submitted that the concept of forming an impartial jury can co-exist with the concept of a representative jury. In fact they are mutually supportive if we view the impartial jury not as one in which there is no prejudice but as one where the balance of prejudices in the community are reflected in the composition of the jury. Deliberations are considered impartial then, when group differences are not eliminated but are invited and represented."²²

**The representativeness of the jury in Hong Kong**

4.12 The number of people who qualify for jury service in Hong Kong is relatively small as a proportion of the overall population. According to the records kept by the Registrar of the High Court, the number of jurors as at mid-2006 was about 469,500 out of a population of around 6.9 million. This is a significant improvement on the position in 1995, when it was said there were only 20,000 persons qualifying for jury service out of a population of around 6 million.³³ One change was the extension of the jury list in 1997 to include those proficient in the Chinese language, where hitherto there had been a requirement for proficiency in the English language. Section 4(1)(c) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) now provides that a person qualifies for jury service if he “has a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the proceedings.” Article 9 of the Basic Law provides that both Chinese and English are official languages of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and, as such, proficiency in either language satisfies the language requirements for jury service.

4.13 Earlier criticisms of the Hong Kong jury list as consisting of “a cultural, social and political elite”⁴⁴ may no longer be justified, but some concerns as to the representativeness of the Hong Kong jury may remain valid. Commenting on the jury system in Hong Kong in 1992, Professor McConville commented:

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"For those Chinese who appear on the jury list, there is a clear bias in favour of the well-educated, middle class, professional or business people. The system is also noteworthy for its composition (seven jurors, with nine possible in complex fraud cases) which may be significantly affected by peremptory challenges (each defendant having five such challenges), extensive provisions for exemption and disqualification..."\textsuperscript{15}

4.14 The authors of the 1992 study of the jury system in Hong Kong were in no doubt as to the desirability of a representative jury:

"In most other common law jurisdictions, the state has been forced to expand the jury franchise as a result of contemporary ideological pressures which render increasingly attractive notions such as democracy, representativeness and community participation in official decision making. ... On a practical level, the ability of the jury to fulfil its task is increasingly perceived to be dependent upon its representing a true cross-section of the community. For example, in comparison to a judge, or a jury drawn from the upper echelons of society, a representative jury is perceived to have wide experience of the world and to possess sound common sense. This gives it the ability to assess the reliability of witnesses and to determine the likelihood of various events having taken place. On the more political level, a jury which represents society as a whole, rather than the social elite, is perceived to be more likely to be independent of the state and impartial in its judgement upon the accused..."\textsuperscript{16}

**Age requirements**

**Lower age limit**

4.15 There are two broad strands of opinion in relation to the appropriate lower age limit for jury service. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the responsibilities of jury service require a level of maturity and experience which precludes those of young age. Lord Roskill, in the 1986 Fraud Trials Committee Report, said that some witnesses had suggested that the lower age limit of 18 was too low and should be raised to 21, or perhaps 25. It was argued that "few 18 year olds can be expected to have sufficient maturity and experience of life to make a proper judgment on the issues which they are required to determine."\textsuperscript{17}

4.16 On the other hand, there are others who argue that the age for jury service should be the same as, for instance, that at which persons are considered mature enough to exercise their electoral rights and vote. The New Zealand Law Commission proposed in their preliminary paper on *Juries in*

\textsuperscript{15} Duff, Findlay, Howarth & Chan (1992), above, at Preface.
\textsuperscript{16} Same as above, at 58-59.
\textsuperscript{17} Fraud Trials Committee Report (1986), above, at Chapter 7, para 7.7.
Criminal Trials that the minimum age limit should be lowered to 18, the same age at which people in New Zealand would qualify to vote, and referred to arguments from the 1976 report of the UK Committee on the Age of Majority:

"By 18 most young people are ready for these responsibilities and rights and would greatly profit by them, as would the teaching authorities, the business community, and the administration of justice, and the community as a whole.\footnote{18}

4.17 A further argument advanced by the New Zealand Law Commission for lowering the age was to enhance the jury's representativeness:

"Lowering the age qualification would benefit representation of the community on juries. The age of defendants who can potentially be tried by jury is 14 years and older. A significant proportion of the population who could be described as a defendant's 'peers' in terms of age would be eligible for jury service if the minimum age qualification were lowered to 18 years.\footnote{19}

It is worth noting that the Juries Amendment Act 2000 subsequently reduced the minimum age for jury service in New Zealand from 20 to 18 years.

Upper age limit

Australia

4.18 In Victoria and New South Wales persons over the age of 65 years are eligible but excused as of right from jury service.

4.19 The issue of the upper age limit of a juror was studied by the Victorian Law Reform Committee, which issued a paper for public discussion and comment in November 1994. Among the submissions received was one from the Council on the Ageing in Victoria, which argued that there should be no automatic exclusion of those over an upper age limit. The Council pointed out, first, that people's abilities related in only a minor way to their age. Secondly, juries should be reflective of the community and older people should be included in the same proportion as they occur in the population. The Council pointed out thirdly that the older age range was likely to cover a greater proportion of retired people who may have more time available, and who have retired from occupations which had earlier exempted them from jury service.

\footnotetext{18}{New Zealand Law Commission (1998), above, at para 331.}
\footnotetext{19}{Same as above, at para 333.}
4.20 In the light of these discussions, the Victorian Law Reform Committee formed the following view:

"Largely for the reasons advanced by the Council on Ageing, the committee believes that an upper age limit should not apply to jury service. However, in order to reduce inconvenience and anxiety, persons aged 70 years and over should be entitled to elect to have their names removed from the jury list. A notice including a form of election should be included on the questionnaire sent to prospective jurors. Persons aged 70 years and over should be able to elect to remain on the jury list or to have their names removed from the jury list. Failure to return a notice of election should be deemed to constitute an election to have one's name removed. Generally, an election should be once and for all. However, a person whose name has been removed from a jury list should have a right to apply to the sheriff to have his or her name reinstated on the roll from which future jury lists will be completed.

The committee recognises that such a system will increase the administrative burden of operating the jury system. However, the system is technically feasible.\(^\text{20}\)

The Committee accordingly recommended that there should be no upper age limit for jury service, and persons aged 70 years and over should be entitled to elect not to be eligible for selection for jury service.\(^\text{21}\)

New Zealand

4.21 The New Zealand Law Commission considered whether the existing maximum age qualification should be removed and observed that:

"Juries should be as representative of the community as possible. There seems to be no reason in principle why people aged 65 and older should not be qualified for jury service. Such people should decide for themselves whether or not they want to serve on a jury.\(^\text{22}\)

4.22 The Juries Amendment Act 2000 subsequently reduced the minimum age for jury service in New Zealand from 20 to 18 years and removed the maximum age limit of 65 years. Registrars were given the power to excuse persons over that age.

England and Wales

4.23 In England and Wales, section 1(a) of the Juries Act 1974 provides that the upper age limit for jurors is 70 years, and section 19 of the


\(^{21}\) Same as above, at para 3.168, Recommendation 40.

\(^{22}\) The New Zealand Law Commission (1998), above, at para 337.
Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that jurors over 65 years of age can be excused as of right.

**Residency requirements**

4.24 In most common law jurisdictions, a prospective juror must be enrolled as an elector (e.g., New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand, Ireland), or a resident or citizen of the jurisdiction in question (e.g., Alberta, USA). In the United Kingdom, a prospective juror must be registered on the parliamentary or local government electoral roll and have been ordinarily resident in the UK, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, for any period of at least five years since attaining the age of 13.

4.25 As with the application of other qualifying criteria which restrict the entry of a person's name to the jury list, the imposition of a residency requirement reduces the representativeness of the jury pool. The Victorian Law Reform Committee pointed out:

"The requirement of citizenship not only reduces the representativeness of the jury system, it has been argued that it encroaches upon the accused person's right to have a trial by his or her peers."^{23}

While recognising the considerable practical and administrative difficulties entailed in such a change, the Victorian Law Reform Committee nevertheless concluded that:

"... the basic qualification for jury service should include non-citizen permanent residents. However, because of the current administrative difficulties in establishing an accurate database of citizens and non-citizen permanent residents, the committee accepts that for the time being the qualification should remain unchanged."^{24}

4.26 The importance of juries representing the local community's values was emphasised by the New Zealand Law Commission in its 1998 discussion paper on juries:

"The use of local jury districts, centred upon a jury court, has parallels with the boundaries of electoral districts and the election of constituency members of Parliament to represent local interests. A similar principle is in operation: people have a strong interest in the administration of criminal justice in their own local community, and their interests and sense of community values should be represented on local juries."^{25}

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24 Same as above, at para 3.11.
4.27 In New Zealand, section 7 of the Juries Act 1981 provides that no one may serve on a jury who has:

(a) at any time, been sentenced to imprisonment for life or for a term of three years or more, or to preventive detention;

(b) at any time in the preceding five years been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three months or more, or to corrective training."

4.28 The New Zealand Law Commission commented in its discussion paper on *Juries in Criminal Trials* that any disqualification diminishes the representative nature of juries. The Commission pointed out that before the enactment of the Juries Act 1981, the corresponding provision (section 5(d)) in the Juries Act 1908 disqualified anyone of "bad fame or repute" as well as people who had previous criminal convictions, and that this was reinforced by section 3 of the 1908 Act, which provided that only those people of "good fame and character" qualified as jurors. The Commission observed, however, that:

"… The inclusion of the 'bad fame or repute' disqualification in the same provision disqualifying people with previous convictions suggests a common rationale for both – a rationale which may still underlie the disqualification based on previous imprisonment for an offence. The rationale may be characterised in terms of impartiality: that there is a risk of bias if a person who has been convicted and imprisoned for a criminal offence is permitted to serve on a jury. …

How do we know that a person who has been convicted and imprisoned for a criminal offence will be biased? The answer is that we do not, any more than we know that such person will not be biased. It is impossible to predict accurately the attitudes of an individual based on their personal characteristics and history."²⁶

4.29 The New Zealand Law Commission considered that excluding those who had served their sentence went against the idea of rehabilitation, by denying them an opportunity to participate in an important civic and community duty. It also diminished the representative nature of the jury.²⁷ The Commission went on:

²⁶ Same as above, at paras 339-340.
²⁷ Same as above, at para 341.
"A primary justification for retaining the present disqualification would be to preserve the integrity of the jury system, rather than attempting to exclude arbitrarily jurors assumed to be biased because of their criminal history. The integrity or legitimacy of the jury system may be compromised if juries include people who have themselves been convicted and punished for criminal offences. If a jury acquits a defendant, and one or more people on the jury had previously been sentenced to imprisonment for serious crimes, then public confidence in the integrity of that verdict could be undermined.

It has been suggested by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in The Jury in a Criminal Trial (1986) that people who have been charged with criminal offences, but who have not yet had those charges finalised, should also be disqualified from jury service. The presumption of innocence suggests that a person should not be disqualified because of what an accusation of criminal offending may say about his or her character. The New South Wales suggestion was that disqualification should arise because of the "currency of their association with the criminal justice process". That association may be a biasing factor. However, we disagree with this approach. A person who has not been convicted should not be disqualified. Being the spouse, a sibling, parent or offspring of a convicted or accused person may be an equally biasing factor. Considerations such as that suggest that drawing the line at any point other than the presumption of innocence would be a difficult exercise, and devoid of principle. If a person summoned for jury service is in custody awaiting trial or sentence, then prison authorities could apply to the Registrar for that person to be excused within the terms of s.15(1) of the Juries Act.²²⁸

4.30 In their report on Juries in Criminal Trials, the New Zealand Law Commission concluded that the current provisions excluding persons with certain convictions from jury service should be retained. Their views were set out as follows:

"It is not possible to predict whether an individual with a conviction will in fact be biased against the justice system. One who regrets conduct which resulted in conviction may feel strongly against criminal behaviour. Moreover, a person who has served a sentence may be said to have paid the debt to society and be entitled not to be punished further. Recent work in the area of restorative justice stresses that crime is a violation of relationships among the offender, the victim and the community, and that there exists a need for the restoration of

²²⁸ Same as above, at paras 342-343.
those relationships and the reintegration of offenders into society. Legal barriers to social and civic participation, such as disqualification from jury service, not only serve as a constant reminder to offenders that they are not permitted to truly re-integrate, but may help to persuade them that any efforts to do so are wasted.

Nevertheless, on balance, the Commission is of the view that the current provisions are justified. Only serious offenders are permanently excluded; most offenders are excluded for five years, if at all. Considerations of possible bias, the need for the appearance of a neutral jury, and the potential distraction of a juror with recent convictions outweigh the desire for more prompt reintegration.

Undischarged bankrupts

Australia: Victoria

4.31 Following their review of the jury system in Victoria, the Victorian Law Reform Committee concluded that undischarged bankrupts should be eligible for jury service. The Committee's views were set out as follows:

"Schedule 2 of the Juries Act 1967 lists those persons who are disqualified from jury service in Victoria. Since 1865 persons who are undischarged bankrupts have been disqualified. The only other Australian jurisdiction to disqualify undischarged bankrupts is the Australian Capital Territory.

This category of disqualification reflects the historical status of an undischarged bankrupt. In the United Kingdom, legislation relating to bankruptcy used to focus on fraudulent debtors, so that over time the following characterisation applied:

Though it is not a crime, becoming bankrupt involves modifications of status, resulting in certain civil disqualifications and quasi-penal consequences.

However, as several submissions to the committee argued, not all bankrupts should be disqualified from jury service because some are rendered bankrupt through factors beyond their control.

Criticism of this category of disqualification is not new. During the revision of the Juries Act in 1958, the author of an internal working document commented:

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It is with some misgiving that this provision has been retained. It appears to pre-suppose that all bankrupts are dishonest.

All categories of disqualification, other than that of being an undischarged bankrupt, exclude persons who have committed fairly serious criminal offences. The committee is of the view that in contemporary Australia it is inappropriate to associate undischarged bankrupts with criminals in regard to jury service disqualification. ¹³⁰

Education requirements

4.32 In response to their consultation about jury service in Victoria, the Victorian Law Reform Committee received submissions suggesting that jurors should have to satisfy a minimum literacy requirement. The Victorian Law Reform Committee did not agree with these submissions and said:

"The committee believes that the introduction of a literacy requirement as part of the basic qualification for jury service is unnecessary because under the Juries Act 1967 a person who is unable to read or write, or has an inadequate knowledge of the English language is already ineligible for jury service. If a higher level of knowledge of the English language were required this would cause juries to be less representative of the community as a whole. This requirement would operate to exclude certain groups within the community. Persons from non-English speaking backgrounds and groups who have been identified as having literacy difficulties would be particularly affected by such a requirement.

In any event, judges already have a discretionary power to direct jurors to seek to be excused if they have difficulty in reading or writing, and a judge can stand a juror aside of his or her own motion in the interests of justice. A direction concerning literacy was given in the Grollo case where important evidence was to be given in the written form. Prospective jurors who sought to be excused on this ground were asked whether they were able to read the daily newspaper. In the United Kingdom in the Maxwell case a questionnaire was administered to the jury panel partly in order to ascertain literacy levels." ¹³¹

4.33 The idea of a literacy requirement for jurors was also discussed in England by Lord Roskill in the 1986 Fraud Trials Committee Report, where he referred to the earlier views of the Morris Committee:

"The Morris Committee considered whether their recommendation that inclusion on the electoral register should be the basic qualification for jury service (in place of the householder qualification) ought to be coupled with a recommendation that some sort of educational, intelligence or literacy test should be introduced. The Committee rejected various proposals along these lines as being either inappropriate or unacceptable. However, they concluded by saying that:

'It is ... self-evident that a juror will not be able to understand what is going on in court unless he has a good command of the English language. He may have to study documents, and perhaps to take notes. We therefore recommend that no one should be qualified to serve on a jury who cannot read, write, speak and understand English without difficulty.'"

4.34 Lord Roskill added:

"It seems to us that in any fraud trial, whether it is an ordinary case or a complex case, it is imperative as a matter of principle that the members of the jury should be able to read and write English without difficulty. The reason is that in fraud cases, so much depends upon documents and tables or figures and jurors will not be able to understand them adequately and make notes unless they have a basic grounding in the English language."\textsuperscript{33}

4.35 In Hong Kong, prospective jurors must have completed education to Form 7 level, but this is an administrative standard applied by the Commissioner of Registrations, rather than one mandated by legislation. The result is that Hong Kong jurors may not be a representative cross-section of Hong Kong society. Most other common law jurisdictions impose no education attainment, other than requiring jurors to be able to understand and speak English.

4.36 According to information provided by the Census and Statistics Department, the population in Hong Kong was about 6.9 million in mid-2006, of whom approximately 4.7 million are aged between 20 and 64. Yet only 469,488 names appeared on the list of jurors as at June 2006, and the number of jurors "ready for selection"\textsuperscript{34} was 267,143.

\textsuperscript{32} Fraud Trials Committee Report (1986, HMSO), at Chapter 7, para 7.9.
\textsuperscript{33} Same as above, at para 7.11.
\textsuperscript{34} The number of jurors ready for selection is the number of jurors on the list less those persons: (a) who have served as jurors at any time within the preceding period of two years, or (b) are not able to attend jury service as they are not currently living in Hong Kong, or (c) are unable to attend on medical or other grounds.
Disability

4.37 In Hong Kong, a person suffering from blindness, deafness or any other disability "preventing [him] from serving as a juror" is excluded from jury service by virtue of section 4(1)(a) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3). The inference is that the legislation assumes that blindness or deafness automatically prevents a person from being capable of jury service. Such an approach may be thought too sweeping, as some visually or hearing impaired persons may still be able to perform the tasks of a juror, depending on the nature of their sensory impairment, and on the technological and other means available to assist them with such tasks.

4.38 In a discussion paper on blind or deaf jurors issued in February 2004, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission said:

"It is a fundamental principle of Australian mores that no group of its citizens should be excluded from the duties or rights attaching to citizenship except for compelling and acceptable reasons. Exclusion of any citizen from jury service should occur only in circumstances where that person is not capable of fulfilling the task. This consideration militates against the current practice that maintains a blanket exclusion on blind or deaf people serving on juries. The apparently positive experience of some United States jurisdictions in utilising blind or deaf jurors supports this view – even allowing for the differing legal, social and economic conditions that exist in the United States, especially by reason of explicit constitutional norms and the pervasive use of juries in criminal and civil proceedings. On the other hand, there is much to commend the view that jurors need to have available all their faculties of communication for the purpose of evaluating evidence which is often a difficult task. It is reasonable to argue that, although blind or deaf persons may not, in the particular case, have greater difficulty in doing this than other jurors, the risk that the quality of justice might be adversely affected justifies retention of the present exclusion. In the case of deaf persons, the requirement of a signer, not only in court but also in the jury room, supports this conclusion."

4.39 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission added:

"The deaf or blind juror will, like most others, have found ways of encountering, and coping with, everyday life, including the attempt to assess the truthfulness of what people say to them. A person who is deaf, for example, might use visual clues to determine a speaker's tone and inflection. It is also very likely

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that he or she will have developed increased sensitivity in other faculties as a means of compensating for the loss of hearing. … Blind people may well have greater listening skills and the ability to recall information than the sighted, and can achieve a high level of auditory and tactile perception. Of course, this will not always be the case."  

4.40 The question raised by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in its discussion paper was whether, if appropriate provisions could be made, blind or deaf jurors who were able to discharge a juror's duties in the circumstances of the particular case should be liable for jury service.

4.41 On the one hand, arguments could be raised that any automatic exclusion of persons with visual or hearing impairment from jury service may affect the representativeness of a jury. In addition, it could be said that complex rules and procedures have the potential to "affect adversely any juror, perhaps a sighted and hearing one even more than a juror who is blind or deaf and who may have become habituated to developing compensating strategies such as a keener memory or lessened likelihood of becoming distracted." On the other hand, it can be argued that, in the interest of due and proper administration of justice, persons who are severely disabled by sight or hearing should be exempted from jury service. Bearing in mind that a juror's task is difficult in many cases even for jurors without disabilities, the additional difficulties posed by sight or hearing impairment create risks for the adequacy of the jury's deliberations.

4.42 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission considered that the right of an accused to a fair trial clearly took precedence over any entitlement of a deaf or blind person to serve as a juror. The Commission went on:

"[T]he issue is whether that entitlement is compatible with the notion of a fair trial or whether there is a point at which they become mutually exclusive. Many of the submissions we received take the view that, despite the desirability on equity or citizenship grounds of having blind or deaf people serving on juries, it is clear that they would experience practical difficulties in so doing."  

4.43 The Victorian Law Reform Committee also examined the issue of disability in their study on jury service and recommended in their Final Report that:

"The current specific categories of ineligibility from jury service relating to persons with mental, intellectual and physical disabilities should be repealed in favour of a general category which renders ineligible a person who has a physical, intellectual

36 Same as above, at para 3.10.
37 Same as above, at para 2.18.
38 Same as above, at para 2.16.
or mental disability that makes the person incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror."^{39}

4.44 In assessing the credibility of the evidence led, a juror will take account of numerous factors, including the witness’s demeanour. The significance of demeanour has been discussed in a number of cases.^{40} In “El Uruguayo,”^{41} Lord Justice Scrutton expressed his view on the significance of seeing a witness giving evidence:

"My view has always been, and is still, that very great importance should be attached to the view of the Judge who has seen the witnesses. Other Judges do not take such a strong view of the importance of seeing a man giving evidence. I have always taken it, and will continue to take the view that it takes a strong case to induce one to interfere with the judgment of a Judge who has seen a witness and has believed him." {42

4.45 In the 1974 case of Commonwealth v Brown,^{43} the defendant contended that the hearing difficulties of a juror, discovered only after the jury's verdict, had denied him a fair, impartial, and competent jury, resulting in less than the unanimous verdict guaranteed by the US Constitution. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania said:

"Fundamental to the right of an 'impartial' jury is the necessity that participating jurors be competent and qualified. By statute, Pennsylvania requires that only 'sober, intelligent and judicious persons,' ... and persons 'able to understand the English language,' ... be eligible as jurors. Implicit in these requirements is that a juror should be free from such physical infirmities as will interfere with or preclude the proper discharge of his duties."^{44}

4.46 The Court went on:

"The appellant is entitled to a jury verdict arrived at by each and all of the jurors upon the evidence introduced. ... The presence of a juror with a physical impairment of such magnitude as to interfere with the juror's ability to hear and understand the presented testimony and evidence precludes a verdict by all jurors. Such a disability would render the juror incompetent to serve and would deny appellant's right to an impartial jury and a fair hearing. While a juror is not disqualified per se because of his deafness, ... where the deafness is of such degree as to

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^{40} The "El Uruguayo" [1928] 31 LIL Rep 89; *Yuill v Yuill* [1945] 1 All ER 183; *R v Ng Wing Ming* [1994] 2 HKC 464; *R v Cheong Luen Shing* [1994] 3 HKC 451.

^{41} [1928] 31 LIL Rep 89.

^{42} Same as above, at 90.

^{43} 332 A.2d 828.

^{44} Same as above, at 831.
indicate that the juror may have not heard material testimony, the juror must be disqualified, rendering any verdict he gave as meaningless.

In the instant appeal, we find that the record indicates that the juror in question had a hearing impairment so great as to deny appellant a fair, impartial trial and a unanimous verdict. We recognize that it is quite difficult to determine the amount of prejudice suffered by the appellant because of the juror's hearing difficulties. However, the record substantiates that the juror had difficulty in hearing. He admitted inability to hear questions and his responses were inconclusive as to whether he had heard all the testimony. Thus, we are confronted with a situation where, in order to insure fairness and to alleviate any possibility of prejudice caused by the deaf juror, we must assume prejudice for the sake of insured fairness. ... We, therefore, reverse the judgment of sentence of the lower court and remand for a new trial.\footnote{45}

4.47 As pointed out by Lawton LJ in the English case of R v Mason, trial judges have a right to intervene to ensure that a competent jury is empanelled. That is part of their duty to see that there is a fair trial. Lawton LJ said that this form of judicial intervention is most commonly used:

"... when a judge notices that a member of the panel is infirm or has difficulty in reading or hearing; and nowadays jurors for whom taking part in a long trial would be unusually burdensome are often excluded from the jury by the judge."\footnote{46}

4.48 With the removal in England by section 118 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 of the defendant's right to challenge jurors without cause, the Attorney General issued new guidelines on the exercise by the Crown in England and Wales of its right to "stand by" jurors. The part relevant to jurors with disabilities read:

"4. Primary responsibility for ensuring that an individual does not serve on a jury if he is not competent to discharge properly the duties of a juror rests with the appropriate court officer and, ultimately, the trial judge. Current legislation provides, in ss. 9 and 10 of the Juries Act 1974, fairly wide discretions to excuse or discharge jurors either at the person's own request, where he offers 'good reason why he should be excused', or where the judge determines that 'on account of physical disability or insufficient understanding of English there is doubt as to his capacity to act effectively as a juror'.

\footnote{45} Same as above, at 831-832.
\footnote{46} R v Mason [1981] QB 881, at 887.
5. The circumstances in which it would be proper for the Crown to exercise its right to stand by a member of a jury panel are: (a) where a jury check authorised in accordance with the Attorney-General's guidelines on jury checks reveals information justifying exercise of the right to stand by in accordance with para. 9 of the guidelines and the Attorney-General personally authorises the exercise of the right to stand by; or (b) where a person is about to be sworn as a juror who is manifestly unsuitable and the defence agree that, accordingly, the exercise by the prosecution of the right to stand by would be appropriate. An example of the sort of exceptional circumstances which might justify stand-by is where it becomes apparent that, despite the provisions mentioned in para. 4 above, a juror selected for service to try a complex case is in fact illiterate.\textsuperscript{47}

4.49 The issue of disability was discussed by the Court of Appeal in England in Chapman and Lauday,\textsuperscript{48} in relation to section 18(1)(d) of the Juries Act 1974.\textsuperscript{49} In dismissing the defendant's appeal, the Court said:

"This Court is a creature of statute. Its powers are contained in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. That Act provides in section 2(1): 'Except as provided by this Act, the Court of Appeal shall allow an appeal against conviction if they think (a) that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe or unsatisfactory; or ..., and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal ...'. One can see that there may be circumstances in which it could be argued that despite the provisions of section 18 of the Juries Act 1974 the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory because of some deficiency in a member of the jury or for some other reason, but on the facts of this particular case, where there is only one juror involved, where that juror could well have been discharged had the facts of his deafness become known, and the trial proceeded; having regard to the fact that majority verdicts are possible in circumstances these days, and there being no evidence whatsoever of miscarriage of justice by reason of the verdicts, it is not possible to say that verdicts in the case of each of these appellants were either unsafe or unsatisfactory.

The substance of the grounds raised in this case was related to a degree of deafness suffered by a juror as a matter which would pose considerable questions for the administration of the criminal law in jury trials, if that was held to be a valid ground, on everyday verdicts of the jury. No doubt that it is the reason why

\textsuperscript{47} Quoted in Peter Murphy, Blackstone's Criminal Practice (1991, Blackstone Press Limited), at Appendix 4.
\textsuperscript{48} (1976) 63 Cr App R 75, where after a verdict had been returned it was found that one of the jurors was exceedingly deaf and had only heard at best about half of the proceedings.
\textsuperscript{49} Section 18(1)(a) Juries Act 1974 states: "No judgment after verdict [emphasis added] in any trial by jury in any court shall be stayed or reversed by reason that any juror was unfit to serve."
section 18 found its way on to the statute book. We think that section provides a complete answer to the appeal of the appellant in this case. The appeal must be dismissed."50

4.50 It should be noted that in Hong Kong a similar provision to section 18(1) of the Juries Act 1974 is to be found in section 6 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3). That section provides:

"If any person is summoned as a juror who is not qualified or liable to serve as a juror, or is exempt from service, such want of qualification or exemption shall be a good cause of challenge and the person so summoned shall be discharged on such challenge or on his own application, if the court is satisfied of the fact and so directs; but no such want of qualification or exemption, if not submitted to the court before such person is sworn, shall afterwards be accepted as a ground for impeaching any verdict given by the jury on which such person has served."

4.51 The judgment of Chapman and Lauday was followed in Barry and Bliss.51 The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and said:

"It appears to us that the principle … is that this Court will not interfere with the verdict of a jury unless there is either evidence pointing directly to the fact or evidence from which a proper inference may be drawn that the defendant may have been prejudiced or may not in fact have received a fair trial. … In all the circumstances of this case, bearing in mind not least the strength of the case mounted by the prosecution against the appellant, the fact that the jury in rejecting the appellant's own account of affairs were unanimous, and that it was a verdict arrived at after due and no doubt careful deliberation, we do not feel that there is really a shred of evidence pointing to any form of risk or injustice or failure to receive a fair trial."52

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52 (1987) 84 Cr App R 1, at 6-7.
Chapter 5
Proposals for reform

Introduction

5.1  As we have seen in previous chapters in this paper, the jury plays a key role in Hong Kong's criminal justice system and allows members of the community to participate in, and contribute to, the operation of that system. We think it is important that the jury system should remain comprehensible and accountable to the community it exists to serve. This chapter reviews the existing qualifications for jury service and considers whether those qualifications should be amended. We also look at the exemptions from jury service for certain categories of persons provided under section 5 of the Jury Ordinance. In conducting that review, we have taken into account a number of specific considerations:

- The jury pool should be as widely representative of the community as is compatible with ensuring the accused's right to a fair trial. In that regard, are the present limitations in respect of age too restrictive? And would it be appropriate to relax the existing blanket exclusion of the blind and the deaf?

- The law should be stated clearly and unambiguously, so that it is accessible and comprehensible to all. That cannot be said to be the case with, for example, the current law's undefined references to "residence" and "good character."

- The criteria for jury service should reflect contemporary conditions. Is it still appropriate, for instance, to exclude those over 65 years of age from jury service?

Qualifications for jury service

5.2  The criteria for service as a juror are set out in section 4 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3). A person is liable to serve as a juror if he satisfies all the requirements that are stipulated in the statutory provisions. This chapter examines each of these criteria in turn.
"A person who has reached 21 years of age, but not 65 years of age"

Lower age limit

5.3 The arguments in favour of retaining the existing lower age limit of 21 may include the following:

- The duties and responsibilities of jury service require a level of maturity and experience which could not reasonably be expected from a younger person. The jury's primary function is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, a decision of the utmost gravity which may in serious cases result in the defendant's loss of liberty. In reaching that decision, the jury will be required to assess the credibility of the evidence led. The ability to judge a witness's veracity, to evaluate the evidence and adequately to understand human nature are skills less likely to be found in a person younger than 21.

- While the legal age of majority is for most purposes set at 18, the particular requirements of jury service justify a higher age. The determination of a person's guilt or innocence is an issue of a greater magnitude than other functions which a person is legally competent to perform at 18.

- The right to stand as a candidate in elections in Hong Kong has been maintained at 21, notwithstanding the reduction of the legal age of majority for most other purposes (including the right to vote) to 18. Jury service is a civic duty of similar importance to which the age of 21 should also apply.

- Unlike most other decisions which a person can legally make at 18, the jury's findings of fact cannot readily be overturned, and the defendant and the victim have little recourse if those findings are wrong. This justifies a requirement that jurors satisfy a higher minimum age.

5.4 We are not aware of any calls to raise the minimum age for jury service above 21.

5.5 Those who favour a change in the existing lower age for jury service generally argue that it should be reduced to 18 to match the legal age of majority. Other arguments for a reduction in the existing lower age limit to 18 may include the following:

- It is a basic tenet of the jury system that it should provide a jury which is representative of the community. The existing lower age of 21 excludes from jury service a significant section of the community. It also dilutes the principle of "trial by one's peers" by denying to defendants aged between 18 and 21 the
opportunity of a jury which includes jurors from a similar age group.

- The legal age of majority for most purposes is 18, based on the belief that persons of that age are sufficiently mature to, for instance, enter into enforceable contracts or make a will. Jury service does not require a higher level of maturity or impose greater responsibilities than these other activities for which the age of 18 is thought appropriate.

- A reduction in the minimum age for jury service would widen the jury pool and would therefore reduce the burden of jury service on others in the community.

5.6 We acknowledge that the trend in other common law jurisdictions has been to reduce the minimum age limit for jury service to (or to maintain it at) 18 years. We note also, however, that Hong Kong has historically moved more cautiously in relation to the age of capacity than some other jurisdictions. The age of majority for most purposes was lowered from 21 to 18 in Hong Kong in 1990, with the enactment of the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 410), some 20 years after similar changes were made in the United Kingdom. It was not until 1994 that the Electoral Provisions (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance reduced the voting age in Hong Kong from 21 to 18, a change which had been adopted in the main common law jurisdictions in the 1970s.

5.7 While the pace of change in Hong Kong has differed from that in other jurisdictions, so too has the extent of that change. The reforms introduced by the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 410) did not bring changes to all aspects of capacity relating to age. The minimum age at which a child could marry without parental consent remained unchanged at 21, as it remains today, reflecting strongly held views by some in the community. Similarly, although the voting age has been reduced to 18, section 37 of the Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap 542) restricts candidates for election to those aged 21 or above. In the circumstances, while the trend in other jurisdictions should not be disregarded, we believe that adopting a cautious approach to reform of the minimum age for jury service in Hong Kong is in line with the approach which Hong Kong has followed generally in relation to age of capacity. Our provisional view is therefore that, unless there is a clear consensus among the consultees to this paper that the minimum age limit for jury service should be reduced, the status quo should be maintained. In reaching that conclusion we are persuaded also by the arguments set out at paragraph 5.3 above.

**Upper age limit**

5.8 The existing upper age limit for jury service is 65. The arguments in favour of retaining that upper age limit include the following:
Jury service is an important civic duty which can be onerous. It would be unreasonable to impose this burden on elderly persons who are likely to be less resilient and more prone to ill-health than younger persons.

The risk of dementia increases with age and the early stages of this may be difficult to detect, but it would be sufficient to impair the individual's ability to function properly as a juror.

5.9 We do not think that there have been any serious suggestions to lower the upper age limit below 65. Arguments to raise the upper age limit might include:

- Raising the upper age limit would enhance the jury's representativeness of the community. Those over 65 represent a significant proportion of the community and should not be excluded from contributing their experience to the jury system.

- Raising the upper age limit would widen the jury pool and lessen the burden on others. In particular, many of those over 65 are likely to be retired and jury service may prove less burdensome for them than for those still in employment.

- Life expectancy has steadily increased over the years. An upper age limit of 65 may previously have been appropriate but it no longer reflects the demographics of the population.

5.10 We have considered these arguments and concluded that the upper age limit for jury service should be raised from 65 to 70. Such a change will make the jury pool more representative of the community and will reflect the fact that life expectancy has increased.

5.11 There are two alternatives to simply raising the upper age limit for jury service and applying it to all persons within that age bracket. The first is to provide that persons between 65 and the new upper age limit must "opt in" to be eligible for jury service. The second is to take the opposite approach, and include all persons below the new upper age limit on the jury list but to allow those over 65 to "opt out" if they choose. The advantage of the latter approach is that, by placing the onus on the individual to take himself out of the system, rather than to opt into it, the jury pool is less likely to be diminished.

We believe that that is the better option, and propose that those aged between 65 and 70 should be entitled as of right to exemption from jury service should they apply for it.

5.12 An alternative which may be argued would be to remove the upper age limit for jurors altogether, reflecting increased life expectancy and the fact that people are living longer in good health. We note that the Victorian Law Reform Committee concluded that there should be no upper age limit for jury service, but that persons aged 70 years and over should be entitled to elect not to be eligible for selection for jury service. Likewise, New
Zealand has removed the maximum age limit of 65 years in the Juries Amendment Act 2000. Court registrars are also empowered to excuse persons over 65 years of age from jury service upon application for excusal on the basis of age. The position in England and Wales under section 321 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is the same.\footnote{A person who is not less than eighteen nor more than seventy years of age is fit to serve as juror unless he can show that he is so physically or mentally unfit as not to be able to act effectively as jurors. Claims by persons over 65 on that account would be sympathetically considered.} We would welcome views on whether a similar approach should be followed in Hong Kong.

**Recommendation 1**

We recommend that the existing requirement for jury service that an individual has attained 21 years of age should be retained, but the upper age limit for jury service should be raised from 65 to 70. We also recommend that an individual who has attained 65 years of age should be entitled as of right to exemption from jury service upon his application.

*"A person who ... is a resident of Hong Kong"*

5.13 The Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) does not specify what constitutes "resident" for the purposes of jury service. The Ordinance does not, for instance, specify a minimum length of residence or stay in Hong Kong for a person to be qualified to serve as a juror, nor does it tie residence for jury purposes to the possession of a permanent or other form of identity card.

5.14 We have already pointed out at the start of this chapter that we consider it important that the jury list should be representative of the community as a whole. That approach, as we have seen in preceding chapters, is in line with the jurisprudence on jury composition in other jurisdictions. In defining what constitutes the community in Hong Kong for these purposes, we think it reasonable to exclude those who are merely transients, or those whose time in Hong Kong has been so short as to preclude them from acquiring some understanding of local norms, values and culture.

5.15 The system currently adopted in Hong Kong is that the name of any person applying for an identity card will, if the person satisfies the criteria for jury service, be passed by the Commissioner of Registration to the Registrar of the High Court for inclusion into the jury list. It is therefore possible that a newcomer to Hong Kong will find himself called for jury service within a relatively short time of arrival. We think it important that a juror should have some understanding of what behaviour the general public would regard as, for instance, decent/indecent or reasonable/not reasonable. We have reservations as to whether a newcomer would be able to apply the "reasonable man" test in the context of the local standards and culture. We
therefore prefer that a person should have resided in Hong Kong long enough to acquire sufficient knowledge of local culture and social values so that he may properly assess the witnesses' evidence. This is also in line with the approach in other common law jurisdictions, such as Alberta in Canada, England and Wales, Ireland, and California in the United States, where they have in their legislation clearly provided that a person would be qualified or liable to serve if he is a resident, a citizen, or has been ordinarily resident in the jurisdiction. England and Wales has, in particular, provided that to be eligible as a juror, the person has to have been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man for any period of at least five years since attaining the age of 13.2

5.16  At the same time, we think it important that the mix of peoples which make up Hong Kong's community should be represented in the jury pool. Figures from the Census and Statistics Department reveal that in 2006, 95% of Hong Kong's 6.8 million population was Chinese by ethnic background. Other significant, though far smaller, ethnic groups included 112,453 Filipinos, 87,840 Indonesians, 20,444 Indians and 15,950 Nepalese.3 All contribute to what constitutes the community of Hong Kong.

5.17  Having taken these considerations into account, we think that, though arbitrary, a minimum period of actual residence in Hong Kong should be required before a person is eligible for jury service. That period of residence should not be so long as to exclude all but permanent residents, but should be sufficient to ensure that the juror has a reasonable connection to Hong Kong. We have therefore concluded that the appropriate minimum period of residence should be three years.

5.18  The question arises as to how the period of residence should be calculated. The options would include allowing any period of three years to count, or to require a three years' period of residence to be completed immediately before the individual's name is included on the jury list. Allied to this is the question of how the period of residence is to be verified.

5.19  While it is desirable that potential jurors should have an understanding of local culture and norms, it is also important that the test of residence for jury purposes should be simple and easily applied. We therefore recommend that a person should be presumed unless the contrary is proved to be a resident of Hong Kong for the purposes of section 4 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) if his Hong Kong identity card has been issued to him three years or more before the issue of the Notice of Jury Service.

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2 Section 1(1)(b), Juries Act 1974.
Recommendation 2

We recommend that, to be eligible to serve as a juror, a person must have been resident in Hong Kong for a period of three years or more immediately before he is issued with a Notice of Jury Service, and if he has been issued with a Hong Kong identity card three years or more prior to his being issued with the Notice, he should be presumed unless the contrary is proved to be a resident of Hong Kong for the purposes of section 4 of the Jury Ordinance.

"The person is of good character"

5.20 The Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) is silent as to what is meant by "good character." We believe that some guidance should be provided in the legislation and have considered three possible classes of person who might be considered not of "good character": undischarged bankrupts; those with previous convictions; and those charged with an offence and not yet tried.

Undischarged bankrupts

5.21 We do not think that an undischarged bankrupt should be automatically excluded from jury service. Bankruptcy does not necessarily imply a lack of integrity, but may be the result of misfortune or poor financial or investment judgement. It would in our view be wrong automatically to characterise all undischarged bankrupts as not of "good character." We note that our view is in line with the Victorian Law Reform Committee, who said that, "in contemporary Australia it is inappropriate to associate undischarged bankrupts with criminals in regard to jury service disqualifications," and suggested that undischarged bankrupts should be eligible for jury service.

5.22 In this context, we also note, however, that this recommendation was not supported by the Victorian Government, which stated that:

"Whilst many people find themselves declared bankrupt through no immediate fault of their own (such as the person whose spouse incurred debts in his or her name without that person's knowledge) there are many others who are in the position by virtue of deliberate and wilful misuse of position, or other questionable behaviour. It would seem not desirable to have such persons eligible for jury service." 

5.23 The stance of the Victorian Government was reflected in the Juries Act 2000 in which an undischarged bankrupt remains disqualified from jury service.  

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Previous criminal convictions

5.24 It seems to us that the essential consideration in determining what amounts to "good character" for the purposes of section 4(1)(b) of the Jury Ordinance is whether or not the individual's inclusion on a jury would impair its integrity. The function of the jury is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, based on its assessment of the evidence led. It is, in our view, essential to public confidence in the administration of justice that there should be no grounds for questioning the integrity of the jury system. For that reason, we prefer to err on the side of caution when deciding whether or not a criminal conviction should bar the individual from subsequent jury service.

5.25 One option would be to adopt provisions similar to those governing candidates for election to the Legislative Council, which disqualify persons who have within the preceding five years been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding three months. It could be argued that the standard set for the nomination or election of legislators is equally appropriate for the selection of jurors, who fulfil a key role in the administration of justice. An alternative would be for the length of the "quarantine period" to relate to the length of the term of imprisonment to which the individual has been sentenced, or to the nature of the offence for which he has been convicted. A further alternative would be that any exclusion could relate to the nature of the particular offence, rather than the sentence imposed.

5.26 The difficulty with adopting a period of exclusion from jury service which relates to the sentence imposed or the nature of the offence itself is to determine where the line should be drawn. Is the line properly to be drawn at imprisonment for one month, three months or six months? Are the appropriate offences those of dishonesty, or some other category? If exclusion is to be based on sentence or the nature of the offence, we think it inevitable that, no matter where the line is drawn, there will be cases where a juror's previous conviction calls in question the impartiality of the jury. As we said at the outset, our inclination is to err on the side of caution and to recommend that a person with a criminal conviction record, regardless of its nature, should be excluded from jury service. This recommendation would, in our view, safeguard the integrity of the jury system.

5.27 It would, however, be against the spirit of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 297) if a person whose criminal conviction was regarded as "spent" under the Ordinance were to be excluded from jury service. We therefore consider it appropriate to follow section 2 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 297), under which a person's conviction would be regarded as spent if he is not sentenced to imprisonment exceeding three months or to a fine exceeding $10,000 and a period of three years has elapsed without the person being again convicted in Hong Kong of an offence. We wish to emphasize that the Rehabilitation of Offenders Ordinance only applies to one conviction, and the first conviction would reappear in the person's criminal conviction record upon his second conviction.
Charged with an indictable offence and not yet tried

5.28 Whilst due regard must be accorded to the principle of presumed innocence, there will be cases where the nature of the alleged offence and the evidence known to exist will demand exclusion of persons awaiting trial for an indictable offence. It would be impossible to examine each case separately. We appreciate that it would be wrong automatically to classify persons falling within this category as anti-social but there is an inherent risk that they may be perceived as sympathetic to the defendant, which may undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

5.29 We note that persons falling within this category are excluded from jury service in Victoria. We agree with that approach and recommend that persons awaiting trial for an indictable offence should be excluded from jury service.

Charged with any offence and remanded in custody

5.30 We think that persons charged with an offence and remanded in custody should be excluded from jury service for the same reasons as we have advanced in respect of persons awaiting trial for an indictable offence.

5.31 In conclusion, we think it essential in order to safeguard public confidence in the administration of justice that the Administration should ensure that any person who has previous criminal conviction(s) other than a spent conviction, or who is charged with an indictable offence and has not yet been tried, or charged with any offence and remanded in custody, should not be included in the jury list or jury panel. Relating to this issue, we note the safeguards that are provided in section 6 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) where want of qualification of a juror is a ground of challenge but is not a ground for impeaching the verdict given by a jury on which such a person has served. We consider it important that section 6 should be retained.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that section 4(1)(b) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) should be replaced by a provision to the effect that a person is liable to serve as a juror if he has no criminal conviction (and a spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 297) should not be regarded as a criminal conviction for these purposes), is not awaiting trial for an indictable offence, and is not remanded in custody pending trial for any offence.
"The person has a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the proceedings"

5.32 The existing practice is that persons between the age of 21 and 65 who have attained an educational level of at least Form 7 (or its equivalent) will be treated as qualified. This arrangement is implemented administratively. The purpose of setting such a standard of education is historic, and was to provide a means of ensuring that jurors had a sufficient knowledge of English, which was the sole language in which jury trials were conducted. However, since July 1997 the language proficiency required has been in either English or Chinese, reflecting the provisions of Article 9 of the Basic Law on official languages and the fact that trials in the High Court are now conducted in either language.

5.33 Since the original reason for applying an educational standard of Form 7 (ie, to ensure jurors were sufficiently competent in the English language) no longer applies to all proceedings, but only to those trials conducted in English, there may be grounds for lowering the educational standard or removing it altogether. The fitness of a juror to serve may be assessed at the time the jury is formed, when parties to the proceedings may accept or reject the appointment of individual jurors. The court has power under section 4(2) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) to discharge any person if the court is not satisfied that the person's knowledge of the relevant language is sufficient to enable the person to understand the proceedings. Removing or lowering the education requirement would have the advantage of widening the jury pool and would include more members of the community in the administration of justice.

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7 Potential jurors are identified as follows:
(i) In filling out the application form for a Hong Kong identity card (whether permanent or otherwise), applicants are required to choose one of the two boxes in the "Education Level" column in the form, namely "Secondary and below" and "Matriculated and above". They are not asked to provide proof of the reported education level. The Commissioner of Registration does not write to secondary schools for a list of matriculants as they are very likely under 21. The Commissioner writes to the eight local universities and, since October 2006, also writes to the three local tertiary education institutions (the Open University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Institute of Education and the Hong Kong Academy of Performing Arts) for lists of graduates. As a matter of practice, the list of graduates provided to the Commissioner of Registration by the universities and education institutions only cover full-time students.
(ii) Matriculants who do not continue with their full-time education and who have subsequently attained the age of 21 would be identified as prospective jurors only when they submit an application form for a new identity card due to loss, defacement or amendment of particulars.

8 Article 9 of the Basic Law provides:
"In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official language by the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."

9 According to the statistics that are compiled on the results of the General Household Survey for July-September 2004, out of a total population of 6,794,000, there were 4,496,100 persons aged 21 to 65, accounting for 66.2% of the total population. Those with higher education attainment were: persons with matriculation level, consisting 4.4% of the total population; persons with tertiary (non-degree) level, consisting 6.3% of the total population, and persons with tertiary (degree) level, consisting of 11.9% of the total population.
5.34 If the educational requirement is to be lowered, rather than removed altogether, an appropriate level might be Form 5 or above. Form 5 marks the completion of general education, which should have equipped the individual with the capability to carry out his civic rights and responsibilities. The disadvantage, however, is that jurors may need to consider documentary evidence and expert reports produced in the course of a trial, much of which may be in English. We therefore have concerns that a juror may not be able to understand or follow the proceedings if the education standards now administratively imposed are lowered.

5.35 Another option would be to create separate pools of jurors (with separate qualifications) for English language and Chinese language trials\(^\text{10}\). However, for the following reasons we do not favour the creation of separate pools of jurors:

- Different education standards for trials conducted in English and Chinese may lead to perception of different standards of justice and may encourage "forum shopping" by the parties.

- Experience has not established that Chinese language trials are less complex than those conducted in English.

- Even in Chinese language trials, a majority of the expert evidence is likely to be in English rather than in Chinese.

- Language is not the only consideration. Education also ensures that jurors have the necessary analytical skills and comprehension to discharge their duties properly. To maintain a separate pool of jurors with a lower education standard for Chinese language trials is not rational.

- This is a divisive measure which may cause suspicion that the quality of justice differs as between the two pools, and prompt the perception that there is no trial by peers.

5.36 In our view, the existing education level of at least Form 7 or its equivalent\(^\text{11}\) should be maintained to ensure that jurors have the ability to understand and comprehend the evidence and to discharge their duties as jurors properly. We have come to this conclusion on the basis of the following considerations:

- All Hong Kong jury trials take place in the Court of First Instance of the High Court and involve more complicated issues of law and fact than cases heard in the District Court and Magistrates' Court.

\(^{10}\) The percentage of criminal jury trials conducted in Chinese language in 2006 was 22% while the percentage of criminal jury trials conducted in Chinese language from January 2007 to June 2007 was 24%.

\(^{11}\) The general qualification required for entry into university.
Courts. Jurors are required to fully understand the oral and written language of trials, most of which are conducted in English. The Form 7 or its equivalent standard, which is currently administratively applied as a means to ensure sufficient knowledge of English, should be maintained, as Form 5 may not ensure adequate standards. However, we think that this requirement should be imposed statutorily, instead of being administratively applied.

- It is recognised that the general standard of English among students is falling. The requirement of Form 7 or its equivalent standard is not a full guarantee, but offers some assurance of a reasonable standard of English.

5.37 It may be worth noting that a person would usually complete his Form 7 education or its equivalent at the age of 18 or 19, and by the time he is eligible to serve as a juror (at the age of 21), he would have about three years' worldly experience to better equip himself to discharge his duties as a juror. The present system has been maintained administratively by the Registrar for many years, without difficulty. Nevertheless, we consider it preferable that the educational standard required of a juror should be provided statutorily, rather than administratively, and we therefore recommend that an appropriate amendment should be made to the Jury Ordinance.

5.38 We note that a new curriculum for secondary education will be implemented in 2012. Under the new system, three years in lower secondary school (the current Form One to Form Three) will be followed by a further three years in senior secondary school (currently Form Four to Form Six, to be described under the new scheme as Secondary Four to Secondary Six). The current two public examinations, the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination ("HKCEE") and the Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination ("HKALE"), will be reduced to one public examination which will lead to the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education ("HKDSE") and be taken at the end of Secondary Six (what is now Form Six). The new qualification would provide students with a common credential giving access to study in the eight Hong Kong universities funded by the University Grants Committee ("UGC").

5.39 There is no direct comparison between the levels of the current system and the new system as they are of different structures. The new senior secondary curriculum and assessment is designed so that standards at the higher levels will be comparable to the existing HKALE and the standards achieved by students awarded good grades will be internationally recognised in the same way as those under the existing arrangements.

5.40 There is no university entrance examination apart from the HKCEE and HKALE (under the current system) and the HKDSE examination (under the new system). Currently, local students applying for entry to undergraduate programmes at any of the eight UGC-funded universities are

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12 As advised by the Education Bureau in a letter dated 3 August 2007 to the Law Reform Commission.
generally required to obtain an HKALE pass in Advanced Supplementary Level Use of English and Chinese Language and Culture. Under the new system, most universities announced in July 2006 that they will require four core subjects (Chinese Language, English Language, Mathematics and Liberal Studies) and one elective subject which may be specified or unspecified. Individual programmes may have other additional requirements. Admission will be based on merit and the student’s capacity to participate fully in the particular programme for which he seeks enrolment.

5.41 The Form 7 requirement will therefore no longer be relevant from 2012. We therefore recommend that, while the existing administrative practice of requiring a potential juror to have attained an education standard of Form 7 or its equivalent should be stipulated in the legislation, this should be amended in 2012 to require a potential juror to have completed Secondary Six and achieved Level 3 in both English and Chinese languages in the HKDSE or the equivalent. The introduction of the new regime in 2012 will have the advantage of increasing the number of eligible jurors.

**Recommendation 4**

We recommend that the existing administrative practice of requiring a potential juror to have attained an education standard of Form 7 (being the minimum entrance requirement for entry to a university in Hong Kong), or an equivalent standard, should be stipulated in legislation. However, this should be amended in 2012 to require a person to have completed Secondary Six and achieved Level 3 in both English and Chinese in the HKDSE or the equivalent.

5.42 We have also considered whether guidelines should be provided for the exercise of the discretion of the Registrar to excuse a person from jury service. Section 28(2) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) confers power on the Registrar to excuse a person from serving as a juror for “good reason.” In our view, discretion should be left to the Registrar as to whether to excuse a person in order to preserve flexibility and we do not consider it necessary to establish guidelines.

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13 The Heads of Universities Committee issued a press release on 18 May 2005, stating: “We expect that the language standards of university entrants will be comparable to the current entrance requirements, which is likely to be Level 3 in the proposed 5 Level system of the new Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education.”
"The person is of sound mind and not afflicted by blindness, deafness or other disability preventing the person from serving as a juror"

"... of sound mind ..."

5.43 We do not think it appropriate for persons with mental impairment or mental handicap to serve on a jury for the obvious reason that they would have difficulty properly performing their functions as jurors.

5.44 We note that there is no way of knowing whether a juror is of unsound mind as there is no source of information for this unless the person summoned for jury service claims exemption on this ground and provides supporting documentation. However, during the empanelling process, both the Registrar and the trial judge would have the discretion to exclude those enlisted jurors whom they perceive to be mentally unsound. The established practice is for the trial judge in the empanelling procedure to invite the prosecution or defence to ask any juror to stand down if the juror's unsoundness of mind becomes apparent on his taking the oath or affirmation. We think this is an effective way to exclude the mentally impaired from jury service.

"... afflicted by blindness, deafness ..."

5.45 It can be argued that the underlying principle that a jury should be representative of the community which it serves would suggest that those suffering from disabilities should be included in the jury pool if that is viable from a practical point of view. There is force in this argument, but at the same time it would not be right to include in the jury pool persons who, by reason of their disability, were unable to participate fully in the jury's work. Among other tasks, jurors must assess the credibility of the witnesses who testify before them and in doing so they will need to consider the demeanour of each witness. Moreover, the jury will have to examine and consider all exhibits produced at the trial, including maps, diagrams, sketches and physical objects, etc, apart from documents. At the close of the defence case, the jury retires to consider its verdict and it is essential that all jurors are capable of taking full part in the deliberations on the evidence, which may include visual or audio elements. The significance of this issue has also been highlighted in cases which we have discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this paper.

5.46 In the end, enhancing the representativeness of the jury pool must give way to ensuring that a defendant receives a fair trial before a jury comprised of persons who can fully discharge their functions as jurors. It is therefore our provisional view that the existing provisions should be retained which exclude blind and deaf persons from jury service.

"... other disability preventing the person from serving as a juror ..."

5.47 The key consideration here is that the disability must be of such a nature or degree that it would mean that the person could not fulfil his functions as a juror. While the nature of some disabilities may render jury
service impossible, others may not. Once more, we would stress the desirability of enhancing the representativeness of the jury pool. If the inclusion of disabled persons in that pool does not adversely impact on the accused’s right to a fair trial, then there are strong grounds for such inclusion. We do not think it would be helpful to attempt to provide an exhaustive list of disabilities in section 4 of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3). Instead, we prefer to maintain the present approach, which is to leave a broad discretion to the Registrar to discharge any person summoned as a juror if that person has applied for exemption on the ground of disability.

5.48 Turning to consideration of specific disabilities, while it would not be practicable to require a person who is severely physically handicapped, such as someone suffering from paralysis, to take up juror duty, we do not think that those with less severe mobility impairment should be excluded from the jury list. What prevents persons confined to wheelchairs from undertaking jury service is not an inability to fulfil the functions of a juror but the physical limitations of the court premises for jury hearings, i.e., the High Court Building and coroners' courts. Accordingly, we think the Registrar of the High Court should consider appropriate modifications to those parts of the High Court Building and coroners' courts which are used by jurors to render them accessible to persons in wheelchairs.

5.49 Speech impairment should not present a problem provided a potential juror with that impairment can communicate his views and questions clearly.

5.50 In some circumstances, impairment in reading and writing may prevent a person serving as a juror; in others, it may not. One form of impairment in reading or writing is dyslexia. We note that persons with dyslexia may be highly educated and would not be excluded under the education requirement. Dyslexic persons can comprehend and perceive words mentally, and do not usually have any problem with silent reading. Their difficulty is in correctly writing or reading aloud some words. The weaknesses that dyslexic persons may have may include difficulties with remembering facts, figures, sequences of instructions, messages, names and other things that place a heavy demand on working memory.

5.51 In this regard, there may be doubts as to whether persons who are dyslexic are able to fulfil jury functions. There is a wide range of conditions amounting to dyslexia and those who have a mild degree of dyslexia may still be able to perform jury service. However, we note that dyslexia or reading disorder is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM IV as:

14 Thomson and Watkins note: "Developmental dyslexia is a severe difficulty with the written form of language independent of intellectual, cultural and emotional causation. It is characterized by the individual's reading, writing and spelling attainments being well below the level expected, based on intelligence and chronological age. The difficulty is a cognitive one affecting those language skills associated with the written form, particularly visual, verbal coding, short-term memory, order perception and sequencing": as cited by McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon and Young in Adult Dyslexia: Assessment, Counselling and Training (1994) at 4.
"[R]eading achievement that falls substantially below expected levels given an individual's age and education. The reading deficit should be sufficiently severe as to interfere with everyday activities requiring reading (e.g., schoolwork or employment). Finally, the reading deficit cannot be strictly due to a sensory disorder; for instance, it cannot be strictly due to vision problems that prevent an individual from seeing words on a page."  

5.52 On balance, we consider that the burden of jury service may not be suitable for persons who are dyslexic, and that they should not be obliged to serve as jurors.

Recommendation 5

We do not recommend any change to the existing provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) concerning disabilities in relation to jury service. We recommend that the Registrar of the High Court should consider making such changes to the physical configuration of the High Court Building and coroners' courts as would facilitate jury service by those confined to wheelchairs.

Form of Notice of Jury Service

5.53 On the basis that our recommendations above were to be accepted, we consider that the Notice of Jury Service form (reproduced at Annex 2) should be amended so as to include a list of exemptions and a list of disqualifications in line with our recommendations. The intention would be that if the person served with the Notice does not fall within the criteria for service as a juror, he should tick the applicable exemption or disqualification listed, and return the Notice to the Registrar of the High Court for the Registrar to verify the truthfulness of the proposed ground for exemption or disqualification.

Recommendation 6

We recommend that the form of Notice of Jury Service should be amended to include a list of exemptions and a list of disqualifications for individuals to tick if applicable, and this should be returned to the Registrar of the High Court for verification.

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Exemptions from jury service under section 5 of the Jury Ordinance

5.54  The existing list of persons exempted from jury service can be found in Annex 1 of this paper. The justifications for the various exemptions under section 5 of the Jury Ordinance may be categorised as follows:

(a)  Where substantial inconvenience to the public may result. This may apply to doctors and other professionals whose services are needed for the welfare and health of the public without the interruptions which jury service would cause.

(b)  Where undue hardship or extreme inconvenience may be caused to the person. This may apply to full time students of any school, or post-secondary or tertiary education institution including any technical institute, industrial training centre or other vocational training institution.

(c)  Where the person is involved in the administration of justice, so that unfairness may result or may be perceived to result because:

(i) he can deduce that the accused has a criminal record;
(ii) he is biased either against the prosecution or defence;
(iii) he is by reason of his status or position likely to unduly influence his fellow jurymen; and
(iv) he may not comply with the judge's direction as to the law because of his own knowledge or understanding of it and may influence his fellow jurymen to do the same.

(d) Those for whom jury service is incompatible with their tenets or beliefs.

(e) Those who are conferred consular privileges and immunities such as consuls, vice-consuls, and officers of equivalent status of governments of foreign states, and the spouses and dependent children of such persons.

(f) Those officers whose relationship with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are governed by the national laws listed in Annex III of the Basic Law and promulgated in the Promulgation of National Laws (no 2) 1997, namely, officers employed on full pay in the naval, military or air services as members of the Hong Kong Garrison; and their spouses.
The Sub-committee noted the view of Lord Justice Auld in his 2001 Report (the "2001 Report") on Review of Criminal Courts of England and Wales that there should be no categories of person who are exempt as of right from jury service. Instead, persons previously granted automatic exemption should be dealt with (i) by way of a discretionary exemption (upon application to be decided by the court), or (ii) by way of postponement of the period that the applicant is required to serve. We also note that these recommendations on jury service were subsequently adopted and enacted in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 in England and Wales.

The Sub-committee acknowledges the force of the arguments put forward in support of the Auld Report's recommendation to abolish automatic exemptions from jury service, and accepts as persuasive the fact that the legal position in England and Wales now reflects the Auld Report's view. Nevertheless, the Sub-committee considers that practical considerations outweigh the theoretical merits of the Auld Report's approach. If the reality is that certain categories of persons would invariably be granted a discretionary exemption from jury service on application to the court, there would seem little point in making them nominally subject to jury service at all. The need to consider individual applications for exemption, even in straightforward cases where the granting of an exemption is not in doubt, would impose an additional burden on the court's time with little concomitant benefit. It is therefore our view that if certain categories of persons would invariably be entitled to exemption from jury service, they should be statutorily exempted. A member of an exempt category of persons should be given the right to apply to be included in the list of jurors if he so wishes, and it would be a matter for the trial judge to decide whether to include him in a particular trial. We are reinforced in our conclusion by the fact that, in contrast to the approach in England and Wales, many common law jurisdictions retain automatic exemptions over some categories of persons.16

We note that the Jury Ordinance uses the term "exemption", without differentiating between different types of exemption. We think that different terms should be adopted in different situations so that the reasons for the individual's exemption or exclusion may be more readily understood. We suggest the following terminology should be used:

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16 For example, California exempts public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government, who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties, and also persons actively engaged in professional occupations, such as doctors and firefighters. In Queensland, the Governor, members of Parliament, local government mayors, or other councillors, a person who is or has been a judge or magistrate, a lawyer actually engaged in legal work, a person who is or has been a police officer, a detention centre employee, or a corrective services officer, are not eligible for jury service. Similarly, in Ontario, every member of the Privy Council of Canada or the Executive Council of Ontario, every member of the Senate, the House of Commons of Canada or the Assembly, every judge and every justice of the peace, every barrister and solicitor and every student-at-law, every legally qualified medical practitioner and veterinary surgeon who is actively engaged in practice and every coroner, every person engaged in the enforcement of law, including sheriffs, wardens of any penitentiary, superintendents, jailers or keepers of prisons, correctional institutions or lockups, sheriff's officers, police officers, firefighters and officers of a court of justice, etc, are ineligible to serve as jurors.
(i) "ineligible for jury service" when a person is not qualified to be a juror because of age, unsoundness mind, or illiteracy, etc;

(ii) "excluded from jury service" when a person is excluded on a point of principle;

(iii) "exempt" for those categories of persons whose services are much needed and in respect of whom there would be substantial inconvenience to the public if they were required to serve on a jury;

(iv) "excused" when an eligible juror is excused from serving on a particular occasion upon application being made to the Registrar or the trial judge, but his service would be required for future cases.

**Recommendation 7**

We recommend that different terms should be adopted for different types of exemption, as follows:

(i) "ineligible for jury service" when a person is not qualified to be a juror because of age, unsoundness of mind, or illiteracy, etc;

(ii) "excluded from jury service" when a person is excluded on a point of principle;

(iii) "exempt" for those categories of persons whose services are much needed and in respect of whom there would be substantial inconvenience to the public if they were required to serve on a jury; and

(iv) "excused" when an eligible juror is excused from serving on a particular occasion upon application being made to the Registrar or the trial judge, but his service would be required for future cases.

5.58 We also think that the guiding principles for the consideration of exemption applications should be spelt out in the Jury Ordinance to assist the Registrar or the trial judge in determining whether or not to grant an exemption, exclusion or deferral. The justifications for exemption, exclusion or deferral should include:

(i) where substantial inconvenience to the public may result;
(ii) where undue hardship or extreme inconvenience may be caused to the person;

(iii) where the person is involved in the administration of justice so that bias may result or may be perceived to result; and

(iv) where jury service is incompatible with the person's tenets or beliefs.

Recommendation 8

We recommend that the guiding principles for the consideration of exemption applications should be spelt out in the Jury Ordinance to assist the Registrar or the trial judge in determining whether or not to grant an exemption, exclusion or deferral. The justifications for exemption, exclusion or deferral should include:

(i) where substantial inconvenience to the public may result;

(ii) where undue hardship or extreme inconvenience may be caused to the person;

(iii) where the person is involved in the administration of justice so that bias may result or may be perceived to result; and

(iv) where jury service is incompatible with the person's tenets or beliefs.

5.59 On the basis of the above discussions, we have formed provisional views on the exemptions granted to the categories of persons provided in section 5 of the Jury Ordinance. Our views on the list of persons exempted under section 5 are set out below:

(a) members of the Executive or Legislative Council –

Our view is that there should not be any change to their exemption from jury service. Members of the Executive or Legislative Council are important elements in the governance of Hong Kong. It would not be in the community's best interests if jury service were to prevent these persons fulfilling their constitutional role.
(ab) justices of the peace –

While justices of the peace fulfill important public duties, such as visiting custodial institutions, taking and receiving declarations and performing other functions under the Oaths and Declarations Ordinance, we do not think that these are exercised so frequently as to justify a blanket exemption of this category from jury service. Where jury service in a particular instance would prevent a justice of the peace from fulfilling a commitment required of him, then the court would no doubt look sympathetically on his application to be excused from jury service.

Given the independent role that JPs play in visiting custodial institutions and the like, we do not think there can be reasonable grounds for any perception of bias if JPs are made liable for jury service. Accordingly, our provisional view is that justices of the peace should not be exempt but should instead be able to apply to be excused from jury service in a particular case.

(b) any public officer who is –

(i) a judge, deputy judge, District Judge, deputy District Judge, Registrar, Senior Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Assistant Registrar, coroner or magistrate –

One of the factors for granting exemption from jury service which we have set out at paragraph 5.51 is that the individual is involved in the administration of justice and that there may therefore be a perception of bias. There are particular issues where a judicial officer is concerned and we agree with the conclusion of the Law Reform Committee in Victoria in their final report on Jury Service in Victoria that persons who are judges or magistrates should not serve on juries. The Committee reached this view because, firstly, of the need to preserve the lay character of jury service; secondly, the likelihood that a judicial officer would have special knowledge which should not enter into a jury's deliberations; and, thirdly, the likelihood that a judicial officer would have undue influence on the jury's deliberations in the sense that the lay jurors could be expected to defer to that person's view of the case.\(^{17}\) There is in addition the concern that a judicial officer serving as a juror may be known to the judge presiding at the trial or the lawyers involved in the case, so that his serving as a juror may risk a perception of favour or prejudice to, or may embarrass, one party or the other. This is of particular relevance to Hong Kong, where the legal profession is of a relatively small size and

\(^{17}\) Victoria Law Reform Committee's final report on Jury Service in Victoria, Vol 1 (1996) at 50.
lawyers are likely to know one another. For these reasons, it is our view is that this category should be *excluded* from jury service for life.

(ii) a presiding officer, adjudicator or member of any tribunal established by law –

Considerations similar to those in category (b)(i) above apply. Jury service by a member of this category of persons may lead to a perception of bias. We consider that this category should be *excluded* from jury service.

(iii) an officer or member of the staff of any court or tribunal established by law, if his work is mainly concerned with the day to day administration of the court or tribunal -

Considerations similar to those in category (b)(i) above apply. Jury service by a member of this category of persons may lead to a perception of bias. We consider that this category should be simplified to "*any member of staff within the Judiciary*" and any such person should be *excluded* from jury service.

(iv) a legal officer within the meaning of section 2 of the Legal Officers Ordinance (Cap 87) –

Considerations similar to those in category (b)(i) above apply. Jury service by a member of this category of persons may lead to a perception of bias. We consider that this category should be *excluded* from jury service.

(v) serving in the Department of Justice, the Legal Aid Department, the Official Receiver's Office or the Intellectual Property Department –

Considerations similar to those in category (b)(i) above apply. Jury service by a member of this category of persons may lead to a perception of bias. We consider that this category should be *excluded* from jury service.

(vi) a member of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Service, the Customs and Excise Service or the Fire Services Department, including a person holding any post specified in the Seventh Schedule to the Fire Services Ordinance (Cap 95) –

Members of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Service, and the Customs and Excise Service are generally perceived as part of the prosecution process. It is the Sub-committee’s view that these persons should
be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias. As regards "a member of the Fire Services Department, including a person holding any post specified in the Seventh Schedule to the Fire Services Ordinance", we consider that their services are indispensable to the community and their exemption from jury service should therefore not be changed.

(vii) an officer of the Correctional Services Department –

As with category (b)(vi) above, members of this category of persons are closely related with the enforcement of the criminal law. It is the Sub-committee's view that these persons should be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias.

(viii) a member of the Government Flying Service –

We note that the Government Flying Service provides a range of essential services to the community, including:

- support to the Hong Kong Police Force and other law enforcement agencies of Hong Kong in carrying out their law enforcement duties;
- search and rescue and casualty evacuation;
- fire fighting;
- medical services purposes.

Many of these are emergency services, provided by a limited workforce. To reduce the Service's available manpower by imposing liability for jury service would impact on the Service's ability to meet its commitments. We therefore consider that this category of persons should continue to be exempt from jury service.

(ix) the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or an officer of the Independent Commission Against Corruption –

These are persons closely related with the enforcement of the criminal law and generally perceived as part of the prosecution process. It is the Sub-committee's view that these persons should be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias.

(x) carrying out duties in the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Department, the Customs and Excise Department, the Fire Services Department, the
Correctional Services Department, the Government Flying Service or the Independent Commission Against Corruption –

Those carrying out duties for the Police, Immigration Department, Customs & Excise Department, the Correctional Services Department, and the ICAC are persons closely related with the enforcement of the criminal law and generally perceived as part of the prosecution process. It is the Sub-committee’s view that these persons should be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias. Those carrying out duties for the Fire Services Department and the Government Flying Service are providing indispensable services to the community and should be exempt from jury service.

(xi) serving in a training or apprentice rank –

It is possible that jury service may cause undue hardship to a trainee or apprentice but we do not think that that need necessarily always be the case. We do not therefore consider that there should be automatic exemption for persons in this category. Instead, they may apply to be excused from jury service on a particular occasion where the circumstances so warrant.

(xii) appointed as the principal probation officer, or as a probation officer, under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 298) –

These are persons closely related with the enforcement of the criminal law. It is the Sub-committee’s view that these persons should be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias.

(xiii) a social worker employed full-time in any reformatory school established under the Reformatory Schools Ordinance (Cap 225), any place of detention appointed under the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance (Cap 226), or any approved institution within the meaning of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 298) –

These are persons closely related with the enforcement of the criminal law. It is the Sub-committee’s view that these persons should be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias.

(c) consuls, vice-consuls, and officers of equivalent status, of governments of foreign states and such salaried functionaries of such governments as are nationals of such governments and are
not carrying on business in Hong Kong, and the spouses and
dependent children of such persons –

These are persons who are conferred in Hong Kong the consular
privileges and immunities accorded by customary international
law and international agreements. We do not consider there is
a case for imposing jury service on such persons and we
consider they should be exempt from jury service.

(d) barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice, and their
clerks –

Considerations similar to those in category (b)(i) above apply.
Jury service by a member of this category of persons may lead to
a perception of bias. We consider that this category should be
excluded from jury service. We do not think that the same
considerations apply in respect of lawyers' clerks, however, and
accordingly recommend that they should not be exempt or
excluded from jury service.

The Sub-committee, however, cannot come to a conclusion as to
whether exemption should be granted (and, if so, the duration of
the exemption) to "barristers and solicitors not in actual practice
or who may be engaged in other fields, such as law lecturers and
professors". We would particularly welcome views on this
issue.

(e) persons duly registered as or deemed to be medical practitioners
under the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap 161), persons
duly registered as dentists under the Dentists Registration
Ordinance (Cap 156) and persons duly registered under the
Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance (Cap 529) –

Clearly, persons in this category provide important services to
the public and their involvement in jury service would
inconvenience the community. At the same time, however, the
numbers of such persons are significant and a blanket exemption
would impinge on the degree to which the jury pool reflects the
community at large. In addition, in contrast to the Government
Flying Service, where the absence on jury service of a single
member might impact on the Service's ability to provide
emergency services, it could be expected that doctors, dentists
and veterinary surgeons, who come from a larger pool, might be
better placed to arrange their affairs to take account of jury
service without adversely affecting the level of patient care.
Where that is not the case, application can be made to be
excused in the particular circumstances. Taking these
considerations into account, we are of the view that persons in
this category should not be automatically exempt or excluded
from jury service. Should they have particular difficulty on any particular occasion, they may apply for excusal or deferral.

(f) editors of daily newspapers in Hong Kong and such members of their staffs in respect of whom the Registrar is satisfied that jury service would disrupt the publication of such newspapers –

We do not consider that persons in this category should be automatically exempt. Where the circumstances justify excusal in a particular case, an application can be made for excusal from jury service.

(g) chemists and druggists actually carrying on business as such –

We do not consider that persons in this category should be automatically exempt. Where the circumstances justify excusal in a particular case, an application can be made for excusal from jury service. In the case of Government chemists, however, we think that they should be excluded from jury service, because they are normally related with the enforcement of the criminal law and would generally be perceived as part of the prosecution process.

(h) clergymen, priests, and ministers of any Christian congregation or Jewish congregation, functioning in Hong Kong

(ha) imams of and persons holding similar positions in any Muslim congregation functioning in Hong Kong

(hb) priests of and persons holding similar positions in any Hindu congregation functioning in Hong Kong –

Our provisional view is that persons in categories (h), (ha) and (hb) should not be automatically exempt, but should be able to apply for exclusion if they find jury service incompatible with their tenets or beliefs.

(i) full time students of any school, college, university, polytechnic, technical institute, industrial training centre or other educational (including vocational education) institution –

Our view is that these persons should not be automatically exempt but should be able to apply for excusal or deferral if attending jury service on a particular occasion would cause extreme hardship or inconvenience to them.

(j) officers employed on full pay in the naval, military or air services of the Hong Kong Garrison –

Persons in this category should remain exempt from jury service
as their relationship with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is governed by the national laws which have been promulgated in the Promulgation of National Laws (no 2) 1997.

(k) pilots licensed under the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap 84), and the master and members of the crew of any ship

(l) pilots, navigators, wireless operators and other full-time members of the crews of passenger or mail or commercial aircraft -

We do not see the justification for exempting persons in categories (k) and (l). They should, however, be able to apply for excusal from jury service in a particular case if that service would cause them significant hardship or inconvenience.

(m) members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force and persons summoned to act or enrolled or appointed as special constables under any enactment:

Provided that any person claiming exemption under this paragraph may be required by the Registrar to produce a certificate from the Commissioner of Police in proof of such exemption –

These are persons closely related with the enforcement of the criminal law and generally perceived as part of the prosecution process. It is the Sub-committee’s view that these persons should be excluded from jury service to avoid a perception of bias.

(n) persons who are vowed and full-time members of any religious orders living in monasteries, convents or other such religious communities –

Our provisional view is that persons in this category should not be automatically exempt, but should be able to apply for exclusion if they find jury service incompatible with their tenets or beliefs.

(o) the spouse of -

(i) the Chief Justice;
(ia) a judge of the Court of Final Appeal;
(ib) the Chief Judge;
(ii) a Justice of Appeal;
(iii) a judge of the Court of First Instance; and
(iv) a coroner
We do not see the justification for exempting persons under this category, and it is the Sub-committee's view that the exemption currently applied to them should be removed.

(p) spouses of members of the Hong Kong Garrison serving on full pay –

The spouses of the Hong Kong Garrison should remain exempt from jury service as the Hong Kong Garrison's relationship with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is governed by the national laws which have been promulgated in the Promulgation of National Laws (no 2) 1997.

(q) the Legal Adviser of the Legislative Council Secretariat and any of his assistants who is in the full time employment of the Legislative Council Commission and is a barrister or a solicitor as defined in the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap 159) –

Considerations similar to those in category (b)(i) above apply. Jury service by a member of this category of persons may lead to a perception of bias. We consider that this category should be excluded from jury service.

Recommendation 9

The list of persons currently exempt from jury service under section 5(1) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) should be amended as follows:

(A) The following categories of persons should be exempt from service as jurors:

(a) members of the Executive or Legislative Council

(b) any public officer who is –

   (i) a member of the Fire Services Department, including a person holding any post specified in the Seventh Schedule to the Fire Services Ordinance (Cap 95)

   (ii) a member of the Government Flying Service
(c) consuls, vice-consuls, and officers of equivalent status, of governments of foreign states and such salaried functionaries of such governments as are nationals of such governments and are not carrying on business in Hong Kong, and the spouses and dependent children of such persons

(d) officers employed on full pay in the naval, military or air services of the Hong Kong Garrison, together with the spouses of such officers

(e) the Legal Adviser of the Legislative Council Secretariat and any of his assistants who is in the full time employment of the Legislative Council Commission and is a barrister or a solicitor as defined in the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap 159)

(B) The following categories of persons should be excluded from service as jurors:

(a) any public officer who is –

   (i) a judge, deputy judge, District Judge, deputy District Judge, Registrar, Senior Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Assistant Registrar, coroner or magistrate – should be excluded for life

   (ii) a presiding officer, adjudicator or member of any tribunal established by law

   (iii) a member of staff within the Judiciary

   (iv) a legal officer within the meaning of section 2 of the Legal Officers Ordinance (Cap 87)

   (v) serving in the Department of Justice, the Legal Aid Department, the Official Receiver's Office or the Intellectual Property Department

   (vi) a member of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Service, the Customs and Excise Service
(vii) an officer of the Correctional Services Department

(viii) the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or an officer of the Independent Commission Against Corruption

(ix) carrying out duties in the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Department, the Customs and Excise Department, the Fire Services Department, the Correctional Services Department, the Government Flying Service or the Independent Commission Against Corruption

(x) appointed as the principal probation officer, or as a probation officer, under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 298)

(xi) a social worker employed full-time in any reformatory school established under the Reformatory Schools Ordinance (Cap 225), any place of detention appointed under the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance (Cap 226), or any approved institution within the meaning of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 298)

(b) barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice.

(c) members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force and persons summoned to act or enrolled or appointed as special constables under any enactment:

Provided that any person claiming exemption under this paragraph may be required by the Registrar to produce a certificate from the Commissioner of Police in proof of such exemption.

(d) Government chemists.

(C) The Registrar or the trial judge, as the case may be,
may defer jury service required of the persons in the following categories who have been summoned, or exclude or excuse them from jury service upon their application, if satisfied with the merits of their applications:

(a) any public officer who is serving in a training or apprentice rank

(b) persons duly registered as or deemed to be medical practitioners under the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap 161), persons duly registered as dentists under the Dentists Registration Ordinance (Cap 156) and persons duly registered under the Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance (Cap 529)

(c) editors of daily newspapers in Hong Kong and such members of their staffs in respect of whom the Registrar is satisfied that jury service would disrupt the publication of such newspapers

(d) chemists and druggists actually carrying on business as such

(e) clergymen, priests, and ministers of any Christian congregation or Jewish congregation, functioning in Hong Kong

(f) imams of and persons holding similar positions in any Muslim congregation functioning in Hong Kong

(g) priests of and persons holding similar positions in any Hindu congregation functioning in Hong Kong

(h) full time students of any school, college, university, polytechnic, technical institute, industrial training centre or other educational (including vocational education) institution

(i) pilots licensed under the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap 84), and the master and members of the crew of any ship

(j) pilots, navigators, wireless operators and other full-time members of the crews of passenger or mail or commercial aircraft
(k) persons who are vowed and full-time members of any religious orders living in monasteries, convents or other such religious communities

(l) justices of the peace

(D) Exemption from jury service currently granted to the following categories of persons should be discontinued:

(a) the clerks of barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice

(b) the spouse of -
    (i) the Chief Justice;
    (ii) a judge of the Court of Final Appeal;
    (iii) the Chief Judge;
    (iv) a Justice of Appeal;
    (v) a judge of the Court of First Instance; and
    (vi) a coroner
Chapter 6
Summary of recommendations

(The recommendations in this paper are to be found in Chapter 5, at the paragraphs marked)

Recommendation 1 (following paragraph 5.12)

We recommend that the existing requirement for jury service that an individual has attained 21 years of age should be retained, but the upper age limit for jury service should be raised from 65 to 70. We also recommend that an individual who has attained 65 years of age should be entitled as of right to exemption from jury service upon his application.

Recommendation 2 (following paragraph 5.19)

We recommend that, to be eligible to serve as a juror, a person must have been resident in Hong Kong for a period of three years or more immediately before he is issued with a Notice of Jury Service, and if he has been issued with a Hong Kong identity card three years or more prior to his being issued with the Notice, he should be presumed unless the contrary is proved to be a resident of Hong Kong for the purposes of section 4 of the Jury Ordinance.

Recommendation 3 (following paragraph 5.31)

We recommend that section 4(1)(b) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) should be replaced by a provision to the effect that a person is liable to serve as a juror if he has no criminal conviction (and a spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 297) should not be regarded as a criminal conviction for these purposes), is not awaiting trial for an indictable offence, and is not remanded in custody pending trial for any offence.

Recommendation 4 (following paragraph 5.41)

We recommend that the existing administrative practice of requiring a potential juror to have attained an education standard of Form 7 (being the minimum entrance requirement for entry to a university in Hong Kong), or an equivalent standard, should be stipulated in legislation.
However, this should be amended in 2012 to require a person to have completed Secondary Six and achieved Level 3 in both English and Chinese in the HKDSE or the equivalent.

**Recommendation 5 (following paragraph 5.52)**

We do not recommend any change to the existing provisions of section 4(1)(a) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) concerning disabilities in relation to jury service. We recommend that the Registrar of the High Court should consider making such changes to the physical configuration of the High Court Building and coroners' courts as would facilitate jury service by those confined to wheelchairs.

**Recommendation 6 (following paragraph 5.53)**

We recommend that the form of Notice of Jury Service should be amended to include a list of exemptions and a list of disqualifications for individuals to tick if applicable, and this should be returned to the Registrar of the High Court for verification.

**Recommendation 7 (following paragraph 5.57)**

We recommend that different terms should be adopted for different types of exemption, as follows:

(i) "ineligible for jury service" when a person is not qualified to be a juror because of age, unsoundness of mind, or illiteracy, etc;

(ii) "excluded from jury service" when a person is excluded on a point of principle;

(iii) "exempt" for those categories of persons whose services are much needed and in respect of whom there would be substantial inconvenience to the public if they were required to serve on a jury; and

(iv) "excused" when an eligible juror is excused from serving on a particular occasion upon application being made to the Registrar or the trial judge, but his service would be required for future cases.

**Recommendation 8 (following paragraph 5.58)**

We recommend that the guiding principles for the consideration of exemption applications should be spelt out in the Jury Ordinance to assist the Registrar or the trial judge in determining whether or not to
grant an exemption, exclusion or deferral. The justifications for exemption, exclusion or deferral should include:

(i) where substantial inconvenience to the public may result;

(ii) where undue hardship or extreme inconvenience may be caused to the person;

(iii) where the person is involved in the administration of justice so that bias may result or may be perceived to result; and

(iv) where jury service is incompatible with the person's tenets or beliefs.

Recommendation 9 (following paragraph 5.59)

The list of persons currently exempt from jury service under section 5(1) of the Jury Ordinance (Cap 3) should be amended as follows:

(A) The following categories of persons should be exempt from service as jurors:

(a) members of the Executive or Legislative Council

(b) any public officer who is –

   (i) a member of the Fire Services Department, including a person holding any post specified in the Seventh Schedule to the Fire Services Ordinance (Cap 95)

   (ii) a member of the Government Flying Service

(c) consuls, vice-consuls, and officers of equivalent status, of governments of foreign states and such salaried functionaries of such governments as are nationals of such governments and are not carrying on business in Hong Kong, and the spouses and dependent children of such persons

(d) officers employed on full pay in the naval, military or air services of the Hong Kong Garrison, together with the spouses of such officers

(e) the Legal Adviser of the Legislative Council Secretariat and any of his assistants who is in the full time employment of the Legislative Council Commission and is a barrister or a solicitor as defined in the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap 159)
(B) The following categories of persons should be excluded from service as jurors:

(a) any public officer who is –

(i) a judge, deputy judge, District Judge, deputy District Judge, Registrar, Senior Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Assistant Registrar, coroner or magistrate – should be excluded for life

(ii) a presiding officer, adjudicator or member of any tribunal established by law

(iii) a member of staff within the Judiciary

(iv) a legal officer within the meaning of section 2 of the Legal Officers Ordinance (Cap 87)

(v) serving in the Department of Justice, the Legal Aid Department, the Official Receiver's Office or the Intellectual Property Department

(vi) a member of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Service, the Customs and Excise Service

(vii) an officer of the Correctional Services Department

(viii) the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or an officer of the Independent Commission Against Corruption

(ix) carrying out duties in the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Department, the Customs and Excise Department, the Fire Services Department, the Correctional Services Department, the Government Flying Service or the Independent Commission Against Corruption

(x) appointed as the principal probation officer, or as a probation officer, under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 298)

(xi) a social worker employed full-time in any reformatory school established under the Reformatory Schools Ordinance (Cap 225), any place of detention appointed under the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance (Cap 226), or any approved institution within the meaning of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap 298)
(b) barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice.

(c) members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force and persons summoned to act or enrolled or appointed as special constables under any enactment:

Provided that any person claiming exemption under this paragraph may be required by the Registrar to produce a certificate from the Commissioner of Police in proof of such exemption.

(d) Government chemists.

(C) The Registrar or the trial judge, as the case may be, may defer jury service required of the persons in the following categories who have been summoned, or exclude or excuse them from jury service upon their application, if satisfied with the merits of their applications:

(a) any public officer who is serving in a training or apprentice rank

(b) persons duly registered as or deemed to be medical practitioners under the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap 161), persons duly registered as dentists under the Dentists Registration Ordinance (Cap 156) and persons duly registered under the Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance (Cap 529)

(c) editors of daily newspapers in Hong Kong and such members of their staffs in respect of whom the Registrar is satisfied that jury service would disrupt the publication of such newspapers

(d) chemists and druggists actually carrying on business as such

(e) clergymen, priests, and ministers of any Christian congregation or Jewish congregation, functioning in Hong Kong

(f) imams of and persons holding similar positions in any Muslim congregation functioning in Hong Kong

(g) priests of and persons holding similar positions in any Hindu congregation functioning in Hong Kong

(h) full time students of any school, college, university, polytechnic, technical institute, industrial training centre or
other educational (including vocational education) institution

(i) pilots licensed under the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap 84), and the master and members of the crew of any ship

(j) pilots, navigators, wireless operators and other full-time members of the crews of passenger or mail or commercial aircraft

(k) persons who are vowed and full-time members of any religious orders living in monasteries, convents or other such religious communities

(l) justices of the peace

(D) Exemption from jury service currently granted to the following categories of persons should be discontinued:

(a) the clerks of barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice

(b) the spouse of –

(i) the Chief Justice;

(ii) a judge of the Court of Final Appeal;

(iii) the Chief Judge;

(iv) a Justice of Appeal;

(v) a judge of the Court of First Instance; and

(vi) a coroner
Annex 1

List of persons exempted from jury service

Section 5 of Jury Ordinance (Cap. 3)

5. Exemptions from service

(1) The following persons shall be exempt from service as jurors -
   (a) members of the Executive or Legislative Council;
   (aa) (Repealed 78 of 1999 s. 7)
   (ab) justices of the peace;
   (b) any public officer who is -
       (i) a judge, deputy judge, District Judge, deputy District
           Judge, Registrar, Senior Deputy Registrar, Deputy
           Registrar, Assistant Registrar, coroner or magistrate;
       (ii) a presiding officer, adjudicator or member of any tribunal
           established by law;
       (iii) an officer or member of the staff of any court or tribunal
           established by law, if his work is mainly concerned with
           the day to day administration of the court or tribunal;
       (iv) a legal officer within the meaning of section 2 of the Legal
           Officers Ordinance (Cap. 87);
       (v) serving in the Department of Justice, the Legal Aid
           Department, the Official Receiver's Office or the
           Intellectual Property Department;
       (vi) a member of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration
           Service, the Customs and Excise Service or the Fire
           Services Department, including a person holding any post
           specified in the Seventh Schedule to the Fire Services
           Ordinance (Cap. 95);
       (vii) an officer of the Correctional Services Department;
       (viii) a member of the Government Flying Service;
       (ix) the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or an officer of
           the Independent Commission Against Corruption;
       (x) carrying out duties in the Hong Kong Police Force, the
           Immigration Department, the Customs and Excise Department, the
           Fire Services Department, the Correctional Services Department, the
           Government Flying Service or the Independent Commission Against
           Corruption;
       (xi) serving in a training or apprentice rank;
       (xii) appointed as the principal probation officer, or as a
           probation officer, under the Probation of Offenders
           Ordinance (Cap. 298); or
       (xiii) a social worker employed full-time in any reformatory
           school established under the Reformatory Schools
Ordinance (Cap. 225), any place of detention appointed under the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 226), or any approved institution within the meaning of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 298);

c) consuls, vice-consuls, and officers of equivalent status, of governments of foreign states and such salaried functionaries of such governments as are nationals of such governments and are not carrying on business in Hong Kong, and the spouses and dependent children of such persons;

d) barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice, and their clerks;

e) persons duly registered as or deemed to be medical practitioners under the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap. 161), persons duly registered as dentists under the Dentists Registration Ordinance (Cap. 156) and persons duly registered under the Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance (Cap. 529);

f) editors of daily newspapers in Hong Kong and such members of their staffs in respect of whom the Registrar is satisfied that jury service would disrupt the publication of such newspapers;

g) chemists and druggists actually carrying on business as such;

h) clergymen, priests, and ministers of any Christian congregation or Jewish congregation, functioning in Hong Kong;

ha) imams of and persons holding similar positions in any Muslim congregation functioning in Hong Kong;

hb) priests of and persons holding similar positions in any Hindu congregation functioning in Hong Kong;

i) full time students of any school, college, university, polytechnic, technical institute, industrial training centre or other educational (including vocational education) institution;

j) officers employed on full pay in the naval, military or air services of Her Majesty;

k) pilots licensed under the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap. 84), and the master and members of the crew of any ship;

l) pilots, navigators, wireless operators and other full-time members of the crews of passenger or mail or commercial aircraft;

m) members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force and persons summoned to act or enrolled or appointed as special constables under any enactment:

Provided that any person claiming exemption under this paragraph may be required by the Registrar to produce a certificate from the Commissioner of Police in proof of such exemption;

n) persons who are vowed and full-time members of any religious orders living in monasteries, convents or other such religious communities;

o) the spouse of -
(i) the Chief Justice;
(ii) a Justice of Appeal;
(iii) a judge of the Court of First Instance; and
(iv) a coroner;
(p) spouses of members of the Armed Forces of Her Majesty serving on full pay;
(q) (Repealed 25 of 1998 s. 2)
(r) the Legal Adviser of the Legislative Council Secretariat and any of his assistants who is in the full time employment of the Legislative Council Commission and is a barrister or a solicitor as defined in the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159).

(2) In this section -
(a) reference to Registrar includes reference to the Registrar of the District Court;
(aa) "Senior Deputy Registrar" (高級副司法常務官) means Senior Deputy Registrar of the High Court;
(b) "Deputy Registrar" (副司法常務官) means Deputy Registrar of the High Court or of the District Court;
(c) "Assistant Registrar" (助理司法常務官) means Assistant Registrar of the High Court or of the District Court.
JURY ORDINANCE, CHAPTER 3

NOTICE

JURY SERVICE

Mr ID No.:

1. Whereas it appears that you are a person -
   (a) qualified to serve as a juror under section 4; and
   (b) not exempt from service as a juror under section 5,

you are hereby notified that your name will be added to the list of jurors unless, within 14 days after the receipt of this notice, you notify me in writing that you claim exemption from jury service on either of the following grounds -

   (a) that you do not qualify to serve as juror under section 4 of the Jury Ordinance;

   (b) that you are exempt from service as a juror under section 5 of the Jury Ordinance.

2. A copy of sections 4 and 5 of the Jury Ordinance is attached hereto for your information.

Dated this day of .

Registrar, High Court

High Court
38 Queensway
Hong Kong

For further information
Please call 2825 4666
4. Qualifications and disabilities

(1) A person who has reached 21 years of age, but not 65 years of age, and is a resident of Hong Kong is, except as provided by this Ordinance, liable to serve as a juror in the proceedings in the court or in an inquest under the Coroners Ordinance (Cap. 504) if (but only if) -
(a) the person is of sound mind and not afflicted by blindness, deafness or other disability preventing the person from serving as a juror; and
(b) the person is of good character; and
(c) the person has a sufficient knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted to be able to understand the proceedings.

(2) In a trial before a jury, the court or a coroner may, on the court or the coroner's own motion or on the application of the Registrar or of any interested party, discharge any person summoned to serve as a juror who is unable to satisfy the court or the coroner that the person's knowledge of the language in which the proceedings are to be conducted is sufficient to enable the person to understand the proceedings.

5. Exemptions from service

The following persons shall be exempt from service as jurors -
(a) members of the Executive or Legislative Council;

(aa) (repealed 78 of 1999 s. 7)

(ab) justices of the peace;

(b) any public officer who is -
(i) a judge, deputy judge, District Judge, deputy District Judge, Registrar, Senior Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Assistant Registrar, coroner or magistrate;
(ii) a presiding officer, adjudicator or member of any tribunal established by law;
(iii) an officer or member of the staff of any court or tribunal established by law, if his work is mainly concerned with the day to day administration of the court or tribunal;
(iv) a legal officer within the meaning of section 2 of the Legal Officers Ordinance (Cap. 87);
(v) serving in the Department of Justice, the Legal Aid Department, the Official Receiver's Office or the Intellectual Property Department;
(vi) a member of the Hong Kong Police Force, the Immigration Service, the Customs and Excise Service or the Fire Services Department, including a person holding any post specified in the Seventh Schedule to the Fire Services Ordinance (Cap. 95);
(vii) an officer of the Correctional Services Department;
(viii) an officer of the Government Flying Service;
(ix) the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or an officer of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption;
(x) carrying out duties in the Hong Kong Police Force, the
Immigration Department, the Customs and Excise Department,
the Fire Services Department, the Correctional Services
Department, the Government Flying Service or the Independent
Commission Against Corruption;
(xi) serving in a training or apprentice rank;
(xii) appointed as the principal probation officer, or as a probation
officer, under the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 298);
or
(xiii) a social worker employed full-time in any reformatory school
established under the Reformatory Schools Ordinance (Cap. 225), any place of detention appointed under the Juvenile
Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 226), or any approved institution
within the meaning of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance (Cap.
298);
(c) consuls, vice-consuls, and officers of equivalent status, of
governments of foreign states and such salaried functionaries of such
governments as are nationals of such governments and are not
carrying on business in Hong Kong, and the spouses and dependent
children of such persons;
(d) barristers-at-law and solicitors in actual practice, and their clerks;
(e) persons duly registered as or deemed to be medical practitioners
under the Medical Registration Ordinance (Cap. 161), persons duly
registered as dentists under the Dentists Registration Ordinance (Cap.
156) and persons duly registered under the Veterinary Surgeons
Registration Ordinance (Cap. 529);
(f) editors of daily newspapers in Hong Kong and such members of their
staffs in respect of whom the Registrar is satisfied that jury service
would disrupt the publication of such newspapers;
(g) chemists and druggists actually carrying on business as such;
(h) clergymen, priests, and ministers of any Christian congregation or
Jewish congregation, functioning in Hong Kong;
(ha) imams of and persons holding similar positions in any Muslim
congregation functioning in Hong Kong;
(hb) priests of and persons holding similar positions in any Hindu
congregation functioning in Hong Kong;
(i) full time students of any school, college, university, polytechnic,
technical institute, industrial training centre or other educational
(including vocational education) institution;
* (j) officers employed on full pay in the naval, military or air services of
Her Majesty;
(k) pilots licensed under the Pilotage Ordinance (Cap. 84), and the
master and members of the crew of any ship;
(l) pilots, navigators, wireless operators and other full-time members of
the crews of passenger or mail or commercial aircraft;
(m) members of the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force and persons
summoned to act or enrolled or appointed as special constables under any enactment:
Provided that any person claiming exemption under this paragraph may be required by the Registrar to produce a certificate from the Commissioner of Police in proof of such exemption;

(n) persons who are vowed and full-time members of any religious orders living in monasteries, convents or other such religious communities;

(o) the spouse of -
   (i) the Chief Justice;
   (ia) a judge of the Court of Final Appeal;
   (ib) the Chief Judge;
   (ii) a Justice of Appeal;
   (iii) a judge of the Court of First Instance; and
   (iv) a coroner;

* (p) spouses of members of the Armed Forces of Her Majesty serving on full pay;

(q) (repealed 25 of 1998 s. 2); and

(r) the Legal Adviser of the Legislative Council Secretariat and any of his assistants who is in the full time employment of the Legislative Council Commission and is a barrister or a solicitor as defined in the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159).

[Note: Pending the adaptation of the Jury Ordinance, section 5 of the Ordinance should be interpreted in accordance with Section 2A and Schedule 8 of Cap 1.]
Application for Exemption
Application for Leave to be Excused

You are now served with a Notice of Jury Service; it does not mean that you are immediately required to attend court and serve as a juror.

2. The Notice of Jury Service tells you that your name is included in the Jury List. Unless otherwise exempted, you are eligible and have to serve as a juror when you are called and selected. If you wish to apply for exemption for reasons stated in Sections 4 and 5 of the Jury Ordinance, Chapter 3 (a copy of those two Sections are enclosed for your reference), you should apply now.

3. Please also note that both Chinese and English are official languages in Hong Kong. Trials may be conducted in one of the two official languages. If a person does not have sufficient knowledge of only one of the two languages, he may not be exempted. Only persons who do not have sufficient knowledge in both can apply for exemption on the ground of language.

4. For each hearing day the computer randomly picks a number of names from the Jury List. According to those names the Registrar shall issue a Jury Summons to those persons and ask them to attend court for selection.

5. Now you are not yet called to attend court. If you are called, the Registrar will normally give you at least 3 weeks’ notice in advance.

6. On receipt of the Summons, if because of some reasons (e.g. health, personal commitment and business engagement etc.) you are unable to attend court on the specified day, you may then apply to court for excuse to attend on that occasion. Unless you apply for exemption relating to Section 4 or 5 and for removal of your names from the Jury List, it is too early for you now to apply for excuse to attend. You should only make such application when you are served with the Summons and have been given the date of attendance.

7. In support of your application it is always advisable to produce documents, if any, for the Registrar to consider e.g. copy of itinerary and air ticket for overseas trip and medical certificate for health reason etc.

8. All applications should be made by way of letter addressed to the Registrar, High Court, Jury Office, 38 Queensway, Hong Kong and marked "Jury Service". If you have any query please call 2825 4666.
Summons to Juror

To:

You are hereby summoned to appear as a juror at the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE to be holden at the High Court at No. 38, Queensway, Hong Kong (Assembling Place: Jurors' Assembly Room, first floor, High Court Building) on _______________ the ___________ at the hour of 9.40 hours in the forenoon, and there to attend from day to day until you shall be discharged from the Court.

Registrar,
High Court
MATTERS TO NOTE

Attendance

1. If there is no court case requiring jury empanelling on the day a juror is due to appear, his attendance will be dispensed with. At any time after 6:00 p.m. on the day immediately before the date for attendance, one may use the following facilities to confirm if court attendance is required:

(a) Dial up the Judiciary Hotline at 2523 2212 and press '7' after selecting the language or

(b) Access to the Judiciary Homepage at http://www.judiciary.gov.hk (Jury - Jurors Attendance Notice)

2. If you are not selected to serve as a juror on the first day of your attendance at court, you will be released from jury service on that day but you may be asked by the court to return on a further day.

3. If a gale warning signal No. 8 (or above) / a black rainstorm warning signal is not lowered before 6.00 o'clock in the morning, please pay attention to the broadcasting announcement of the Judiciary whether you are required to attend Court on that day.

4. Being served with a summons, if a juror fails without reasonable cause to attend Court, does not appear when called in Court or withdraws from Court without the permission of the Trial Judge, that juror commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 2 (between $2,001 and $5,000) (Sect. 32, Jury Ordinance).

5. Any employer who terminates or threatens to terminate the employment of an employee, or discriminates against an employee by reason of jury service, commits an offence and is liable to a fine of $25,000 and to imprisonment for 3 months (Sect. 33, Jury Ordinance).

Information

6. Please read the enclosed "Notes on Attendance" which gives a brief description of the juror's duty, function and procedure in court etc.

Language

7. A trial can be conducted in either of the official languages, Chinese or English. Exemption from jury service and removal of one's name from the Jurors' List may only be granted for insufficient knowledge of both languages. If this is claimed, one should make application as soon as possible.
8. A juror does not know in advance in which case he will serve as a juror and in which official language the trial will be conducted until the proceeding commences and the selection of jurors process begins. If a juror does not have sufficient knowledge of an official language, on learning that the proceedings are to be conducted in that language, he should immediately ask to be excused from hearing that case. Such excuse will relate only to that case and the juror will not be released for empanelling in other cases. However, a similar application may be made, if appropriate, in a subsequent case.

9. Please note that when such application is made the Court may require the applicant to produce evidence of proof e.g. examination certificate and testimonial etc. and to attend an interview by the Registrar to ascertain his claim, if so directed.

**Application for exemption or leave to be excused**

10. Applications for exemption from jury service or leave to be excused from attendance should be made in writing and addressed to the Registrar, High Court, Jury Office, No. 38 Queensway, Hong Kong and marked "Jury Service". Such applications should reach the Registrar not later than 3 working days before the date of attendance specified in the Summons but it is always advisable to make application as soon as possible.

11. If an application is made, the applicant still has to attend court on the date as set out in the Summons unless, prior to the date of attendance, the applicant has received a formal notification from the Registrar that the application is successful.

**Others**

12. There are no car parking facilities for jurors at the High Court Building.

13. For any further information about this Summons, please telephone the Jury Clerk at **2825 4668**.
NOTES ON ATTENDANCE

1. Hours of Sitting
1.1 Jurors are summoned to attend court for selection in cases which are due for trial on the return day of the Summons. They should arrive at the Court at 9:40 a.m. on the date stipulated in the Summons and they will be directed to a courtroom for the formal selection of the Jury. After a jury has been empanelled, those not selected will be told if they are required for another case.
1.2 On trial days, unless the trial judge directs otherwise, court hours are from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and from 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Mondays to Fridays inclusive.

2. Dress Code
Jurors are requested to dress properly and appropriately for the purpose of attending court as jurors.

3. Selection of the Jury
3.1 A jury usually has seven members, selected by ballot from those jurors who have attended. It may have nine members if the judge so decides. With a seven-member jury, the verdict must be by a majority of at least five, and with a nine-member jury, at least seven. If the jury is reduced in number during the trial, perhaps through illness, the judge will advise on the numbers acceptable in returning the verdict.
3.2 A jury in the Coroner’s court has five members and a majority verdict is acceptable.
3.3 If a juror knows anyone involved in the case, whether defendant, counsel or witness, he should tell the judge immediately on selection.

4. Exemption
Any juror selected who seeks exemption or leave to be excused should immediately apply to the judge. Applications will not normally be entertained after a juror has taken the oath or affirmation.

5. Function and Duty of the Jury
5.1 The juror selected has to take an oath or to affirm to decide the case upon the law and the evidence. The trial judge will direct the jury on the law and the jury is bound by these directions. The evidence is the testimony given by witnesses and the exhibits produced. Although the trial judge decides which evidence the jury may hear, it is for the jury to decide the weight (if any) to attach to it in reaching their verdict.
5.2 Members of the jury should not form premature opinions. They should hear all the evidence and allow their conclusions to develop in discussions amongst themselves.
5.3 Deliberations of the jury are confidential. Members of the jury should be careful not to allow discussion of the case with anyone other than their fellow members.

6. Foreman
Members of the jury will be asked by the trial judge to select one amongst
them as the foreman. The foreman is the spokesperson of the jury throughout the trial. The foreman acts as chairperson during the jury's deliberations when they retire to consider their verdict, or during discussions they may have at any stage of the proceedings.

7. **Procedure**

7.1 After the jury has been empanelled, counsel appearing for the prosecution opens his case by describing the evidence he will produce; thereafter he calls his witnesses. When a witness for the prosecution has been examined (this is called examination-in-chief), the witness may then be cross-examined by counsel for the defence and re-examined by counsel for the prosecution. At the conclusion of the prosecution case, the defence opens its case and the defendant may, if he wishes, give evidence and/or call witnesses. They are also liable to cross examination and re-examination thereafter.

7.2 At the conclusion of the defence case, counsel for the prosecution and counsel for the defence each makes his final speech to the jury, after which the trial judge summarises the evidence and gives directions on the law. The jury then retires to consider its verdict.

7.3 There is no objection to the jury taking notes as the case progresses. Writing materials are supplied.

8. **Waiting at Court to Serve on a Jury**

More jurors are summoned than are needed to try pending cases. This is because allowances are made for challenges and for those granted exemption. Every effort is made to release as soon as possible those not required to serve on a jury.

9. **Payment of Jurors**

A juror served in a case is paid an allowance in accordance with Section 31(1) of the Jury Ordinance. He may be paid an additional allowance not exceeding the amount prescribed under the Ordinance if the Chief Justice or the trial judge so orders. If he wishes to have the payment made to his bank account, he should complete a Payment Instruction, provided on request. Otherwise, payment will be made by cheque through the post.
FORM 7
SUMMONS TO JUROR

You are hereby summoned to attend at Court No. ___, 10/F., Eastern Law Courts Building, No. 29, Tai On Street, Sai Wan Ho in Hong Kong on __________, the _____ day of __________________ at ________, and there to appear as a juror at an inquiry to be held by a coroner concerning the death of ____________________, and there to attend until you shall be discharged.

Dated this _______ day of ________________.

Coroner’s Clerk

NOTE: Please report your attendance to the Court Clerk inside the said Court.

The penalty for failing to comply with this summons is a fine at level 2. Personal service of this summons is not necessary to subject the juror summoned to this penalty.
Notice to Jurors

(Jury Ordinance Cap. 3 and Coroners Ordinance, Cap. 504)

1. If, after receiving a summons, a juror fails without reasonable cause to attend an inquiry or at any adjournment of an inquiry, that juror commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 2 (Sect. 22(4), Cap. 504).

2. Any employer who terminates or threatens to terminate the employment of an employee, or discriminates against an employee by reason of jury service, commits an offence and is liable to a fine of $25,000 and to imprisonment for 3 months. (Sect. 33, Cap. 3)

3. Enquiries or applications for exemption or to be excused from jury service should be addressed to the Registrar, High Court, No. 38, Queensway, Hong Kong and marked 'Jurors'. Applications MUST be in writing and not be accepted by telephone (Sect. 28, Cap. 3) and should reach the Registrar not later than 3 working days before the date for attendance. In any event applications should be submitted as early as possible. Late applications made on the date for attendance on the Summons will not be entertained by the Registrar. Please note that the Registrar may give leave to be excused on a particular occasion, when the applicant will be recalled later. He may also grant permanent exemption for lack of Chinese and English or on medical grounds. He may not however grant permanent exemption for other reasons, such as business commitments. Such applications should be made to a judge in terms of Section 28 of the Jury Ordinance.

4. If exemption is claimed for insufficient knowledge of the Chinese and the English languages, a personal appointment should be sought by letter to the Registrar, High Court at the above address. It should be sent as soon as possible after receiving the jury summons. (Sect. 4, Cap. 3). Copies of educational certificates together with a letter from your employer to attest to your level of the Chinese and the English languages would have to be sent in support of your application.

5. If you apply for exemption to be excused from jury service, you must still attend the inquiry according to this summons unless, prior to the date for attendance, you have received formal notification from the Registrar that your application is successful.

6. Jurors are requested to dress properly when attending Court.

7. Upon arrival at the Coroner’s Court, you will see prominent notices located at the main entrance that indicate which of the 3 courts you
should attend.

8. Unless otherwise directed by the Coroner, court hours are normally from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and from 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Monday to Friday inclusive. Jurors are usually summonsed to serve on one or more inquests on the same day. You should arrive at the Court at about 9:15 a.m. on the date for which you have been summonsed.

9. Of those persons summonsed to act as jurors, five will be chosen by ballot. After the jury has been empanelled, those not selected will be released only upon the order of the Coroner. If a juror who is selected to sit upon the jury, is acquainted with any of the parties concerned in the inquest (whether they be Coroner’s Officer, Counsel, relatives of the deceased, or witnesses involved) he should bring this fact to the attention of the Court as soon as possible.

10. Any juror, if selected to sit on a jury, who considers he has any reason for exemption, should immediately apply to the Coroner for exemption (notwithstanding that a prior application has been made to the Registrar, High Court and declined).

11. Enquiries concerning the inquest only may be made to the Clerk to Coroners at ☎ 2886 6820. Enquiries concerning exemptions must be addressed to the Jury Clerk, High Court at ☎ 2825 4668.

12. In the event of sickness preventing attendance, notification must be made as soon as possible to the Clerk to Coroners, and failure to do so can result in a further summons to attend to explain your absence, and possibly render you liable to a penalty – Section 11(4), Cap. 504. Normally a medical certificate is required, depending upon the circumstances.

13. Jurors selected to sit on a jury are responsible for their own meals at the luncheon adjournment, unless they are then in the course of their deliberations, in which case reasonable meals are supplied to them in the Jury Room.

14. A serving juror is paid an allowance in accordance with Section 31(1) of the Jury Ordinance. If a juror wishes to have the payment made to his bank account, he should complete a Payment Instruction, provided on request. Otherwise, payment will be made by cheque through the post.

15. If a gale warning signal No. 8 (or above) / a black rainstorm warning signal is not lowered before 6.00 o’clock in the morning, please pay attention to the broadcasting announcement of the Judiciary whether you are required to attend Court on that day.